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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the impact of company announcements on the daily stock 
returns of lowly capitalised companies. A total of 105 companies comprise the 
sample and 1464 events are examined over the period 21110/97 to 03/0412000. 
The methodology employed is primarily, empirical in nature. Event studies are 
conducted to gauge the impact of company announcements on stock returns using 
the single index market model (SIMM) as the chosen equilibrium market model 
for modelling abnormal returns. 
The study professes three mam contributions to knowledge. The empirical 
evidence suggests that financial announcement have a more timely impact on 
stock returns than non-financial announcements. Secondly, there appears to be 
significant over-reaction and mean-reversion exhibited by lowly capitalised firms. 
Thirdly, the speed of adjustment of stock prices to new information is increased in 
cases where shareholder concentration is high while over-reactions appear 
inversely proportionate to shareholder concentration. This may be a consequence 
of smaller firms experiencing leakage of boardroom level information prior to 
public announcement days. 
2 
Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
DEDICATIONS 
I dedicate this work to Vishwa Mitra Tulsi, whose contribution to knowledge is 
written on the unsuspecting soul of all in the form ofthe Gayatri Mantra 
Aum Bhoor Bhuway Swaha, 
Aum Tat Savitur Varenyam 
Bhargo Devasaya Dheemahi 
Dhiyo Yo Naha Prachodayat 
Translation: 
Oh Ishwar, The Source Of All True Knowledge, May We Guide Our Intellect In 

The Right Direction 

3 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................... 2 

DEDICATIONS .................................................................................................... 3 

TABLE OF CONTENT ........................................................................................ 4 

LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................ 12 

LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................. 14 

PREFACE............................................................................................................ 16 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................ 17 

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION........................................................................... 18 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................ 19 

CHAPTER 1, INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 20 

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 20 

PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH .................................................................... 20 

NATURE OF THE RESEARCH ...................................................................... 27 

4 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH ......................................................................... 31 

SEMI-STRONG FORM EFFICIENCy ....................................................... 31 

SHORT-TERM OVERREACTION ............................................................. 32 

FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS .................. 35 

INSIDER DEALING DETECTION ............................................................. 36 

PREVIOUS INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY RESEARCH ....................... 40 

METHODOLOGy............................................................................................ 44 

CHAPTER 2, THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EMH ....................... 49 

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 49 

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY 49 

BACKGROUND TO THE THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT ................ 50 

EARLY USE OF THE TERM EFFICIENCy .............................................. 51 

EARLY WORKS .......................................................................................... 52 

COMPARISONS OF EMPIRICAL FINANCE AND ECONOMICS 

APPROACH TO THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS .............................. 59 

EMH - IIv1PLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS ................................................. 63 

MARKET AMNESIA ................................................................................... 63 

READ THE ENTRAILS ............................................................................... 65 

THERE ARE NO FINANCIAL ILLUSIONS .............................................. 66 

THE DO-IT-YOURSELF ALTERNATIVE ................................................ 67 

CONTROVERSIES IN EMH THEORy .......................................................... 68 

CHAPTER 3, EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS ............................................ 76 

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 76 

5 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN EFFICIENT MARKET STUDIES ...... 84 

WEAK FORe\{ MARKET EFFICIENCy .................................................... 84 

RANDOM WALK TESTS ................................................................................... 84 

SERIAL CORRELATION TESTS ....................................................................... 84 

RUNS TESTS ....................................................................................................... 85 

SEMI STRONG FORM MARKET EFFICIENCY ...................................... 86 

STRONG FORM MARKET EFFICIENCy ................................................ 87 

ANNOUNCEMENT SIGNALS AND MARKET OVER-REACTIONS ........ 89 

DATA BIASES IN EMH STUDIES ................................................................ 93 

COMPANY SIZES ....................................................................................... 93 

TYPES OF ANNOUNCEMENTS ............................................................... 96 

METHODOLOGIES IN THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE .......................... 96 

EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGy ........................................................... 97 

EQUILIBRIUM MARKET MODELS ....................................................... 101 

SINGLE INDEX MARKET MODEL ................................................................ 101 

STANDARD CAPM (SCAPM) ......................................................................... 103 

CONSUMPTION CAPM .................................................................................... 106 

INFLATION CAPM ........................................................................................... 108 

MULTI-PERIOD CAPM .................................................................................... 108 

ARBITRAGE PRICING THEORY (APT) ........................................................ 110 

USES OF DIFFERENT MODELS IN EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ....... 111 

CHAPTER 4, METHODOLOGY ................................................................... 116 

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................... 116 

WHAT IS SCIENCE....................................................................................... 118 

6 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
ISM'S IN RESEARCH METHODOLOGy ................................................... 119 

INDUCTIVISM .......................................................................................... 119 

THE APPEAL OF NAIVE INDUCTIVISM ...................................................... 123 

CAN THE PRINCIPLE OF INDUCTION BE JUSTIFIED? ............................. 124 

FALSIFICATIONISM ................................................................................ 127 

FALSIFICATIONISM AND PROGRESS ......................................................... 129 

RATIONALISM ......................................................................................... 130 

RELATIVISM............................................................................................. 131 

INDIVIDUALISM ...................................................................................... 132 

OBJECTIVISM ........................................................................................... 134 

ANYTHING GOES .................................................................................... 136 

mSTIFICATION OF METHODOLOGY FOR THE STUDy..................... 138 

PREVIOUS MODELS USED IN EVENT STUDIES ................................ 139 

SINGLE INDEX MARKET MODEL. ............................................................... 139 

CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODELS ............................................................ 140 

ARBITRAGE PRICING THEORY (APT) ........................................................ 143 

SUITABILITY OF THE MARKET MODEL ............................................ 144 

SIMM AS A TRIED AND TESTED METHODOLOGy .................................. 145 

SIMM AS THEORETICALLY mSTIFIABLE .............................................. '" 145 

DEFINITIONS OF MARKET INDICES USED IN SIMM ............................... 149 

FTSE ALL-SHARE ............................................................................ 149 

FTSE 100 ............................................................................................ 149 

FTSE 250 ............................................................................ : ............... 149 

FTSE SMALL CAP ............................................................................ 150 

7 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
FTSE UK. STYLE ............................................................................... 150 

FTSE TMT .......................................................................................... 150 

NATURE OF POPULATION OF DATA .................................................. 150 

CHAPTER 5, DATA ANALYSIS & RESULTS ............................................ 155 

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL 

DURBIN WATSON TEST OF INDEPENDENCE / AUTOCORRELATION IN 

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................... 155 

EXPLANATION OF DATA USED IN THE ANALySIS ............................ 157 

ANNOUNCEMENTS ................................................................................. 157 

REGULATORY NEWS SERVICE (RNS) ANNOUNCEMENTS ........... 159 

THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET (AIM), UK ................. 169 

NEED FOR DATA MODIFICATION ....................................................... 173 

THE PROCESS OF DATA MODIFICATION .......................................... 175 

REPRESENTATIVENESS OF RESULTANT DATASET ........................... 187 

ANALYSIS OF SEMI-STRONG FORM OF MARKET EFFICIENCy...... 198 

MARKET MODEL BASED REGRESSION RESULTS........................... 200 

R SQUARED REGRESSION RESULTS .......................................................... 201 

Y INTERCEPT REGRESSION RESULTS ....................................................... 202 

GRADIENT OF THE REGRESSION RESULTS ............................................. 204 

KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TEST OF RESIDUALS NORMALITy ........... 205 

SKEWNESSIKURTOSIS ................................................................................... 206 

WHITE'S TEST OF HETEROSCEDASTICITY .............................................. 207 

RESIDUALS ....................................................................................................... 208 

ANALYSIS OF OVER-REACTION AND MEAN REVERSION................ 210 

8 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
REACTION OF FINANCIALINON-FINANCIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS .. 212 

IMPACT OF SHAREHOLDER CONCENTRATION .................................. 215 

IMP ACT OF FINANCIAL VERSUS NON-FINANCIAL WHEN 

CONTROLLING FOR SHAREHOLDER CONCENTRATION .................. 217 

CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION AND RESULT IMPLICATIONS ................... 221 

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................... 221 

DISCUSSION OF SEMI-STORY FORM OF EMH RESULTS ................... 222 

SIGNIFICANCE OF ABNORMAL RETURNS ........................................ 222 

ACQUISITION ANNOUNCEMENTS .............................................................. 223 

ANNUAL GENERAL MEETINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS .............................. 224 

ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHAIRMEN'S STATEMENT .................................. 226 

CONTRACT AWARDS ..................................................................................... 229 

DIRECTOR CHANGES ..................................................................................... 230 

DOCUMENT SUBMISSION ............................................................................. 232 

DIRECTOR SHARE DEALING ........................................................................ 232 

ANNOUNCEMENT OF EXTRA-ORDINARY MEETINGS ........................... 234 

HOLDING CHANGES ....................................................................................... 235 

DIFFERENCES IN ABNORMAL RETURNS .............................................. 238 

CORRELATION OF ABNORMAL RETURNS ........................................... 246 

OVER-REACTION AND MEAN REVERSIONS ........................................ 253 

IMPACT OF SHAREHOLDER CONCENTRATION .................................. 260 

CHAPTER 7, CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS ............................... 262 

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................... 262 

9 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
EXISTING INVESTOR BEHAVIOUR ......................................................... 263 

DO INVESTORS RESPOND SLOWLY TO NEW INFORMATION? .... 263 

NEW ISSUES ..................................................................................................... 265 

EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS ............................................................ 265 

THE CRASH OF 1987................................................................................ 266 

MARKET ANOMALIES AND THE FINANCIAL MANAGER ............. 270 

CORPORATE PARADIGMS IN MARKET EFFICIENCy ......................... 271 

WEAK FORM EFFICIENCY HOLDS ...................................................... 272 

THE FAIR GAME MODEL HOLDS ......................................................... 273 

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS HAVE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT .. 273 

INVESTOR INDIFFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUENT OF WEALTH 274 

ACCOUNTING CHANGES ARE NOTED BY INVESTORS ................. 276 

INVESTORS CAN EMULATE CORPORATE DECISIONS ................... 277 

REFLECTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THIS RESEARCH ................... 278 

DATA.......................................................................................................... 283 

FIRM SIZE.................................................................................................. 287 

DISCLOSURE EFFECTS .......................................................................... 289 

METHODOLOGy...................................................................................... 292 

BETA STABILITy ..................................................................................... 295 

ANNOUNCEMENTS CONSIDERED ...................................................... 296 

REFERENCES .................................................................................................. 301 

APPENDICES ................................................................................................... 324 

APPENDIX 1 PILOT STUDY ....................................................................... 325 

10 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
APPENDIX 2 LISTING OF AIM COMPANIES ANALySED .................... 343 

APPENDIX 3 SKEWNESSIKURTOSIS TEST OUTPUT ............................ 348 

APPENDIX 4 MEAN VARIANCE ANALySIS ........................................... 351 

11 

e 
Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 1 Development of Emerging Markets ........................................................95 

Figure 2 Number Of AIM Companies (1995-2003) ..............................................172 

Figure 3 Increase In Market Capitalisation Of AIM ............................................ I72 

Figure 4 Increase In Trading Activity on AIM.....................................................173 

Figure 5 , Altheney, VosN et and Print Potato Observation Period .....................177 

Figure 6 Company And Observation Period For 193 Companies.......................180 

Figure 7 Updated Trend Line Of Observations ...................................................183 

Figure 8 Impact Of Marginal Increases In Dataset ..............................................184 

Figure 9 Impact Of Outliers....................................................................................184 

Figure 10 Histogram Of Summary Statistics When Outliers Omitted ...............185 

Figure 11 Frequency Distribution Of Sectors Analysed .......................................189 

Figure 12 Market Capitalisation Frequency Histogram ......................................191 

Figure 13 Market Capitalisation Of Data Analysed .............................................192 

Figure 14 Number Of Announcements Analysed .................................................195 

Figure 15 Histogram Of Frequency Of Announcements......................................196 

Figure 16 Split Of Financial/Non-Financial Announcement Analysed ...............197 

Figure 17 Frequency Distribution Of Shareholder Concentration .....................198 

Figure 18 AAR Per Announcement For The Event Window ..............................200 

12 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
Figure 19 Comparison Of Difference Of Means ...................................................209 

Figure 20 Summary Of Average Return Critical Values .....................................210 

Figure 21 Comparison Of Financial And Non-Financial AR's ...........................214 

Figure 22 Shareholder Concentration Percentiles Used ......................................216 

Figure 23 Frequency Of Shareholder Concentration ...........................................216 

Figure 24 Mean Variance Controlling For Shareholder Concentration ............217 

Figure 25 Summary Of Mean And Variance Analysis .........................................218 

Figure 26 Correlation Matrix Of Financial And Non-Financial Returns ..........219 

Figure 27 Correlation Matrix Of Returns And Market Capitalisations ............220 

Figure 28 AAR For Each Announcement For Each Event Window Day ...........227 

Figure 29 CAR's For Each Announcement Over The Event Window ...............237 

Figure 30 Average Abnormal Returns Per Announcement.................................254 

13 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Summary Of Classical Studies in Efficient Markets...............................25 

Table 2 Stock Exchanges Previously Researched ................................................ .43 

Table 3 Data Sets Previously Analysed ..................................................................78 

Table 4 Announcements In Previous Event Studies .............................................80 

Table 5 Use Of Single Index Market Model ..........................................................82 

Table 6 Use Of Standard Capital Asset Pricing Model ........................................82 

Table 7 Use Of Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model .................................83 

Table 8 Use Of Zero Beta Capital Asset Pricing Model .......................................83 

Table 9 Use Of Arbitrage Pricing Model ...............................................................83 

Table 10 Previous Announcements In Previous Event Studies ...........................96 

Table 11 Definition Of Financial And N on-Financial Announcements ..............194 

Table 12 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Of Normality ..............................................206 

Table 13 CAR For Each Event Over The Event Window ....................................209 

Table 14 Average Abnormal Return For Each Announcement.. ........................ 211 

Table 15 Post Announcement AAR........................................................................211 

Table 16 Correlation Matrix Of AAR....................................................................212 

Table 17 AAR For Financial And Non-Financial Announcements .....................213 

Table 18 Assessing Difference Between Financial And Non-Financial Returns 214 

14 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
Table 19 Significant Abnormal Returns Over The Event Window .................... 223 

15 

; 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
PREFACE 
The author's motivation for this work stems from a fascination in financial 
markets. Issues of informational flows, investor reactions, signalling and market 
returns are fundamental to the system that sustains financial markets where huge 
amounts of financial assets bounce from one country to another. 
Since the global relaxation of regulation, increased liberalisation of once highly 
regulated markets and the fall of communism, the financial world has witnessed a 
huge growth in emerging capital markets, which are typically characterised by 
new and emerging finns. With the increased role that these markets play in the 
world economy, this trend lends credence to the idea that doctoral research into 
small firms on emerging markets is indeed timely. 
It is hoped that the work contained herein will assist an understanding of the role 
of information in facilitating the development of lowly capitalised firms on the 
Alternative Investment Market (UK) as well as assisting other emerging markets. 
¥, 
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CHAPTER 1, INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets out the purpose and motivations for undertaking doctoral 
research in this area of corporate finance. The chapter begins by highlighting the 
primary purpose of this research both on a theoretical basis and at a practical level 
in the context of how the work relates to the world of finance. The nature of the 
study in terms of methodological approach is outlined while Chapter 4 deals with 
methodology in more detail. The scope within which this research is contained in 
terms of related finance theory is also described. Although Chapter 3 deals with a 
review of the empirical contributions of previous studies, the opportunity is taken 
here to introduce the reader to previous work and studies conducted in related 
areas of corporate finance. 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
Stock markets across the world have, to a greater or lesser degree, an obligation to 
inform investors about developments impacting on the prospects of their 
investments. While the majority of company announcements infOlming investors 
may be of a financial nature, (dividends and earnings announcements), 
announcements with no apparent direct financial implication such as director 
20 
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share dealings and boardroom changes are also covered by company disclosure 
obligations. In the UK, the current procedure that ensures the efficient 
dissemination of price sensitive information was set up by the London Stock 
Exchange in the early 1980's and is known as the Regulatory News Service 
(RNS). Through a series ofmodems linking company nominated advisors and the 
exchange, price sensitive information is disseminated into the public domain. 
Why is it important to keep investors informed about company prospects and are 
all investors equally infom1ed? These questions can be best addressed if we 
consider what may happen if information asymmetries develop on stock 
exchanges. 
The market price of stocks and securities is reflected by market equilibrium with 
investors expressing their stock demands as a function of the information they 
hold. As new information comes to light, investors adjust their portfolio holdings 
to reflect anticipated performance in the light of new information. While some 
investors choose to buy, others may divest their holdings based on their liquidity 
needs. If different investors hold different sets of information, the new market 
price no longer reflects all information about that company. This leads to a 
distortion in demand and assets become mis-priced. Better-informed investors are 
left to exploit this mis-pricing at the cost of less informed investors who 
ultimately may choose to leave the market feeling informationally disadvantaged. 
After all, who wants to play the game unless there is a level playing field? In the 
spirit of a Walrasian paradigm, Akerlof (1970) described this phenomenon as the 
21 
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establishment of a 'Market for Lemons' since investors begin to leave the market, 
taking with them, their investment capital. Capital is crucial for the market to 
develop and so the market begins to contract. Consequently, for a market to 
develop, information must be seen to flow freely and be equally available to all 
economic agents. 
One manner in which a market can simultaneously vindicated itself and restore 
confidence in its investors is by demonstrating the responsiveness of traders to 
incremental information releases. Where stock prices adjust through trading to 
reflect newly available information. New equilibrium trading prices transpire and 
investors feel that traded prices more closely reflect fundamental values. By 
ensuring that company information is publicly available, the 'game' becomes 
fairer. A fairer game attracts more players, each player bringing with them 
investment capital leading the market to expand. This phenomenon of stock 
prices speedily and accurately reflecting information releases is known as the 
Semi-Strong Form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, (EMH). 
The purpose of this research is to identify and examine the impact of company 
announcements on stock prices. Do investors adjust their portfolio holdings as 
new information comes to light and do stock prices actually incorporate these 
information releases. If so, how speedily and accurately do they do this? 
However, since investors are less interested in the absolute price of a stock and 
more interested in the returns stocks generate. This study examines the impact of 
announcements on stock returns. 
22 
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While this work lays claim to several innovations regarding research in the area, 
one such innovation relates to data used in the analysis. (see page 43). 
Studies of the behaviour of stock prices began around the tum of the twentieth 
century. Bachelier (1900) analysed the extent to which patterns could be detected 
in time series of share prices by looking at samples and sub-samples of historical 
data. Bacheliers' rationale was that if stock prices were adjusting to incorporate 
new information as it came to light, then stock prices would have to be random. 
This had to be the case since the frequency and nature of new information is 
uncertain and unpredictable and any mechanism that responds to this information 
must also be random. Bachelier found that the degree of randomness in the time 
seri.es presented little scope for future predictability demonstrating that the market 
was indeed efficient in incorporating information as it came to light. 
The contemporary school of thought is that share prices adjust as a results of 
trading motivated by incremental information. Academic researchers have been 
prolific in looking to either substantiate or refute whether stock prices are indeed 
reflective of true values and whether the adjustment to incremental information 
flows is speedy [see, for example, MacKinlay (1988) or Martikainen et al (1993)]. 
Rather than such studies being exclusively of academic interest, the curiosity from 
industry and commerce has understandably been extensive. If mis-priced 
securities can be identified, stockholders, investment brokers and fund managers 
can exploit such opportunities for profit generation. 
23 
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Although EMH has been well tested in the academic literature, datasets have 
typically been based on fim1s that are large and have been well established. These 
companies are popularly known as 'blue chip' companies and examples would 
include ICI, Shell, IBM and British Airways. There appears to have been a 
neglect of either analysing the efficient market hypothesis in the context of lowly 
capitalised companies or assessing whether any security mis-pricing exists among 
new and developing security markets on which such stock are typically traded. 
Owing to the nature of empirical studies in the field of the efficient market 
hypothesis, empiricists depend upon large amounts of information about securities 
in order to extrapolate meaningful conclusions. As if by default, empirical work 
in the field will always favour either large companies or large stock markets on 
which these companies are traded since the willingness to research needs to be 
met by the availability of information. Where information is less forthcoming, 
empiricists will be frustrated by the amount of data on which to base their 
research and will have little choice but to move to sample data where their 
research requirements can be met. From a supply side, there is a significant body 
of evidence to support the notion that information availability for larger 
companies far exceeds that of smaller companies. Studies from, amongst others, 
Cook (1992), Hossain et al (1994) and Raffournier and Dumontier (1998) 
supports the idea of disclosure being greatly increased in circumstances where 
company size is large. Consequently, research does seem to favour studies into 
the security price and returns behaviour of large firms. This assertion is borne out 
by considering samples of data used by some of the more prominent research into 
24 
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the area of infonnation efficiency over the past decade. Table 1 on page 25 
summarises some prominent research in semi-strong fonn efficient market type 
studies together with the nature of data analysed. 
As can be seen from this table, the most prominent research in the area of 
infonnational efficiency has been derived from the large established stock markets 
of London and New York. 
Table 1 Summary Of Classical Studies in Efficient Markets 
YEAR AUTHOR DATA USED 

(S) 
1968 Beaver 
1969 Fama, 
Fisher, 
Jensen 
Roll. 
1976 Patell 
1981 Cohn 
Lessard 
1985 Atiase 
1991 Cready 
Mynatt 
, 
and 
143 NYSE firms 
with Compustat 
records 
NYSE Companies 
NYSE Companies 
& 
& 
Listing of major 
domestic stock 
exchanges 
Data IS required 
to have a 
..
mlllimum 
capitalisation 
value of$400m 
Sample considers 
a sample with a 
minimum trading 
price of$10. 
1992 Adhikari & Sample is based 
Tondkar on 41 of the most 
25 
COMMENT 
Compustat lists main companies 
with high capitalisation rates. 
NYSE Companies typically 
reflect large, blue chip companies. 
NYSE listing reqUIres high 
capitalisation in order to attain full 
listing 
The sample data is restricted in 
order to reflect a representation of 
the "major" domestic stock 
exchanges. 
The minimum capitalisation rate 
of $400m m 1985 would be 
reflective of a relatively large 
capitalisation value (RLCV) 
If we are to accept that share 
prices tend towards their intrinsic 
values over time, then such a 
sample with a lower limit would 
on the trading price would require 
a large asset base and therefor a 
large capitalisation rate. 
Market capitalisation IS 
considered as a suitable proxy for 
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1994 
1995 
1996 
2000 
2004 
2004 
Wright 
Rippington 
& Taffler 
Chan & 
Alice 
Freund & 
Pagano 
Gropp 
Gu 
largest, developed 
stock exchanges 
in the world. 
Standard & Poors 
500 Index. 
337 Companies 
with full listing 
status on the 
NYSE 
18 Major World 
Stock Markets 
New York and 
Toronto Stock 
Exchange 
NYSE 
NASDAQ 
a large, well developed exchange. 
This study also considers the level 
of activity in trading tenns as a 
relevant factor. 
The study utilised a Standard & 
Poors 500 Composite Index that is 
based on 500 companies across 
the market who's movement is 
representative of the sentiment of 
the market and the economy. 
The sample of 337 fully listed 
companies on the NYSE would 
therefor require to meet minimum 
capitalisation rates m order to 
attain full listing status. 
Assessed the impact on 
infonnational efficiency of closer 
integration ofmajor stock markets 
around the world stock 
Looked at the increased rate at 
which infonnation flows m 
automated stock exchanges and 
the impact 
Conducted a longitudinal study 
for the period 1926-1998 to assess 
the role of infonnation and its 
reaction, specifically in the 
context of over-reactions and 
mean reverSIOns. 
Analyses the listing status of 
NASDAQ stocks and the role of 
infonnation In increasing 
infonnational efficiency of the 
NASDAQ 
Firms listed on such markets are typically categorised by relatively high market 
capitalisation's and are generally well-established blue chip firms. 
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This work is focused on informational efficiency issues specific to smaller firms. 
While the term "small firms" may be taken in the context of turnover, number of 
employee's etc, for the purpose of this work, small firms are defined in terms of 
their relatively low market capitalisation's. Such firms are typically newly 
formed, have only recently gained listing status and are typically lowly 
capitalised. 
A second yet equally important innovation stems from the fact that it is untypical 
of small finns to obtain listing status on the main exchanges of New York, 
London or Tokyo. To obtain full listing status on the established markets there 
are several disclosure requirements that companies have to be able to meet. Once 
listing status is granted, subsequent disclosure requirements as demanded by stock 
exchange regulatory authorities place further financial burdens on companies. 
Consequently, smaller firms find the cost associated with obtaining listing status 
prohibitive thereby finding their listing requirements satisfied in new and 
emerging markets where such disclosure and regulatory costs are reduced. As a 
result, studies into lowly capitalised public listed companies may offer insights 
into emerging markets since companies traded in emerging markets are often, by 
definition, lowly capitalised. 
NATURE OF THE RESEARCH 
The nature of studies in research fall within a spectrum that is bound at one 
extreme by a positivist and at the other, by a phenomenology type approaches. As 
is increasingly the case in finance research, this study has an empirical 
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component. The work relies heavily on a positivist approach to research since it 
requires the testing of several hypotheses from which theory is developed. While 
Chapter 4 of this thesis is devoted to establishing a research methodology, the 
study can be categorised as positivist as opposed to phenomenologist in nature by 
virtue of the manner in which the study is progressed. 
The phenomenological approach to research is so called as it is based on the way 
people experience social phenomena in the real world. It can be contrasted with 
the positivist approach, which treats the social world in the way it would be 
approached by the natural scientist clinically and numerically. 
Phenomenology is characterised by a focus on the meanings that research subjects 
attach to social phenomenon, and this method is an attempt by researchers to 
understand what is happening and why is it happening? Such research would be 
more concerned with the context in which events were taking place rather than in 
the events themselves. A phenomenology type study typically involves a small 
sample of subjects rather than a large number as with the positivist approach. 
Esterby, Smith et al (2003) suggest that researchers using this approach are more 
likely to work with qualitative data and use a variety of methods of data collection 
in order to establish different views ofphenomena. 
Positivists adopt a more structured, almost algorithmic type approach to research. 
Consequently, positivist research is considered to be more suited to empirical 
work and hypothesis testing where a procedural approach is favoured. Robson 
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(1993) lists five sequential stages through which positivist research is developed 
as follows: 
1 	 Deduce a hypothesis (a testable proposition about the relationship between 
two or more events or concepts) from a theory. 
2 Express the hypothesis in operational terms (i.e. ones indicating exactly how 
variables are to be measured) which propose a relationship between two 
specific variables. 
3 Test this operational hypothesis. This will involve an experiment or some 
other form of empirical inquiry. 
4 Examine the specific outcomes of the inquiry. This will either tend to 
confirm the theory or indicate the need for its modification. 
5 Ifnecessary, modify the theory in the light of the findings. An attempt is then 
made to verify the revised theory by going back to the first step and repeating 
the whole cycle. 
There are a number of distinguishing features regarding the nature of positivist 
research that make it appealing to this particular study. 
1 It is deductive (theory tested by observation, in this case, observing stock 
returns behaviour). 
2 It seeks to explain causal relationships between variables (in this case, 
announcements and stock returns oflowly capitalised firms). 
3 It normally uses quantitative data (in this case, daily share price data). 
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4 It employs controls to allow the testing ofhypotheses. 

5 It uses a highly structured methodology to facilitate replication 

Easterby-Smith et al (2003) also list eight features of positivism in organisational 

learning which also apply to this work as follows: 

1 Independence. The observer is independent ofwhat is being observed. 

2 V altio-freedom. The choice of what to study, and how to study it, can be 

determined by objective criteria rather than by human beliefs and interests. 
3 	 Causality. The aim of the social sciences should be to identify causal 
explanations and fundamental laws that explain regularities in human 
social behaviour. 
4 	 Hypothetico-deductive. Science proceeds through a process of 
hypothesising fundamental laws and then deducing what kinds of 
1observations will demonstrate the truth or falsity ofthese hypotheses. 
5 Operationalisation. Concepts need to be operationalised in a way which 
enables facts to be measured quantitatively. 
6 Reductionism. Problems as a whole are better understood if they are 
reduced to the simplest possible elements. 
7 Generalisation. In order to be able to generalise about regularities in 
human social behaviour, it is necessary to select samples of sufficient size. 
8 Cross-sectional analysis. Making comparisons of variations across 
samples can most easily identify such regularities. 
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Easterby, Smith et al suggest that the proposed approach to research is of vital 
importance for three reasons. Firstly it enables one to take a more infonned 
decision about the research design, which is considered to be 'more than simply 
the methods by which data are collected and analysed'. It is the over-all 
configuration of a piece of research, what kind of evidence is gathered, from 
where and how such evidence is interpreted in order to provide good answers to 
the basic research question. 
Secondly, it helps one think about those research approaches that will work for the 
area of study and, crucially, those that will not. For example, in contrast to this 
work, if one is solely interested in understanding why something is happening 
rather than being able to describe what is happening, it may be more appropriate 
to adopt the phenomenological approach than the positivist. Thirdly, knowledge 
of different research traditions enables one to adapt the research design to cater for 
constraints. These constraints may be practical, involving, say, limited access to 
data, or they may arise from a lack of prior knowledge of the subject. One may 
not be in a position to frame a hypothesis because one has insufficient knowledge 
of the area. 
SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
SEMI-STRONG FORM EFFICIENCY 
The scope of this work can be said to cover the main question of the extent to 
which small finns are semi-strong fonn informationally efficient as defined by 
I Stock returns behaviour is observed using event study analysis as described in Chapter 4. 
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Roberts (1959). Semi-strong fonn efficiency assumes that prices not only reflect 
past or historical information (available through company reports and historical 
press releases) but also current publicly available information such as 
announcements about earnings, dividends, finn and sector specific forecasts etc. 
If the market is semi-strong form efficient, the effects of such announcements are 
impounded into prevailing share prices almost instantaneously (with a time lag 
sufficiently short to eliminate the possibility of generating a profit through trading 
in the price adjustment period). The theoretical implication that follows is that the 
scope for transacting on the back of finn specific announcements is close to zero. 
By tackling this research question in the context of small firms, the scope and 
findings impact on several other related issues. 
SHORT-TERM OVERREACTION 
The results of the study offers an insight into other related hypotheses. One ofthe 
most important of these, from the point of view of long-term investment decision­
making, is that markets tends to 'overreact' in the short run to company specific 
announcements (see Park et al (2004)). Experimental and survey evidence 
indicates that there is a tendency for individuals to overweight more recent 
announcements at the cost of historical data. From a stock market point of view 
this means investors over-react to newly announced earnings and dividends 
causing stock prices to departing from their underlying fundamental values. The 
returns from a company investment in long-term projects such as those in research 
and development tend not to be reflected in company earnings figures for the 
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early years of a project's life. Therefore, although such investments increase the 
fundamental value of a company, they are not immediately reflected in the market 
price of a company's shares. DeBondt & Thaler (1987) and other researchers have 
found evidence that in the USA investors tend to over-react to short-term earnings 
and dividends announcements. Investors are found to focus on current 
information at the cost of not looking beyond the immediate future. This results 
in a close correspondence between share price returns and changes in the short­
term earnings and dividends outlook. 
DeBondt & Thalers' study vindicates the view of investors having an excessively 
short-term orientation. While these results are US based, they are equally 
applicable to the UK since here we too have similar financial inter-mediation 
systems. These results are disturbing for companies undertaking investments that 
will not show early earnings figures. They also indicate that it is important for 
management to show 'good' current earmngs figures since current disclosure 
results are considered as more meaningful. 
These findings are inconsistent with what one would expect from an efficient 
market but there is increasing evidence that share prices oscillate away from 
fundamental values. On the other hand, there is also anecdotal evidence that these 
'erroneous' movements away from fLmdamental values are eventually corrected, a 
phenomenon known as mean reversion in share prices. Studies by, amongst 
others, Summers & Sweeny (1998) support there being a transitory component in 
share prices responsible for short-run deviations from fundamental values and 
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these results have proved both consistent in the USA and the UK. This transitory 
component or mis-pricing is significantly large in relation to what one would 
expect with stock market efficiency and it is often suggested that the overreaction 
of the market to good and bad short-term earnings figures leads to volatility in 
investors' returns. The implication of short-tenn overreactions from 
announcements for companies about to disclose financial news is to encourage 
them to emphasise short-term perfonnance and to demonstrate encouraging short­
term earnings per share figures. Long-term investments are reflected in long-run 
share prices and increase the fundamental value of the company, but the present 
value of such investments is not necessarily reflected in stock prices in the short 
nm. This encourages stock price manipulation through 'the management of 
earnings disclosures'. From an investor's point of view, it is imperative to read 
financial reports with care. 
In the context of the over-reaction hypothesis, the results of this study have 
implications since the stock price reaction of a range of announcements is 
considered within a short-term event window. Impacts of both financial and non­
financial announcements are considered around announcement dates. The 
reaction of these announcements in terms of their impact on the abnormal returns 
is gauged to identify if such reactions are reflective of announcements made. In 
cases where stock returns are affected significantly, perhaps this is indicative of 
overreactions. The study then analyses whether markets go through a period of 
mean reversion with stock prices stabilises nearer their true fundamental values 
over time. 
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FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS 
Capital markets are imperfect in the sense that information is neither costless nor 
universally available. Financial decisions have to be made by investors on the 
basis of imperfect and incomplete information. In such circumstances, a 
company's dividend declaration - a free and supposedly universally available 
piece of data - is often thought to signal the sentiment of future financial 
performance. In fact, given that general information about a company's future 
performance prospects is fairly sparse - especially to the individual investor - any 
information that becomes available is seized upon and embodied with a measure 
of importance which may often be in excess of its real value. In these terms, the 
dividend decision once again gains in importance. 
If the stock market places informational importance on announcements such as a 
dividend declaration, a company will not be acting so as to maximise its 
shareholders' wealth if it ignores this and similar announcements. It is most likely 
for this reason that many publicly quoted companies follow consistent dividend 
policies where a dividend is reduced or passed 2completely only in the most dire 
of financial circumstances (Lipson et a1 (1998)). This signalling effect of the 
dividend declaration is an important issue, particularly for smaller companies. 
For small firms, studies have shown that an increase (decrease) over the expected 
level of dividends does precipitate a rise (fall) respectively in the market share 
price. Hence dividend declaration effects on share prices may be a major (if not 
2 An excellent exposition of this point is given in a brief article that appeared in the Investor 
Relations Business Magazine in Feb 1999. 
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the major) consideration in dividend policy decision making. 
This study considers, as one type of event, dividend announcements of companies. 
By gauging the stock price impact of dividends and other announcements, it is 
possible to detect the signals that such announcements send to shareholders. 
The question does arise as to how rational small finns investors are in interpreting 
the signals that announcements such as dividends convey to the market. How 
consistent are investors in their interpretation? Perhaps more interestingly, there 
are studies that have concentrated primarily on the impact of financially orientated 
announcements on stock returns (see for example Srinivasan (1998)). Little work 
has been done to monitor the impact of non-financial company announcements on 
stock returns. The scope of this study allows for samples to be split in order to 
analyse the impact of both financial and non-financial announcements on stock 
returns. 
INSIDER DEALING DETECTION 
Many countries feel that curtailment of insider trading adds to the respectability of 
their respective financial markets but this is only the case if such bans were infact 
successful. Despite the more stringent increases in regulation (see the Criminal 
Justice Act (1993)), recent cases the world over have been testimony to the fact 
that insider dealing still takes place. It is important to note examples of insider 
dealing and place them in the context of the workings of the stock market. Some 
examples are cited below along with why the findings of this research are 
important in the context of this work. 
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According to Britain's Department of Trade & hldustry (DTI), Jeffrey Archer, a 
British peer, millionaire novelist and a former deputy chaimlan of Britain's 
Conservative Party, was investigated for possible insider-trading offences 
committed before the January 1999 take-over of Anglia Television by MAL Lord 
Archer's wife happened to be a non-executive director of Anglia at that time and 
made significant trades in Anglia prior to the announcement being made public. 
Insider-trading - the use in share dealings of price-sensitive information available 
to people privy to confidential company data not yet disclosed to the rest of the 
market - has a long history in Britain. Insiders have profiting from such 
information for as long as stocks have been traded, although they have been 
prosecuted for a much shorter period. In 1998 alone, the London Stock Exchange 
referred seventeen suspected cases of insider trading to the DTI for further 
investigation. 
While it is accepted that insider-trading exists in all exchanges to a greater or 
lesser extent, there have been many cases of authorities making a concerted effort 
to stamp it out. 
In 1999, a Paris appeals court upheld a prison sentence imposed on Alain Boublil 
for insider trading. He is alleged to have passed on sensitive information relating 
to the impending take-over in 1988 by Pechiney, a French metals and packaging 
firm, of Triangle, an American company, while he worked for France's then 
finance minister. In the same year, Germany's most powerful union boss, Franz 
Steinkiffiler, resigned from his job after trading in the shares of a company 
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affiliated with Daimler Benz while still servmg as a member of Daimler's 
supervIsory board. At the end of June 2000, the Japanese Securities and 
Exchange Commission instigated proceedings against employees of Nippon 
Shoiin, a drugs firm, for dumping shares in the company just before the health and 
welfare minister announced that one of the firm's drugs had a lethal side-effect. 
Such cases are the tip of an iceberg. Investors in many countries still believe that 
insider trading is a legitimate way to beat the market rather than an offence while 
other countries only recently outlawed insider dealing practices. In Germany, the 
upper house ofparliament passed a financial markets bill on 1999 that for the first 
time made insider-trading a criminal offence, punishable by up to five years in 
pnson. 
Other countries have moved faster. America has been stamping on insider dealing 
since the 1930s and with particular vigour since the mid-1980s. France banned 
insider trading in 1974, Britain in 1980, Switzerland and Japan in the late 1980s, 
and Italy in 1991. Hong Kong is still trying to curb insider trading too, though 
without making it a criminal offence. The Securities and Futures Commission, its 
stock market regulator, refers suspects to the government, which may assign a 
tribunal to investigate. However, until April 2000, the only penalty tribunals 
could administer was a public apprehension. Since then they have had more 
power, anyone found guilty of insider-trading can now be fined up to three times 
the forbidden profits he made and banned from acting as a company director. 
China is trying to curtail insider trading which is rife in its fledgling financial 
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markets. In February 1999, the Shanghai branch of Xiangfan Credit & 
Investment, a securities broker owned by the state run Agricultural Bank of China, 
was fined two million yen (£150000). He also had sixteen million yen of profits 
confiscated for buying shares in companies on the basis of inside knowledge of a 
pending bids. That one successful prosecution puts China streets ahead of some 
far more developed markets. Switzerland and Italy have yet to bring a successful 
prosecution under their insider-trading laws. Japan has successfully prosecuted 
just one culprit since it banned the practice back in 1989. 
In the UK, since 1980, 23 investors have been convicted of insider dealing with 
more than 300 being investigated by the DTI and fifty prosecuted. Of the seven 
people prosecuted in 1999, none was convicted which prompted the government 
to toughen insider-dealing regulations. A new law, which came into effect in 
March 2000, extended the definition of an 'insider' to cover any individual with 
sensitive information. 
Although the new law widens the net, it does not tackle the problem of 
enforcement. British regulators tend to be less effective than their foreign 
counterparts. In 1999 for example, France's regulatory authority, the Commission 
des Operations de Bourse (COB) fined ten people for insider trading while 
America's Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) fined thirty-four. 
The implication of this research in the context of insider dealing is that the sample 
data analysed is further ranked in accordance with shareholder concentration 
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percentage under consideration. Where results demonstrate that announcements 
are anticipated and incorporated into stock returns on an a-prior basis, this may 
provide anecdotal evidence of a potential for insider dealing activities. Since 
stock holdings of lowly capitalised companies tend to be relatively closely held, 
the potential for insider dealing may be mitigated as compared with that of larger 
firms. The results of this study will be able to cast light onto the potential extent 
of insider dealing in small firms. 
PREVIOUS INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY RESEARCH 
Previous work clearly suggests that academics have been active in their study of 
security market price behaviour and the role of information contained therein. 
Analysts of security prices have, atleast from a methodological point of view, 
become more and more sophisticated in their approach when trying to out­
perform the market. Bachelier's graphical approach at the turn of the twentieth 
century provides for almost intuitive results and the conclusion of the majority of 
pre 1950's efficient market hypothesis studies relied continually on graphical 
analysis. Kendal (1953) and later Cootner (1962) and Fama (1965) began to 
develop a more objective and statistical approach to modelling security market 
behaviour. The contribution of Roberts (1959) in redefining the concept of 
informational efficiency concluded with three levels, Weak, Semi-Strong and 
Strong Form, each with its own testing methodology. 
Testing of market efficiency in the weak form assesses the level of predictability 
based on past security price behaviour. If it can be shown that historical share 
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prices follow a random walk, this can be seen as a proxy for the market being 
weak fonn efficient since past price behaviour cannot be used to predict for the 
future. This test, later to be known as the Random Walk Hypothesis. (see page 
49 for the origins of this tenn) relied on regression analysis. A whole battery of 
tests were later developed and found serial correlation coefficients between 
observations within a time series were statistically significant, suggesting a degree 
of stock-price inter-dependence. Runs tests were conducted to monitor the 
number of times prices changed direction (from continual increase to decrease and 
vice versa) and a hypothesis test was conducted to conclude as to whether these 
runs tests results were significantly different from what would have been expected 
from a random data set. Filter based trading rules were also used to test the weak 
fonn of market efficiency. 
Tests of the Random Walk Hypothesis have, in the main, tended to refute the idea 
of historical security price behaviour being productive in predicting future 
security prices. Studies by Samuelson (1965), Mandelbrot (1966) and in the case 
of UK data, Kemp & Reid (1971) have all supported the Random Walk 
Hypothesis. More recently, Mills (1995) and Preda (2004) have presented results 
in favour of the Random Walk Hypothesis. However, the results of studies by 
Dimson & Marsh (1990) and Scott (1990) cast doubt over stock markets 
exhibiting randomness. With regards to serial correlation tests, most research up 
until the late 1970's supported the idea of no serial correlation in share prices. 
Where the extent of serial correlation was low it was still argued that the extent 
was not sufficient to justify trading on a post transactions costs basis. However, 
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more recently, a body of literature has emerged (see, for example, Hatheway 
(1986) and Ali, Klein & Rosenfeld (1992)) supporting the existence of serial 
correlation in stock prices. Runs tests and filter tests appear somewhat more 
conclusive with the studies of, amongst others, Barnes (1986), Urrutia (1995) and 
Wang (1995) a11 supporting the contention of security price randomness. 
Semi-strong form efficiency tests centre around event study methodology based 
on the work of Fama et al (1969). Semi-strong form efficiency tests assess the 
speed at which incremental firm and sector specific announcements are 
incorporated by the market into the share price with a speedy adjustment process 
deeming the market semi-strong form efficient. Support for the findings of the 
1969 study came from many quarters including that of Firth (1977) and, more 
recently Martikainen, Rothovius & Yli-QUi (1993). However, the findings of 
Pope, Morris & Peel (1990) and Goforth (1992) reject the hypothesis of markets 
being semi-strong form efficient. 
In summarising the performance of traders vis a vis the ability to generate 
abnormal returns, the work of Pettengill (1989) and, more recently, Pare (1995), 
Hulbert (1996a) and Alpert (1997) are of interest. They have demonstrated that 
the flow of information to the market is often sufficiently slow to allow for the 
ability to generate a significant abnormal return on a systematic basis. 
It is easy to summarise the findings of the tests for strong form efficiency since 
there are far fewer tests of this level of efficiency than of the weak or semi-strong 
form. This is attributed mainly to the fact that the probability of obtaining share 
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trading infonnation specific to economiC agents likely to have access to non 
public infonnation, is low. 
The literature provides substantial evidence both in support and contrary security 
markets being infonnationally efficient. It appears that, on balance, evidence of 
weak fonn of infonnational efficiency of stock markets appears relatively 
consistent. Strong fonn efficiency presents the problem that certain groups of 
potential 'insiders' can not be easily identified. This results in difficulty in 
concluding on studies into its existence since sufficient reliable data is not 
available. The general contention of markets being informationally efficient in 
the semi-strong fonn sense would imply that it would not be possible to beat the 
market on a risk adjusted, systematic basis. Prices would adjust in a speedily 
manner, leaving little time to place a profitable trade as a result of company 
announcements. Studies demonstrate, atleast in an empirical sense, that security 
markets are semi-strong fonn efficient but as demonstrated by Table 2, studies 
have been concentrated on large companies traded on the established exchanges. 
Table 2 Stock Exchanges Previously Researched 
Nature of Dataset Author Frequency 
Companies listed on major domestic Cohn & Lessard (1981) 
stock exchanges 
Companies listed on major domestic Adhikari et al (1992) 2 
stock exchanges 
Companies with minimum market Atiase (1985) 1 
capitalisation of $400m 
Companies with minimum stock price Cready & Mynatt (1991) 1 
of$10 
Five Major US Exchanges Pandey, Kohers & 1 
Kohers (2004) 
London Stock Exchange Holland (2000) 1 
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New York Stock Exchange Beaver (1968) 
New York Stock Exchange Fama, Fisher, Jensen & 
Roll (1969) 
New York Stock Exchange Patell (1976) 
New York Stock Exchange Rippington & Taffler 
(1995) 
New York Stock Exchange Akhigbe, Gosnell & 5 
Harikumar (1998) 
Nikkei, Standard & Poors 500 Parsons & Richardson. 1 
Companies and FTSE 100 (2004) 
Companies. 
Standard & Poors 500 Companies Wright (1994) 
Standard & Poors 500 Companies Olson, Nelson, Witt & 
Mossman (1998) 

Standard & Poors 500 Companies Pizzi, Economopoulos, 

O'Neil & Heather (1998) 

Standard & Poors 500 Companies Lynch & Medenhall 4 

(1997) 

METHODOLOGY 
The method of testing for the impact of announcements on stock returns is 
commonly known as 'event study methodology'. Standard event study 
methodology sets out a framework that allows one to test for the affect of 
economic events on the returns of securities. This methodology focuses on the 
behaviour of the security return around the time of the event (the event window). 
It then compares the actual return with that which was forecast under one of a 
choice of several equilibrium return forecasting models. While this methodology 
appears to be build on a sound theoretical framework, debate still surrounds as to 
which of the equilibrium model should be used to forecast for expected returns. A 
discussion of why the single index market model is theoretically justifiable is set 
out in chapter 4. A pilot study conducted to consider which dispensation should 
be used for this study and which supports the use of the single index market 
model can be found in Appendix 1. Yadav et al (1992) defines an event study as 
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one constituting 
'an empirical study that attempts to gauge the affect of economic announcements 
or events on key attributes of a security. The most common attribute considered 
is the affect of events on the returns of a security.' 
Initially, event studies were undertaken to examine the extent of semi-strong form 
market efficiency by examining the speed of price adjustment to reflect the 
informational content of incremental announcements. For example, one may be 
interested in the effect of an earnings announcement on the returns of a security. 
If the earnings announcement was less than the market expected this would be 
seen as 'bad news' and would therefore depress stock returns and visa versa. 
Alternatively, a dividend announcement that exceeded market expectations would 
be viewed by the market as 'good news' and would have a positive effect on the 
stocks return. 
In line with positivist research ideology as outlined by Easterby-Smith et al 
(2003), the study requires a systematic method of generating results. An 
algorithm of sort is required that systemises the procedure for analysing the data. 
Elton & Gruber (1995) propose such a process for conducting event studies. First, 
a sample of firms is constructed that have announcements to make to the market 
(events). What causes investors to react and prices to change are 3lIDOUncements 
that are surprises to investors. 
For many studies, announcement say relating to a merger may be treated as a 
surprise. For other studies earnings announcements may be treated as a surprise. 
However, for announcements of this nature, it is slightly more complicated. A 
component of the earnings announcement may already have been expected or 
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anticipated by the market. A surprise is normally defined by comparing company 
announcements to that which was expected as reflected in the average estimate of 
professional analysts. A number of companies provide this data. To form a 
sample of surprises one separates a group of firms where announcements are 
significantly different from forecasts. Since positive and negative surprises would 
affect stock prices differently, the sample is further separated into two groups, one 
for positive surprises (alIDouncements exceeding analysts expectations) and one 
for negative surprises (announcements falling short of market expectations). 
The second step is to determine the precise time of the announcement and 
designate this as time period zero. Consistent with most studies, this work uses 
daily data. For measuring semi-strong form market efficiency it is important to 
measure the impact of the announcement using the smallest feasible intervals. 
Where data availability has permitted, studies have looked at stock returns 
impacts using intra-day data. 
The third step is to define the period to be studied. If one were to consider, say, 
60 days around the event, then one would designate -30, -29, -28, ... -1 as the 30 
days prior to the event, 0 as the event day, and + 1, +2, +3, ....+30 as the 30 day 
post event period. 
Step four would be to compute the return on each of the days being studied. For 
step five we compute the 'abnorrnar return for each of the days being studies for 
each firm in the sample. The abnormal return is then defined as the difference 
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between the actual return and the forecasted return. Different authors use 
different dispensations for forecasting expected return. (see pages 82 to 83) 
Step five is to compute for each day in the event period the average abnormal 
return for all the firms in the sample. Normally, we look at the average affect of 
the announcement rather than examine each firm separately, because other events 
are occurring and averaging across all firms should minimise the effects of these 
events. However, for studies where the magnitude of announcements vary across 
firms (such as earnings surprises), it may be useful to examine individual firm 
behaviour as well. By adding the individual day's normal return, the next step is 
to compute the cumulative abnormal return from the beginning of the period. 
Finally, the cumulative abnormal return is examined for significance thus giving 
an insight into the returns impact ofthe announcements considered. 
To summarise, this study considers the role and impact of both financial and non­
financial information on the returns oflowly capitalised firms. The purpose of the 
study is to assess the level of semi-strong form of informational efficiency of 
lowly capitalised firms to see if the exchange on which these firms trade are 
efficient in incorporating announcements into prevailing stock prices. The 
underlying importance of this work is that stock markets require a speedy and 
efficient stock price adjustment mechanism to attract capital and facilitate further 
development. The study contains an empirical component and adopts a positivist 
approach to researching the issues raised. The impact of the findings of the work 
provide scope for application of the findings to the areas of returns overreactions, 
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the ability of traders in small firms to interpret financial and non-financial 
announcement signals and the potential for insider dealing in close held lowly 
capitalised listed companies. 
The methodological approach deployed is based largely on the Elton & Grubers 
method of event study but via utilisation of the Single Index Market Model, 
SIMM approach to equilibrium market model returns generation. 
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CHAPTER 2, THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EMH 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter charts the theoretical development of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis as a distinct Finance theory. The chapter discusses the different 
definitions of "efficiency" that have been proposed and the background against 
which the ideas has emerged. The chapter continues by charting the development 
of EMH and draws comparisons between the finance and economics approaches. 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY 
The term "efficient" has been used to describe securities markets in a variety of 
ways since Fama (1965). This chapter canvasses the definitions that have been 
proposed and the theoretical development that has consequently formed in order to 
provide a basis for the analysis in subsequent sections of this thesis. It is hoped 
that the theoretical development will provide a context for the results that have 
transpired from this doctoral works. Since the study is empirical in nature, the 
discussion is oriented toward interpreting empirical results as distinct from 
integrating with the broader body of economic theory. In the literature on efficient 
stock markets, the term consistently has referred to 'informational' efficiency, 
which is a property of the relation between information and securities prices. It has 
not referred to as 'production' efficiency (a property of how production is 
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organised) or 'exchange' efficiency (a property of consumption markets). One 
could argue that, strictly speaking, these are inseparable concepts but the 
distinction is observed in this chapter. Further, this study does not consider the 
issues of operational or transactional efficiency. 
BACKGROUND TO THE THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Even a casual perusal of the literature confirms that economics and finance 
professors conducted little research on stock prices before the theory of efficient 
markets was developed. The empirical contributions in Chapter three 
demonstrate that empirical approaches to this area post-date the concept of 
efficient markets. The stock market was generally viewed as exhibiting little 
economic order and the empirical literature that preceded the efficient 
market hypothesis described prices in statistical rather than economic terms. 
Early work by Bachelier (first published in 1900), Working (1934), Kendal 
(1953) and Cootner (1962) suggested that successive stock changes are 
approximately independent i.e. that prices behave like random walks. This 
pattern initially was puzzling as it seemed to suggest both order and chaos. In 
the absence of an economic explanation, this phenomenon was described for 
approximately a decade as the Random Walk Hypothesis (RWH). 
Around the time of an important paper by Roberts (1959), the literature began to 
connect random walk models with the economics of competitive markets. Roberts 
(1959) tentatively reasoned that there was a plausible rationale for the random walk 
model. He suggested that if the stock market behaved in the manner of a 
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mechanically imperfect roulette wheel, people would notice the imperfections and 
by acting on them, remove them. This rationale is appealing, if for no other reason 
other than its value as counterweight to the popular view of stock market 
irrationality. The explanation however, was seen as incomplete. 
Stock price behaviour was not viewed at the time as being describable in terms of 
economic theory but Roberts reasoning provided a fOlmdation for doing so. From 
approximately that point onward, evidence of statistical dependence in security 
returns was interpreted by this literature as suggesting the existence of un­
exploited economic returns and thereby being inconsistent with rational investor 
behaviour in competitive markers. 
EARLY USE OF THE TERM EFFICIENCY 
The term 'efficient market' was soon used in the context of securities markets by 
Fama (1965) who defined it as a market where large numbers of rational, profit­
maximisers compete to predict future market stock prices and where important 
current information is almost freely available to all participants. Fama drew the 
following implication of efficiency 
"In an efficient market, on average, competition will cause the full effects of 
new information on intrinsic values to be reflected "instantaneously" in 
actual prices." 
It is interesting to note the role of information in the above definition in leading to 
change in intrinsic values. Around the same time, Samuelson (1965) and 
Mandelbrot (1966) formalised Roberts reasoning, proving that under certain 
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conditions, successive price changes are independent in competitive markets. 
Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll (1969) developed the economics further. They cited 
Mandelbrot (1966) and Samuelson (1965) and by linking random: walks 
with 'efficiency' they implemented the "market model" By doing this, they 
extended the information set studied beyond the time series of prices to a 
publicly-available datum 
The market model relaxed the stationarity assumptions of the random walk model 
and allowed researchers to make. predictions about the sequence of abnormal 
returns. (computing abnormal returns using the market model is discussed in Chapter 
4). Overall, FFJR pushed empirical research on security markets significantly 
closer to mainstream economic theory. 
EARLY WORKS 
The early empirical work was increasingly conducted under the belief that it was 
researching the implications of competitive equilibrium in stock markets in the 
context of information use. It did so and achieved important results without 
using fonnal models. The first attempt at a formal model did not come until 
Fama's (1970) review. It was based on the concept of market use of 
information introduced in Fama's 1965 paper and FFJR's paper of 1969. 
In extending the information set studied beyond past prices, to include publicly 
available information such as stock splits or earnings, FFJR pioneered what 
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researchers still consider an ingenious research design. As a theoretical construct, 
'publicly-available' information is defined as information that is accessible to all 
investors and is costless. While earnings reports for example, are costly for firms 
to produce initially, once made public they are approximately costless for many 
investors to reproduce. Basic economic models, ignoring transaction costs, imply 
that average revenue and cost are equated in competitive equilibrium. A testable 
implication of such models is that if the cost of reproducing public information is 
zero then so are the expected gains. Security prices therefore should adjust to 
information at the first trade after it becomes publicly available. The 
consequential abnormal returns should be experienced entirely by owners of 
securities at the time of the announcement. In contrast, a competitive market 
would allow private gains from producing costly private information (that is, 
information that is not publicly available). 
Tests of whether competitive returns are earned from private information 
production would be difficult to implement, because (among other things), they 
would require estimates of the cost of infomlation production. With the use of 
computerised accounting packages as standard and the use of the internet in 
dispersing information into the public domain, this statement is no longer a 
theoretical constraint. The central role of public information in early empirical 
research on market efficiency thus is easier to explain. The cost of information 
production in the research context is known to be approximately zero, thus 
allowing a simple and unique test of some of the most basic reasoning in 
economICS. The test is that average revenue equals average cost equals zero. This 
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is the spirit in which the early works and theoretical development was conducted. 
Researchers sought to demonstrate, in the setting of public information, that the 
stock, market can be described in terms of simple economic models of 
competition. Thus, a model of competitive market behaviour in response to 
information was born. This opened the stock market as a legitimate area for 
economic research. 
Of course there is no such thing as a precisely costless economic good whether it 
be a product or service In empirical research, the economic construct of privately 
costless public information is only proxied by announcements in, say, the London 
Financial Times or the Wall Street Journal. We can extend this to the Regulatory 
News Service (RNS) Electronic Announcements used for this study. While such 
information is not precisely costless to acquire and process by investors it is 
assumed to be so. If this assumption is approximately correct, then the 
competitive return for incurring information costs would be small and difficult to 
detect in observed rates of return so it is predicted to be zero. 
It is important to distinguish two types of cost involved in the above explanation. 
First, there is the cost to an investor of re-producing information, including the 
costs of acquiring and processing it. This is relevant because competitive 
economics predicts a relation between costs and rewards. (the research issues 
here concern the, validity of assuming that a particular historical datum was 
approximately, costless to acquire and process at that time) However, is it valid to 
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assume that a sophisticated computerised trading strategy developed from 
research available in 1990 was costless to process in, for example, 1946, when 
information processing costs were higher? Yet this assumption is implicit in using 
abnormal stock returns from the strategy during 1946 as evidence of inefficiency. 
Secondly, there is the cost of transacting on the basis of information. The cost of 
operating the market mechanism is relevant because the economic tradition 
underlying the prediction of a cost-reward equation assumes frictionless markets. 
In contrast, a large literature stemming from Coase (1937) and Hayek (1945), 
among others, views markets as optimal solutions to the demand for costly 
transactions. From this perspective, it is unacceptable to view markets as being 
absolutely costless to operate. We could say that they are cost-minimising rather 
than cost eliminating institutions. In contrast, the basic economics that motivated 
the early work on stock market efficiency assumes that markets are or act as if 
they are frictionless. The effective magnitudes of both transactions and 
information production costs are not always clear and while a market is not 
inefficient due to information production costs, the role of transactions costs in the 
theory of efficient markets is far from clear. 
Fama (1970) continued the process of formalising the concept of market 
efficiency in economic terms. He noted that to a large extent the empirical work 
in this area preceded the development of the theory. He defined an efficient 
market as one in which prices always fully reflect available information. He 
states sufficient, but not necessary, conditions for efficiency as being: 
1 There are no transactions costs in trading securities 
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2 All available information is costlessly available to all market participants 
3 All participants agree on the implications of current information for the 
current price and distributions of future prices of each security. 
His clear intent was to formalise the 'fully reflect' notion in terms closer to 
those of equilibrium pricing theory. Fama was saying that a market is called 
'efficient' if investors who possess information nevertheless earn a competitive 
expected return from investing. That is, that the information does not alter their 
expected returns. This is the basis of his definition equating securities conditional 
on the information set and unconditional expected returns 
The return that would have been earned without possessing information is not 
directly observable. Its proxy typically has been the regression function 
prediction (a + /3r,) of the market model, which researchers have associated, 
however loosely, with the CAPM. The market model residual (or error) is the 
difference between the observed return, which by sample construction is 
conditional upon the information set being studied and the model's proxy for the 
correct return. The efficient market prediction then is that the sample average 
post-announcement residual is zero. The residual post abnormal return can be 
seen on page 210 onwards. The research thus can be interpreted as comparing 
observed returns which, by sample construction, are conditional upon information 
announcements, with some economically correct value using the market model to 
provide the empirical proxy for 'correct' returns. 
Crediting Harry Roberts, Fama distinguished three nested information sets as past 
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pnces; publicly available information and all information, including private 
information. Correspondingly, he distinguished the 'weak', semi-strong' and 
'strong' forms of market efficiency. Whilst this was the first recognition that 
efficiency must be defined with respect to a particular information set, it 
unfortunately was couched in terms of statistical rather than economic 
properties of information. In particular, the distinctions were not explicitly 
based on costs of producing information, which are necessary for the economics 
of competitive markets to predict different returns to public and private 
information. The statistically-based classification scheme possibly distracted 
attention away from the important issue of the costs of obtaining and processing 
information and thus from the fundamental economics involved. This 
demonstrates that the theory of efficient markets had not yet shed its statistical 
ongms. 
Fama's 1970 modelling seems loose in hindsight but it served the purpose of early 
empirical researchers well. It was taken for granted that this was a precise enough 
statement of what they were looking for in the data. It also stimulated a 
definitional debate that continued for almost two decades. The modelling and even 
the concept of 'efficiency' began to attract criticism, possibly fuelled by the 
emergence of information economICS as an important field, populated by 
researchers placing more emphasis on logical coherence than did the 
"empiricists". Further criticism was based on the logical scrutiny of the 
'efficiency' construct that arose naturally from researchers seeking explanations 
for the early empirical anomalies. 
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Fame's definition was criticised on the grounds that it was tautological as it 
allowed any feasible set of return distributions to be consistent with market 
efficiency. The equality of conditional and unconditional expected returns is 
logically feasible in a market that gets them both wrong. One could argue that 
this criticism misses the spirit of Fame's original definition in which the 
unconditional expected return seemed intended to represent its "correct" 
equilibrium value. Fama (1976) responded with a revised definition explicitly 
requiring that 'the market correctly uses all available information' and thus the 
joint distribution of future prices established by the market is identical to the 
"correct" distribution implied by all available information at the time 
This definition requires empirical researchers to state or imply something about 
the 'correct distribution of future prices. That is, to have some way of 
characterising a rational, competitive equilibrium. The revised definition by 
Beaver embodied the spirit of Fama's earlier definition and most of the early 
empirical work in the area. 
Beaver (1981) states that 
" .... a securities market is efficient with respect to a signal y, if and only if 

the configuration of security prices {Pjt} is the same as it would be in, an 

otherwise identical economy (i.e.. , with an identical configuration of 

preferences and endowments) except that every individual receives Yt as 

well as that individual's own information." 

Latham. (1986) observed that it is logically feasible for a piece of information to 
cause offsetting revisions in individual 'investors' portfolios, without any net 
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effect' on excess demand and therefore on pnces. For example, information 
feasibly could cause two investors to make precisely offsetting buy and sell 
decisions. He therefore defined efficiency relative to some information set "if 
revealing it to all agents would change neither equilibrium prices nor 
portfolios". An advantage of this definition is its potential for linking in with the 
theory and empirical work on, amongst other subjects, trading volume. 
COMPARlSONS OF EMPIRICAL FINANCE AND ECONOMICS 
APPROACH TO THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The Rubinstein-Sharpe-Beja-Beaver-Lathan1 sequence develops the efficiency 
construct down a different intellectual path than that of Fama's. Most noticeably, 
Fama (and much of the empirical literature) talks of the market using information 
or of the market establishing prices. More formal definitions are expressed in 
terms of individual investors' actions and their relation to prices and volumes. 
Fama's financial approach, not surprisingly, is closer to the more empirically 
oriented traditions of what is sometimes referred to as the Chicago School Of 
Thought. The Rubinstein-Latham sequence of definitions is closer in spirit to 
Information Economics. 
The "Chicago" tradition might alternatively be described as the "pragmatic or 
empirical" tradition and is strongly influenced by the arguments developed in 
Hayek (1945) and Alchian (1950). It argues that rational, informed, maximising 
behaviour by all individuals is not a necessary condition for markets to behave 
as predicted by models which assume such behaviour. Under this school of 
thought, to build models which successfully explain prices, we do not need to 
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fully understand the process by which prices emerge from individual action. 
Hayek (1945) argues that no single individual can know the information 
embedded in prices. Accordingly, the process of aggregating from the 
individual to the market is likely to be left as a "black box" under this tradition 
and the market is described as if acting as an entity in its own right (e.g. as 
reacting to information). 
Fama's revised definition, that the market correctly uses all relevant information in 
determining security prices, is unclear if investors have heterogeneous 
information, since Fan1a did not explain what "the market use" of information 
would mean in such a case. 
A further development is the treatment of non-publicly available information 
which, by definition is privately costly and thus potentially privately valuable. In 
these models, all markets are tautologically inefficient with respect to all privately 
valuable information. The existence of competitive rewards for effort implies 
that investors' private information on average has positive value and so placing it 
in the public domain will alter prices in a competitive market. By analogy, 
private information, if made public in the hypothetical 'otherwise identical world', 
would imply different prices to those in the 'real' world, simply because the 
supply prices of information differ. Thus, a property of the supply of 
information (its cost) determines whether we call a market "efficient", under these 
models. In the spirit of efficiency as a statement about competitive 
equilibrium, one would expect the construct of "efficiency" to be defined in such 
a manner so as to allow private reward for private investments in infom1ation, 
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including those made by individual investors,' security analysts and corporations. 
However, the proposed definition does not allow this. All 'real world' markets 
thus would be judged "inefficient" with respect to all valuable private 
information but only because the information is privately costly to produce, not 
because ofproperties of the markets themselves. 
Readers of this chapter may feel that the proposed concept of efficiency seems to 
have emphasised logical coherence at the expense of usefulness. The structure 
offers no immediate promise of assisting or even interpreting empirical work on 
efficiency. It also has defined the term "efficiency" as one which is believed to be 
almost universally interpreted by researchers as a property of markets in terms of 
properties of information production. It describes markets as efficient only when 
all information is publicly owned. This contradicts the spirit of both the original 
efficiency concept and the mainstream empirical literature. 
Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Jordan (1983), among 
others, sought an alternative "efficiency" construct that is more compatible with 
incentives to produce information. Grossman and Stiglitz rejected Fama's (1970) 
definition that in an efficient market at any time, prices fully reflect all 
available information. They demonstrated that in such a market there would be 
no incentive for any individual to produce information. They offered a 
reformulation of "efficiency" as a noisy rational expectations market with supply 
induced noise interfering with the inference of information from prices. Prices then 
cannot fulfil Fama's "fully reflect all information" criterion without noise. No 
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infonnation is produced due to lack of incentive and with noise, prices cannot 
fully, reflect infonnation. In this model, Fama's definition cannot possibly 
describe any hypothetical market. 
While clearly there is no incentive to incur costs in reproducing information that 
already is costless publicly available, there do remain incentives to produce 
private infonnation in a competitive world. For example, consider the relation 
between a companies reported earnings and prices. Ball and Brown (1968) states 
that there are gains from obtaining private infonnation on earnings before "the 
market" does, that is, before it becomes publicly available. Security analysts thus 
incur costs in forecasting earnings (or in obtaining infonnation that subsequently 
will be reflected in earnings). However, such infonnation cannot be "fully 
reflected" in security prices and remain privately valuable, which highlights the 
inadequacy of Fama's (1970) original definition that Grossman and Stiglitz 
observed. 
The problem in part is due to Fama's (1970) statistically based classification of 
infonnation sets. If the classifications had been based on the cost of production of 
infonnation (zero in the case of weak and semi-strong fonns of the EMH and 
positive in the strong fonn), then the subsequent confusion might not have arisen. 
Whereas Fama referred to prices reflecting "all available infonnation", 
fundamental competitive economics predicts only that prices reflect all, public1y­
available infonnation. Grossman and Stiglitz' argument thus points out once more 
the inadequacy of Fama's (1970) original definition, which they cited, though in 
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fairness to Fama it should be noted that his 1976 revision by then was free of 
these problems. 
EMH - IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS 
Following on from the development of the ideas of market efficiency, what are the 
implications for financial managers in an informationally efficient capital market? 
If one accepts that capital markets function sufficiently from an informational 
point of view, the potential opportunities for beating the market on a systematic 
basis are rare. Should financial analysts come across instances where market 
prices apparently do not make economic sense based on prevailing economic 
conditions, forecasts and expectations, disregarding the EMH may be rather 
premature. One may suggest that financial managers should assume, at least as a 
starting point, that security prices are fair and that it is very difficult to outguess 
the market. This has some important implications for the financial manager. 
MARKET AMNESIA 
The weak form of the efficient-market hypothesis states that the sequence of past 
price changes contains little information about future changes. Economists 
express the same idea more concisely when stating that capital markets are devoid 
of memory. However, there is evidence to suggest that managers often act as if 
this were not the case. Studies by Francious et al (2004) in emerging markets and 
by Deesomsak et al (2004) in the United Kingdom show that managers generally 
favour equity rather than debt financing after an abnormal price rise, the idea 
being to catch the market while it is high. Similarly, they are often reluctant to 
issue stock after a fall in price. They are inclined to wait for a rebound. However, 
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since markets do not have memories, the cycles that financial managers seem to 
rely on may not even exist. 
Sometimes a financial manager will have inside information indicating that the 
firm's stock is either over or under-priced. Suppose, for example, that there is 
some good news which the market does not know but the financial managers does 
know about it. The stock price will be expected to rise sharply with the 
incremental release. Therefore, if the company sold shares at the current price, it 
would be offering a bargain to new investors at the expense of present 
stockholders. Naturally, managers are reluctant to sell new shares when they have 
favourable inside information. However, such information has nothing to do with 
the history of the stock price. The firm's stock could be selling at half its price of 
a year ago, and yet the financial manager may still have special information 
suggesting that the stock is still over-valued. 
In an efficient market investors are expected to trust prices as true reflections of 
intrinsic values. This means that in an efficient market, there is no way for most 
investors to achieve consistently superior rates of return. To do so, one not only 
need to know more than anyone else but one needs to know more than everyone 
else. This message 'is important for the financial manager who is responsible for 
the firm's exchange-rate policy or for its purchases and sales of debt. If you 
operate on the basis that you are smarter than others at predicting currency 
changes or interest-rate moves, you will trade a consistent financial policy for an 
elusive will-o'-the-wisp. The company's assets may also be directly affected by 
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management's faith in its investment skills. For example, one company may 
purchase another simply because its management thinks that the stock is 
undervalued. On approximately half the occasions the stock of the acquired firm 
will with hindsight tum out to be undervalued. However, on the other half it will 
be overvalued. On average the value will be correct, so the acquiring company is 
playing a fair game except for the costs ofthe acquisition. 
READ THE ENTRAILS 
If the market is efficient, prices impound all available information. Therefore, if 
investors can learn to read we can only learn to read the entrails, security prices 
can tell us a lot about the future. For example, information regarding a company's 
statements can help financial managers estimate the probability of bankruptcy. 
The market's assessment of the company's securities can also provide important 
information about the firm's prospects. Thus, if the company's bonds are offering 
a much higher yield than the average, you can deduce that the firm is probably in 
trouble. 
As another example, suppose that investors are confident that interest rates are set 
to rise over the next year. In such cases, they will prefer to wait before they make 
long-term loans, and any firm that wants to borrow long-term money today will 
have to offer the inducement of a higher rate of interest. In other words, the long­
term rate of interest will have to be higher than the one-year rate. Differences 
between the long-term interest rate and the short-term rate tell you something 
about what investors expect to happen to short-term rates in the future. 
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THERE ARE NO FINANCIAL ILLUSIONS 
In an efficient market there are no financial illusions. Investors are 
unromantically concerned with the firm's cash flows and the portion of those cash 
flows to which they are entitled. This can be illustrated by looking at the effect of 
stock dividends and splits. Every year many companies increase the number of 
shares outstanding either by subdividing the existing shares or by distributing 
more shares as dividends. This does not affect the company's future cash flows or 
the proportion of these cash flows attributable to each shareholder. 
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) studied the affect of stock splits during the 
years 1926 to 1960. They investigated the cumulative abnormal performance of 
stocks around the time of the split after adjustment for the increase in the number 
of shares. A significant rises before the split was noticed since announcements of 
the split would have occurred in the last month or two ofthis period. That implies 
that the decision to split is both the consequence of rising prices and 
simultaneously the cause of a further rise. The study demonstrated that financial 
managers and shareholders were not as hard-headed as expected and that they did 
care about the form as well as the substance of security prices. However, during 
the subsequent year, two-thirds of the splitting companies announced above­
average increases in cash dividends. Usually such an announcement would cause 
an unusual rise in the stock price, but in the case of the splitting companies there 
was no such occurrence at any time after the split. The apparent explanation 
offered by financial managers is that stock splits are accompanied by explicit or 
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implicit promises of dividend increases and that rising prices are the time of splits 
have nothing to do with the prediction of a forthcoming split but with the 
infonnation that splits convey. 
This behaviour does not imply that investors prefer dividend increases for their 
own sake. Companies that undergo stock-splits appear to be unusually successful 
in other ways. For example, Asquith, Healy, and Palepu (1989) and more 
recently, Krantz (2004) found that stock splits are frequently preceded by sharp 
increases in earnings. Such earnings increases are very often transitory and 
investors rightly regard them with suspicion. 
However, the stock split appears to provide investors with an assurance that in this 
case the rise in earnings is indeed permanent. 
THE DO-IT-YOURSELF ALTERNATIVE 
In an efficient market investors will not pay others for what they can do equally 
well themselves. As can be seen from the academic literature, many of the 
controversies in corporate financing centre on how well individuals can replicate 
corporate financial decisions. For example, companies often justify mergers on 
the grounds that they produce a more diversified and hence more stable firm. 
However, if investors can hold stock of both companies, then why should the 
company be required to do it on their behalf? Diversification for the individual is 
far more costly than diversification for the company as a whole. 
The financial manager needs to ask the same question when considering whether 
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it is better to issue debt or common stock. If the filTIl issues debt, it will create 
financial leverage. As a result, the stock will be more risky and it will offer a 
higher expected return. Shareholders can obtain financial leverage without the 
firm issuing debt since they can borrow on their own accounts. The problem for 
the financial manager is therefore to decide whether the company can issue debt 
more cheaply than the individual shareholder. 
CONTROVERSIES IN EMH THEORY 
Jensen (1978) proports that 'the efficient market hypothesis is the best established 
fact in all of the social sciences'. In 1988 he went further, telling us that 'no 
proposition, in any of the sciences is better documented than the efficient market 
hypothesis'. It is true that there is much evidence indicating that stock market 
prices (in the USA in particular) appropriately incorporate all currently available 
public infolTIlation. Nevertheless these are sweeping statements, particularly as 
Jensen does admit in his 1988 study that the evidence is 'not literally 100 percent 
in support' of the hypothesis. What can we say about the evidence on the 
efficiency of stock markets? 
The semi-strong test of EMH also referred to as information arbitrage efficiency 
does not imply rational prices. It does imply that the share price of a company 
reflects its fundamental value. At the best the weak form and semi-strong form 
tests indicate that it is not possible to identify persistent opportunities through 
stock market trading to achieve excess profits. The tests indicate that the EMH 
cannot be rejected on the basis of the data being used -this does not mean that the 
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tests prove that the market is efficient. The empirical tests in fact can neither 
confirm nor refute that stock markets are 'efficient'. The tests do not establish that 
a stock market is efficient. All they show is that it cannot be proved that it is 
inefficient. 
There are important differences between the stock markets in Europe and the US 
stock markets. In the UK the financial institutions own much higher percentage of 
the shares of UK companies than is the case with financial institutions in the 
USA. This means that in the UK there are not always a large number of buyers or 
sellers of a company's shares which economics teaches is a necessary condition 
for perfect competition. We should be careful before assuming that findings 
based on the situation in the USA apply to the UK. 
Most of the empirical evidence used to support the EMH was published in the 
1960s and 1970s. More recent research has explored a number of 'anomalies' with 
respect to the behaviour of share prices. There are alternative hypotheses that, 
rather than imply the market is efficient, imply that there are large and persistent 
valuation errors. These hypotheses refer to 'fads', 'speculative bubbles' and the 
'inflation illusion'. 
Researchers have been kept busy on both sides of the Atlantic, for over 30 years 
studying how share prices react to new information. For share prices to reflect 
publicly available information (which is still highly debatable) does not mean that 
the share price reflects the fundamental value of the share {sometimes referred to 
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as the true or intrinsic value of the share). 
One basic problem is that we do not know what is the 'fundamental value' of a 
share. We have to rely on valuation models that of necessity need to be based on 
certain assumptions. Even having estimated a true value we then have to decide 
how far away from this true value the actual price of a share has to be before we 
say the market is underestimating or overestimating and is therefore inefficient. A 
third problem is what percentage of quoted companies need to have their shares 
under or over-priced before we say the market is inefficient. Black caused a stir 
when in his presidential address to the American Finance Association, he stated 'I 
think almost all markets (he was referring to US stock markets) are efficient 
almost all of the time.' Almost all he explains means at least 90% of the time. In 
fact if 10% of the time markets are not efficient this gives a lot of opportunity for 
'bargain purchases' of undervalued shares. Black pointed out that a certain 
amount of trading in shares was motivated by 'noise'. He wished to contrast 
'noise' with 'information'. From the market's point of view all trading is good as it 
makes markets liquid, whether or not the trading is based on facts. 
Black's VIews of what at any point of time the relationship between a true 
(intrinsic) value and the actual share price should be in an efficient market leaves 
a lot of room for those engaged in investing in equities to exploit price gaps. 
Black refers to the market being efficient if it results in the actual price of a 
company's shares being within a factor of two of its true value. This factor 
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represents his view of a reasonable price and Black admits it is arbitrary but he 
states 'intuitively, though, it seems reasonable to me, in the light of sources of 
uncertainty about value'. The above comments suggest that either the markets are 
not so efficient at interpreting the information given in company financial 
statements or that the statements do not give sufficient information for the 
intrinsic value to be determined. 
As Stiglitz points out the existence of asymmetric information means that 
'managers can take actions which affect the returns to those who provide capital'. 
m the 1980s the 'management of earnings disclosure' became an art and 
unfortunately became not uncommon both in the US and the UK. The 
manipulation of reported earnings means that one group of market participants 
have information and an understanding not available to other participants. On the 
question of understanding, doubts arose particularly in the late 1980s as to 
whether financial analysts, who had the necessary information, were able to 
understand its true importance. 
Modigliani (1988) expressed concern with the efficiency of the stock market. He 
believed that irrational investors are present in the market. He wrote that he had 
'become a bit disenchanted with the indiscriminate use of super-rationality as the 
foundation for models of financial behaviour'. Modigliani examines the effects of 
inflation on market valuation. He believed that the market fails to 'understand 
how to value equities in the presence of significant inflation, which results in 
systematic, predictable error'. Modigliani and Cohn (1979) offer an explanation 
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for some of the unexpected movements in share price, namely the existence of 
irrationality on the part of a subset of investors. Campbell and Kyle (1993) show 
how the presence of such a subset of irrational investors can result in under-or 
over-valuation of shares persisting over time. Bhattacharya et al (2003), in 
reviewing the literature on the valuation of equities in the stock market, concludes 
'the accumulation of evidence presents, in my view, a murky picture vis-a-vis the 
prevalence of rational (information efficiency) valuation in the stock market.. 
Researchers have found that significant movements in individual share price and 
stock market indices cannot on many occasions be related to public news and vice 
versa. The announcement of fundamental news does not on occasions move 
prices. It is not just news that leads to movements in share prices; the action of 
uninformed investors also moves prices. 
It is claimed by supporters of the efficient markets that the anomalies that have 
been identified are not of major importance. The ones that have been found only 
affect a minor part of stock market activity. There does not seem to be anything 
systematic about them, which would give grounds for concern that the stock 
market is not on the whole a fair game. 
It is accepted that discrepancies do exist between actual share prices at anyone 
time and what are thought to be 'true' (intrinsic) values. The research of Bernard 
& Jacob (1997) suggests that the market only allows small discrepancies to arise, 
which they estimate to be on average up to a 2% difference for larger firms and up 
to a 6% difference for smaller firms. 
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The studies mentioned above have all been published in the USA and are 
primarily based on the situation in that country. There has been a vast amount of 
empirical research in the USA testing the efficient market hypothesis. Whittington 
(1998) in his overview of financial accounting theory asserts that 'the empirical 
approach has become almost a cult among ambitious young academics, especially 
in the USA' and refers to 'the age of the computer' which facilitates this type of 
research. 
There is a certain amount of evidence relating to the efficiency of the London 
Stock Exchange, but much less evidence on the efficiency of the other stock 
exchanges in Europe. In fact the concept of the efficient market hypothesis is of 
more interest and of more significance in some countries than in others. This is 
because in some countries stock exchanges are of more importance in the 
financial system than in others. 
The results of the German EMH tests that have been undertaken are consistent 
with the findings of the studies which were carried out in the USA and the UK. 
Stock prices not only react to the publication of annual reports, but the German 
investors also seem to anticipate to some degree the information, which is 
published in the accounts. As far as the anticipation of information is concerned 
Coenenberg et al (1976) singles out companies which, due to their size, are 
obliged by the Commercial Code to disclose more data than their smaller 
counterparts. The stock price reaction after the publication of the annual reports 
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of these big companies is relatively minor, thus reflecting that there are less sur­
prises resulting from the publication of the accounts of large companies than 
small. 
Choi and Levich (1991) 'take it as given that US capital markets are highly 
efficient'. They refer to 'the conventional notion that European capital markets are 
more likely to be inefficient in a weak form sense'. It will be remembered that 
weak form efficiency implies that knowledge of past changes in share price will 
not be useful in predicting future changes in share price. If stock markets are not 
weak form efficient then it is possible to predict future price changes on the basis 
ofpast price changes. 
Choi and Levich point out that contrary to what may be thought the evidence is 
that many European stock markets are weak fom1 efficient. Hawawini (1994) 
examined the literature on weak form efficiency of the markets in 14 European 
countries. He concludes that in most of these countries 'when returns are 
measured over intervals longer than a week, the Random Walk Model cannot be 
rejected'. This says nothing of course about movement within a week. There is 
much less literature on the semi-strong efficiency of European markets. 
Hawawini's review of the literature for France and the UK indicates that these 
countries are semi-strong efficient but that Germany is not. The studies indicate 
that for France and the UK the share prices that are set by the market do not leave 
opportunities for abnormal returns for investors who have publicly available 
information. The findings are that market prices quickly reflect accounting 
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information and those operating in the market are not misled by changes in 
accounting rules. 
Although most of the evidence produced over the last twenty years indicates that 
the major stock markets of the world are efficient in a weak form and semi-strong 
form sense, doubts are now being raised. It is becoming fashionable to critize the 
idea that stock markets are efficient. The problem is that the theory has perhaps 
been oversold in the past. 
One foml of criticism relates to the mathematical analysis that has been used in 
the past to test the hypothesis. New mathematical analysis of stock market prices 
show there is often unexpected predictability. This is being explained by the fact 
that those who trade in the market do not all think the same way. They reason 
differently about the information they receive, they have different time horizons 
and different attitudes towards risk. It has been suggested that the more advanced 
computer models now being developed allow opportunities to outperform the 
market at least for awhile. Such opportunities result from the way in which 
information is interpreted and used by the participants in the market. The 
information is efficiently and fairly distributed; it is how it is used that creates 
opportunities. The efficient market hypothesis does not say anything about how 
market participants incorporate news into investment decisions. 
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CHAPTER 3, EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to empirical contributions 
that have shaped the research agenda within this thesis. In formulating the 
research question it often proves difficult to study an area in isolation. Rather, a 
proposed area of research is formalised as a result of several peripheral 
controversies. In the context of this work, controversies surrounding existing 
empirical contributions, methodology, and dataset biases lead the debate. 
This chapter reviews relevant published empirical works in several corporate 
finance areas with the aim of highlighting issues of potential contention and 
providing a statement of how such issues have influenced the research agenda. 
As stated in Chapter 1, the purpose of the study is to examine the impact of 
company announcements on stock returns of lowly capitalised listed companies. 
The importance of markets to demonstrate the ability to reduce informational 
asymmetries and enhance investor confidence is also emphasised. A measure of 
this ability can be gauged through analysing the speed and impact of 
announcements on stock returns and identifying how responsive traders are to 
incremental company releases. Since this area falls within the remit of the 
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informationae form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, (EMH), literature III 
EMH has been dominate in influencing the research agenda. 
In formalising this research topic, a review of empirical studies highlights several 
currently unresolved issues. Consistent with the aims of the study, one can 
consider the broad areas of literature that impact on the formalisation of this 
research agenda below: 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis, despite being heavily researched, has produced 
conflicting empirical results. Historical prices appear to bear little predictive 
power in forecasting future market directions implying that the market is efficient 
in the weak form sense. There are few strong-form efficiency tests available 
owing to methodological problems - who willingly declares knowledge of insider 
information? 
In terms of the semi -strong form of market efficiency, research output appears to 
be less decisive than in the weak and strong form sense. While several studies 
exist providing empirical substantiation of semi-strong form efficiency, an 
emerging body of research casts doubt over this result. Consequent to this 
emerging controversy, it was felt that further study in the area of semi strong form 
efficiency was needed. 
A second contention that has impacted on the formulation of this research agenda 
3 Allocational efficiency and transactional efficiency are outwith the scope of this work 
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relates to data analysed in previous informational efficiency studies. Analysis of 
previous work provides anecdotal evidence that most studies in the area have been 
devoted to datasets derived either from blue chip companies or drawn from the 
established security markets of the world. Analysts have tended to concentrate on 
analysing stocks traded on the exchanges of London, Tokyo and New York, as 
evidenced in the below Table 3 
Table 3 Data Sets Previously Analysed 
Nature of Dataset 
Large cap Fortune 500 Companies 
New York Stock ExchangelNASDAQ 
Listed Companies 
Singapore Stock Exchange 
Dow Jones Index 
Nikkei, Standard & Poors 500 
Companies and FTSE 100 Companies. 
New York Stock Exchange 
Standard & Poors 500 Companies 
Standard & Poors 500 Companies 
Five Major US Exchanges 
Standard & Poors 500 Companies 
London Stock Exchange 
New York Stock Exchange 
Standard & Poors 500 Companies 
Companies listed on major domestic 
stock exchanges 
Companies with minimum stock price 
of$lO 
Companies with minimum market 
capitalisation of $400m 
Companies listed on major domestic 
stock exchanges update this table 
New York Stock Exchange 
New York Stock Exchange 
New York Stock Exchange 
Author 

Jorgensen & Wingender (2004) 

Garfinkel & Nimalendran (2003) 

Loh and Mian (2003) 

Day & Wang (2002) 

Parsons & Richardson. (2004) 

Akhigbe, Gosnell & Harikumar (1998) 

Pizzi, Economopoulos, & O'Neil 

(1998) 

Olson, Nelson, Witt & Mossman 

(19981 
Pandey, Kohers & Kohers (2004) 

Lynch and Medenhall (1997) 

Holland (2000) 

Rippington & Taffler (1995) 

Wright (1994) 

Adhikari & Tondkar (1992) 

Cready & Mynatt (1991) 

Atiase (1985) 

Cohn & Lessard (1981) 

Patell (1976) 

Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll (1969) 

Beaver (1968) 
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Whilst the absolute importance of these exchanges, both in terms of market 
capitalisation and their role in the world economy cannot be overstated, the 
relative importance ofnew and emerging markets is of interest. 
With the growmg role of emergmg markets in international economIC 
development, (if current predictions bear true, emerging markets will account for 
forty-five percent of total world market capitalisation by the year 2010), it was felt 
that informational efficiency issues in emerging markets could no longer be 
ignored. 
A third area that has directed this research has been the debate around the ability 
of the market to effectively interpret company announcements. For example, if 
one were to presuppose a market composed of rational investors, one would 
expect company announcements to be interpreted consistently. Investors would 
adjust portfolios in line with sentiments expressed through company news in order 
to maximise their own utility functions. While there is emerging doubt of the 
ability of investors to adjust portfolio holdings in line with company I 
announcements speedily (except perhaps in the case of dividend announcements), j................:.....~1 

the extent of adjustment as accurately reflecting announcement sentiments is also I 
contentious. I 
Empirical evidence ((Manalis et al (1999), Cuthbertson et al (2003)) suggests that 
investors consistently overreact to news after announcements with mean reversion 
taking place in lagged trading periods. This is due to an over-compensation of 
~~~-:?i 
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initial announcement impacts. In this study, apart from looking at announcement 
impacts on stock prices within a specific event window, the behaviour of stock 
returns beyond the event window are also examined to see if mean reversion does 
infact exist, leading to a stabilisation of stock returns in the long run. 
Increased empirical research questioning the rationality of stock markets points to 
Chaos Theory as one of the primary explanatory phenomenon underlying asset 
prices. With the suggestion that fundamental analysis provides little insight into 
asset valuations, Chaos Theory challenges the ability of investors to react 
rationally in providing measured responses to incremental profits, earnings and 
dividend announcements. By testing the mIDouncement impacts on stock returns, 
this work sheds light on the extent to which such over-reactions exist. 
Fourthly, Table 4 suggests that armouncements considered in previous seml­
strong form efficiency tests are largely of a financial nature. 
Table 4 Announcements In Previous Event Studies 
Nature of Announcements Author Freguen~ 
Accounting earnings Freeman (1987) 1 
Annual Report Lirnmack & Ward (1990) 
Changes III institutional Pruitt & J01m (1989) 1 
holdings 
Annual report Dimson & Marsh (1986) 1 
Balance of payments Pruitt et al (1992) 2 
announcements 
Challenger Explosion Blose et al (1996) 1 
Dividend announcements Sant & Cowan (19941 
Dividend announcements Mozes & Rapaccioli (1995) 
Dividend announcements Gosnell, Keown & 
Pinkerton_C19961 
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Dividend announcements Bessler & Nohel (2000) 3 
Earnings announcements Lee & Chung (1990) 
Earnings announcements Choi (1995) 
Earnings announcements Rippington & Taffler (1995) 
Earnings announcements Atiase (1985) 
Earnings announcements May (1971) 
Earnings announcements Beaver (1968) 8 
Earnings per share Brown and Neiderhoffer 1 
announcements (1968) 
Stock Splits Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll 1 
(1969) 
By default, such studies are restrictive in the nature of conclusions they derive 
since the data is not representative of the different types of announcements 
entering the public domain. Usually, announcements analysed tend to be of a 
financial nature relating to such matters as profit declarations, earnings figures 
and dividends announcements. While this work conducts analysis into the impact 
of financial announcements on stock returns, it also compares the impact of non-
financial announcements, acquisitions, director dealings and boardroom changes 
on company returns. 
A fifth factor influencing the direction of this research has been from the point of 
view of methodology. While an established algorithm4 exists to test stock return 
impacts of announcements as required by semi-strong form efficiency tests, there 
remains a need to extract from stock returns, that return generated under non-
announcement conditions. The residual return is attributed to the announcement 
impact. A range of equilibrium market models exist that allow for the forecasting 
of returns under non-announcement conditions but little work has been conducted 
4 See Elton & Gruber, Modem Portfolio Theory 5th Edition. Wiley ISBN 04714285666. 
81 
Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
to examme deviations in results under different equilibrium market model 
approaches. Often studies have been conducted by selecting a single 
methodology as given without first identifying differences resulting from each 
model. Table 5 to Table 9 below cite some of the more prominent event studies 
along with the choice of returns generation model utilised. 
Table 5 Use Of Single Index Market Model 
Cready, W., & Mynatt, P. Haddad, A., Mathur, I, Rangan, N., & Tadisina, 
(1991) S. (1993) 
Chaney, P., Devinney, T,., Park et al (2004) 
& Winer, R. (1991) 
Conn R & Connell, F (1993) 
Albert, R & Henderson, G. Strong, N. (1992) 
(1995) 
Pope, P., Morris, R & Peel, D. (1990) 
Mozes, H., and Rapaccioli, Chandra, R., Rohrbach, K,., and Willinger, G. 
D. (1995) (1992) 
Rippington, F., and Taffler, De Jong, F., Kemna, A,., & Kloek, T. (1992) 
R. (1995) 
Frankfurter, G., Leung, W., Wijmenga, R. (1990) 
& Brockman, P. (1993) 
Ali" Klein and Rosenfeld Helmuth ate al (1998) 
(1992) 
Razaee (1995) 
Table 6 Use Of Standard Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Fama et al (1996) Da Costa and Newton (1994) 
Handa et al. (1993) 
Rippington, F., and Taffler, R. Fama, E & French, 1. (1992) 
(1995) 
Albert, R and Henderson, G. Strong, N. (1992) 
(1995) 
Lally, M. (1995) Bark, H. (1991) 
Gompers et al (2003) Pope, P., Morris, R and Peel, D. (1990) 
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Table 7 Use Of Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Consumption CAPM 

Detemple, J, & Giannikos, C. Kazemi, H, (1991) 

(1996) 

Lund, J, & Engsted, T. (1996) Chan and Lakonshok (2002) 

Mankiw, G, & Shapiro, M. Jorion & Giovanni (1993) 

(1986) 

Kazemi (1988) 

Table 8 Use Of Zero Beta Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Zero Beta CAPM 

Wood, J, (2001) Levy, H., & Levy, A. (1987) 

Zhou, G, (1991) Kandel, S, (1986) 

Faff, et al (2001) Shanken, J, (1986) 

Best, M., & Grauer, R. (1990) 

Table 9 Use Of Arbitrage Pricing Model 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory 

Darrat, A., & Dickens, R. Sun and Zhang (2001) 

(1996) 

Gallo, l, & Swanson, P. Ctin, Roberts and Protter (2004) 

(1996) 

Narayanaswamy (1996) 

Chen et al (2004) Clare, A, (1995) 

This work conducts a pilot study (see Appendix 1) usmg a battery of 
methodological approaches. The merits of each method are debated in the light of 
differences in results of the pilot study in order to provide support for the 
methodology chosen. The extent to which the semi-strong form of event study 
results are sensitive to the choice of equilibrium market model utilised are 
discussed in the pilot study. However, a decision on the most appropriate market 
model approach is made as a result of the theoretical justification of the market 
model discussed on page 144 with the pilot study providing support for the 
decision 
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EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN EFFICIENT MARKET STUDIES 
WEAK FORM MARKET EFFICIENCY 
RANDOM WALK TESTS 
Weak form market efficiency tests form proxy tests of random walks in stock 
prices. While the prevailing wisdom is of markets following what appears to be 
random walks, improvements in methodology have recently lead us to doubt what 
was formally conventional wisdom. 
Early studies on US data supporting random walks came from Samuelson (1965) 
and Mandolbrot (1966) though Kemp & Reid (1971) used UK data and found that 
non-random price changes existed in 80% of stocks. Girmes & Benjamin (1975) 
studied the movement of a large number of UK share prices and found that 
approximately 20% did not move in a manner expected of a random walk, thirty 
percent were found to exhibit random behaviour and the remaining rendered 
inconclusive results. More recently, studies by Balky and Fombe (1991) and by 
Mills (1995) have generated empirical results in support of the Random Walk 
Hypothesis (RWH). Fama (1995) also generated results that were seen to 
substantiate random walks in stock prices thus supporting the notion of weak­
form efficiency. 
SERIAL CORRELATION TESTS 
Studies have found stock prices to exhibit a level of correlation with lagged values 
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demonstrating a degree of predictability using historical prices and negating the 
presence of weak form efficiency. However, those same studies have also found 
the level of serial correlation as insignificant to justify profitable trading on a post 
transactions-cost basis. Kemp & Reid (1971) and much later, Panas (1990) also 
support these findings. However, a body of literature has recently emerged 
supporting the existence of the existence of serial correlation's in stock returns. 
More specifically, Hathaway (1986) and Ali, Klein & Rosenfeld (1992) have 
shown that strong serial correlation in stocks is evident. Hathaway (1986) 
suggested that, in cases where datasets do exhibit strong serial correlation, testing 
methodologies and procedures must be adopted to accommodate such changes. 
RUNS TESTS 
Barnes (1986) and Urrutia (1995) conducted runs tests and found markets to be 
weak-form efficient with studies later supported by Wang et al (199411995). 
These results suggest either there is no relationship between lag period price 
changes or that statistical techniques are not powerful enough to identify such 
dependencies. Filter rules have been used to filter away short-tenn movements 
and isolate long-term trend market trends and suggested that the use of such 
techniques may generate profits in excess of those achieved by a naive buy and 
hold strategy. More recently, a re-analysis of stocks examined by Sweeney 
(1988) indicates that filter rules as a tool for profit generation have more potential 
than previously indicated. Davutyan & Pippenger (1989) also find filter rules 
yielding returns in excess of a buy and hold strategy. Twark & D'Mello (1991) 
support the findings of the use of filter rules to generate increased returns as do 
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Corrado & Lee (1992) and Levich & Thomas (1993). Earlier studies against the 
use of filter rules as viable strategies include the work of Anderson (1986) and 
Sweeney (1986) 
SEMI STRONG FORM MARKET EFFICIENCY 
Semi-strong form efficiency tests analyse the speed at which company 
announcement affects are incorporated into stock prices. A semi-strong form 
efficient market implies that the speed of price adjustment to new information is 
high. The most classical study adopting the semi-strong approach was that of 
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll who in (1969) tested the impact of stock-split 
announcements and found that the market incorporated stock-split impacts months 
previous to announcement dates. Subsequent to the announcement, no abnormal 
returns were recorded. Fama et aI's study was seen as anecdotal evidence of the 
existence of semi-strong form efficiency. Beaver (1968) found that around the 
time of company earnings declarations, there were trading and price reactions 
suggesting that the informational content of annual earnings was indeed high. 
Ball & Brown (1968) concluded that earnings announcements were well 
anticipated and that up to 80% of their effect is incorporated into share prices in 
the days leading up to the announcement, again supporting the semi-strong form 
of market efficiency. Firth (1981) carried out similar tests on stock market 
information using UK data and found that stocks adjusted speedily to new 
information. Support for semi-strong form efficiency was also forthcoming from 
Green & Segal (1967) and Brown and Neiderhoffer (1968). Later, studies by 
MacDonald & Reign (1993) were supportive of semi-strong form efficiency but 
86 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
the hypothesis itself has since been rejected by, amongst others, Pope, Morris and 
Peel (1990) and Goforth (1992). More recently, Rippington & Taffler (1995) 
found that, on average, the week of preliminary announcements saw little activity 
implying that these announcements were only slowly absorbed into stock prices. 
STRONG FORM MARKET EFFICIENCY 
Strong form market efficiency implies that all information, privately available or 
otherwise, is incorporated into market price reducing the concept of insider 
trading to a hypothetical one. However, it goes without saying that not all 
information enters the public domain. The theoretical implication is that while 
insider dealing may be a profitable activity, the magnitude of insider dealing is 
perceived by the market as insignificant. Otherwise, rational, risk averse, 
'outsiders' would withdraw from the market. Indeed, regulation aimed at 
preventing insider dealing by providing for rapid financial disclosure IS 
increasingly common to all major stock exchanges. 
While, on balance, studies support the market being informationally efficient in 
the weak-form sense, the detection of strong-form efficiency represents a 
problem. Testing strong-fom1 efficiency requires that groups of insider dealers 
are identified, a task that is difficult to execute. In the case of semi-strong form 
efficiency, a paradox does appear to exist between a voluminous academic 
literature that displays inconclusive evidence. 
Pennar (1986) argues that contradictory results relating to semi-strong form 
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efficiency tests have forced economists to question standard stock market wisdom 
that markets are infact informationally efficient. He demonstrates that the use of 
the dividend discount model, (see Kolman (1987)) can beat Wall Street's market 
return on a systematic basis which contradicts the implication of an efficient 
market. 
The experience of renowned traders is also clear, that the use of Cumulative 
Volume Relative Strength and Moving Average System (CRISMA) also 
outperfonn the market over a significant time period (see Pruitt & White (1988). 
Paustian (1987) demonstrate that stock selection can enable equity managers to 
outperform the stock market by an average of 130 points. Pettengill (1989) has 
shown the Dow Jones Industrial Average for the period 1962-1986 to have 
statistically significant correlation co-efficient for daily returns thus rejecting the 
notion of randomness in favour of historical prices having informational content 
vis a vis future predictability. Hulbert (1996) demonstrate the out-performance 
over the market of stock split securities for months beyond announcement dates 
and Janijigian (1997) have shown that the adjustment procedure to information 
flows is sufficiently slow to allow for abnormal profits to be generated in the short 
run. Alpert (1997) found that stocks with certain characteristics (stocks that were 
under-priced as gauged by their book value, earnings or cashflow) routinely beat 
the market. 
One concludes from the empirical literature that there appears to be a 
contradiction between the performance of traders and academic findings. Traders 
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have demonstrated an ability to out-perform the market on a systematic basis, thus 
contradicting the findings stemming from semi-strong form efficient empiricism. 
A need for re-examining the existence of semi-strong form market efficiency is 
therefore proposed. 
ANNOUNCEMENT SIGNALS AND MARKET OVER-REACTIONS 
The theoretical development of EMH as described in Chapter 2 is based on the 
notion of investors having access to a certain set of information in order to revise 
security prices instantaneously and in an unbiased manner. In the presence of 
uncertain information (the timing and nature of company announcements is 
considered to be unpredictable), the ability of stock prices to impound company 
announcements in a manner reflective of the sentiments of those announcements 
is questionable. An additional hypothesis of investor behaviour is brought to 
light, the Over-Reaction Hypothesis (ORR). Ajayi et al (1994) state: 
'investors process the arrival of unexpected information in a manner that displays 
over-reaction to favourable as well as unfavourable surprises' 
A survey of existing literature is divided on the issues of whether or not stocks 
over-react to company announcements. Brown (1998) begins by studying the 
extent of investor over-reactions. A longitudinal study is conducted analysing the 
impact of both financial and non-financial announcements using CRSP data 
spanning the period January 1946 to December 1988. Focusing on the residual 
losses and gains of individual securities, investor's responses to events that 
differed in intensity and magnitude are isolated. The results demonstrate clearly 
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that the manner in which market participants react to extreme price movements is 
critically dependent upon the direction of the initial change. For positive events, 
only mild evidence transpired that investors set prices in any manner other than 
efficiently. The evidence on short-term corrections to negative events 
corresponds strongly with over-reactions. 
In the same year, Chen et al (1998) also found evidence for the over-reaction 
hypothesis. Chan found that, by pre-supposing the over-reaction hypothesis, a 
trading rule could be devised to beat the market since a characteristic of the over­
reaction hypothesis was that stocks reverse their over-reactions through time. 
Chan's study simulated abnormal returns by investing in stocks that had recently 
experienced negative returns and divesting stocks that recently demonstrated 
positive returns. The study found that applying investment-based strategies on 
correction of over-reactions through time could generate positive abnormal 
returns. 
Lincoln (2002) provides further evidence on the investor over-reaction hypothesis. 
By taking sample data of 101 companies and applying standard event study 
methodology, a positive 21 % excess return was documented prior to good news 
announcements followed by a negative 9.3% average excess return after the 
announcement. 
Apart from confirmation of the over-reaction hypothesis, Ajayi & Mehdian (1994) 
found two further insights. They found that not only do stocks overreact to 
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announcements but that "rational investors" revise their security prices differently. 
Investors react to favourable and unfavourable surprises by trading stock prices to 
below fundamental values. Stock returns variability tended to be higher following 
the arrival of unexpected infonnation and post event price variability tended to be 
larger following the arrival ofunfavourable news as opposed to favourable news. 
Akhigbe, Gosnell and Harikumar (1998) further substantiate the overreaction 
hypothesis when studying New York Stock Exchange listed companies. By 
considering stocks with the largest one-day price change they find stocks 
experience the largest returns reversal in subsequent periods, a result consistent 
with the overreaction hypothesis. The sample tested included all listed finns on 
the Tiawan Stock Exchange for the period 1971-1993 and the results found 
significant price reversals subsequent to announcement periods. Further, they 
found that price reversal remains significant after controlling for the size effect. 
However, the existence of overreaction hypothesis is not totally conclusive. 
Empirical studies have found against the existence of the overreaction hypothesis. 
Paterson (1994) analysed security returns following large one-day declines. The 
primary objective of the study was to explain large price reversals experienced in 
US stock exchanges following large lag-day declines. Since the impact of the 
overreaction hypothesis is observed in subsequent long-term reversals of stock 
returns, a second obj ective was to investigate security returns behaviour 
subsequent to three day reversal period. The study found that it was not investor 
reaction that causes the over-reaction of stock prices, rather, over-reactions related 
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more to a high degree of liquidity in the market. 
More contemporary studies by Chen (1998) investigated the over-reaction 
hypothesis drawing motivation from the fact that the overreaction hypothesis cast 
doubt on the widely held belief of financial systems being informationally 
efficient. Chen found that while trading rules could be designed to exploit 
systematic mistakes made by traders, overreactions would also make contrarian 
investment strategies profitable. 
A further dimension to the controversy of the overreaction hypothesis can be 
considered in the context of small firms. Chopra et al (1992), when looking at 
lowly capitalised firms on the New York Stock Exchange added further 
contention to the overreaction hypothesis. While tax-losses selling effects often 
contributed to the overreaction hypothesis, this study points to seasonal effects as 
playing a major role in the hypothesis. More interestingly, when sorting the test 
sample by market capitalisation, the study found that the over-reaction hypothesis 
was more pronounced for lowly capitalised firms than for large firms. 
Ketcher et al (1994) also investigate the extent of overreactions in small firms. 
They conduct an analysis examining the behaviour of security returns on the 
period immediately following abrupt changes in values of stock returns. Whilst 
the over-reaction hypothesis predicts negative (positive) abnormal returns 
following positive (negative) events, the results of the study clearly point to 
significant negative abnormal returns following positive events and are thus 
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consistent with short-tenn market overreactions than with the uncertainty 
information hypothesis. More recently, Clare & Thomas (1995) analysed UK 
data and found in support of the overreaction hypothesis. A statistically 
significant yet economically insignificantly overreaction effect transpired. More 
interestingly, when the study controlled for firm size, a limited over-reaction 
effect was documented for UK lowly capitalised stocks. 
DATA BIASES IN EMH STUDIES 
COMPANY SIZES 
Owing to the nature of infonnational efficiency studies, empiricists require large 
amounts of information in order to extrapolate meaningful conclusions. 
Consequently, empirical work will favour either larger companies or larger stock 
markets on which these companies are traded. Clearly, the willingness to research 
needs to be met. by the availability of infonnation. Where information is less 
forthcoming, empirical work becomes frustrated by the amount of information 
forming the research data sample. From the supply side, there is overwhelming 
evidence to support the notion of infomlation availability of larger companies far 
exceeds that of smaller companies. 
There are several key factors that influence the level of disclosure and availability 
of information of finns often leading to biases in research in favour of larger 
companies. Positive correlation between finn size and data availability has been 
well documented in the academic literature. Early studies by Singhvi & Desai 
93 

Sudes h Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
(1971) and Chow & Wong-Boren (1987) have demonstrated this. Later, studies 
by Kasznik & Lev (1995) demonstrated that more highly capitalised firms are 
required to comply with rigorous stock exchange listing regulations leading to a 
higher level of information dissemination. More recently, studies by Adams & 
Hossain and Han & Manry (2000) have also shown that smaller firms have a 
proportionally higher associated 'cost of disclosure' which causes a reluctance to 
disseminate information into the public domain. 
As a result of this apparent anomaly, empiricists do seem to favour 
informationally efficient market associated with the behaviour of larger and more 
highly capitalised firms. 
Development of newer emerging markets over the past 10-15 years can only be 
described as impressive. One of the most appropriate indicators of this has been 
the marked increase in the number of companies that have attained listing status 
leading the exchange growth. With the exception of Argentina, Turkey and 
Venezuela, the trend has indeed been encouraging as demonstrated by Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 Development of Emerging Markets 
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As a result of recent emerging market development, it is proposed that future 
studies in efficient markets should reflect this trend if conclusions and 
recommendations of the study are to be meaningful in a global environment where 
the role of emerging markets is ever increasing. 
Limited preliminary work has been conducted on informational efficiency in 
emerging markets. Saatcioglu & Starks (1998) have analysed the extent of 
informational asymmetries on deVeloping South American markets. Koutmos 
(1999) and more recently Ramcharran (2003) have analysed the impact of events 
on stock return in emerging markets and have found that these market rarely 
register a reaction when company announcements are made. 
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TYPES OF ANNOUNCEMENTS 
It appears that event study theorists place greater emphasis on the impact of those 
announcements that are directly financially motivated such as dividends and 
earnings with little work gauging the impact of non-financial annOlmcements that 
may also have a financial impact on a firm's future earnings potential. Such 
announcements may for example include changes in directorships, acquisitions 
and legal actions. Table 10 below summarised the nature and frequency of 
announcements analysed. The table demonstrates that mainstream announcement 
impact research concentrates primarily on financial announcements. 
Table 10 Previous Announcements In Previous Event Studies 
Nature of Announcements Author Year 
Changes in sovereign risk Brooks et al 2003 
Change in accounting legislation Dwyer 2001 
Earnings forecasts Capstaff et al 2001 
Earnings announcements Srinivasan 1998 
Earnings announcements Teoh, Welch & Wong 1998 
Challenger Explosion Blose et al 1996 
Dividend announcements Gosnell, Keown & Pinkerton 1996 
Dividend announcements Bessler & Nohel 2000 
Dividend announcements Mozes & Rapaccioli 1995 
Earnings announcements Choi 1995 
Earnings announcements Rippington & Taffler 1995 
Dividend announcements Sant & Cowan 1994 
Impact Of Industrial Actions Pmitt& Wei 1988 I 
Annual Report Limmack & Ward 1990 I 
Accounting earnings Freeman 1987 I 
Annual report Dimson & Marsh 1986 
Stock Splits Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll 1969 
METHODOLOGIES IN THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
While evidence in support of the market being weak and strong form efficient 
appears relatively conclusive, the semi-strong form provides cause for further 
research. Empirical results, in the main, fail to be consistent, a contention that 
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forms the basis of re-examining methodologica15 approaches that is all too often 
taken for granted. 
In an attempt to ascertain the level of semi-strong fonn of infonnational efficiency 
of stock markets, the most common approaches remains that of event study. 
Yadav et al defines an event study as one which 
'constitutes an empirical study that attempts to gauge the effect of economic 
announcements or events on key attributes of a security. The most common 
attribute considered is the effect of events on the returns of a security' 
Event studies are conducted to examine the extent of semi-strong fonn market 
efficiency by examining the speed of price adjustment to reflect the informational 
content of incremental announcements. 
EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY 
Elton & Gruber (1995) set out a systematic process for conducting event studies 
as demonstrated by the schematic diagram as illustrated by Chart 1 
5 Methodology is more fully dealt with in Chapter 4 
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Chart 1 Algorithm of Event Studies Testing 
Algorithm of Event Study Testing Procedure 
Step 1 

Collect sample 

Step 2 

Detemne precise day ofannOW1cement 

Step 3 

Define period of study 

Step 4 

Compute expected return 

Step 5 

Compute Abnonnal Return 

Step 6 

Compute the average abnonnal retwn 

Compute cumulative abnonnal return 
As shown by , an algorithm is presented explaining the approached to event study. 
Each step can be summarised as follows: 
Step 1 
Collect a sample of firms that has announcements (the event). What causes prices 
to change is an announcement that is a surprise to investors. For many studies, 
such as an announcement of a merger, any announcement can be treated as a 
surprise. For other studies such as the impact of earnings announcements, it is 
more complicated. For these studies it is necessary to define a surprise. This is 
normally done by comparing announcements to what was expected as reflected in 
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the average estimate of professional analysts. To fonn a sample of surprises one 
first separates out a group of finns where the announcement is significantly 
different from what is being forecast. Since positive and negative surprises impact 
on price differently, this group is further separated into two groups, one for 
positive and one for negative earnings surprises. 
Step 2 
Determine the precise day of the announcement and designate this day as zero. 
Most current studies use daily data, whereas historically, monthly data was used. 
The use of monthly data however makes measurement much more difficult owing 
to several announcements taking place in the same study period. Thus for 
measuring market efficiency it is important to measure the impact of the 
announcement using the smallest feasible intervals. 
Step 3 
Define the period to be studied. For example, where a 60 day time frame is being 
studied, one designates -30, -29, -28, ... -1 as the 30 days prior to the event, 0 as 
the event day, and + 1, +2, +3, ....+ 30 as the 30 days after the event. 
Step 4 
For each of the firms in the sample, compute the return on each of the days being 
studied. In the example above, this would mean 61 days (30 before the event, the 
event day plus the 30 days after the event). 
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Step 5 

Compute the "abnonnal" return for each of the days being studies for each finn in 

the sample. The abnonnal return is defined as the actual return less the expected 

return. Different authors use different models for expected return. (see Chapter 4) 

Step 6 

Compute for each day in the event period the average abnonnal return for all the 

finns in the sample and examine results. One nonnally considers average 

announcement effects rather than examining each finn separately. Other events 

are occurring and so averaging across firms should minimise the effects of other 

events. However, for studies where the magnitude of announcements vary across 

finns (such as earnings surprises), it may be useful to examine individual finn 

behaviour as well. 

Step 7 

Often the individual day's normal return is added together to compute the 

cumulative abnonnal return from the beginning of the period. Fame et al (1969) 

conducted such an experiment and graphed the cumulative abnonnal return that 

demonstrated an increase up to the day of the announcement after which, 

remaining constant. 

Step 8 

Examination and discussion of results 

Results ofthe analysis are then discussed. 
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This algorithm is well-established in event study research and event studies differ 
only marginally in their approach. Although the above leaves little room for 
deviation, there are several models that can be used in Step 5 when generating 
abnormal returns. 
EQUILIBRIUM MARKET MODELS 
An abnormal return requires one to first generate a normal return under non­
announcement conditions. This is done using one of a range of equilibrium 
market models. The choice of either the Single Index Market Model, one of 
several variations of Capital Asset Pricing Model, (CAPM) or the Arbitrage 
Pricing Model exists. 
SINGLE INDEX MARKET MODEL 
According to the single index market model, expected returns on stock I, RI, can 
be stated as per Equation I 
Equation 1 
where 
ar = represents the component of the security i's return that is independent of 
overall market performance 
Rm shows the rate of return on a highly diversified portfolio, Rm 
~t denotes the beta constant that measures the expected change in Ri gIVen 
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incremental market return changes 
This equation simply breaks the return on a stock into two components, that part 
that is due to the market return as defined by a highly diversified portfolio and 
that part independent of the market. Pi in the expression measures how sensitive a 
stock's return is to the return on the market. It measures the resultant increase in 
stock returns from an incremental increase in market return. The term aj 
represents that component ofretums insensitive to or independent of the returns of 
the market. It is useful to break the term aj into two components. For example let 
Uj denote the expected value of aj and let ej represent the random or uncertain 
element of aj. We then have the following expression: 
Equation 2 
where ej has an expected value of zero under standard OLS assumptions. The 
equation for the returns on a stock can now be written as follows: 
Equation 3 
It is important to note that both ej and rm are random variables. They each have a 
probability distribution, a mean and a standard deviation. Let us denote their 
respective standard deviations as (J"ei and (J"m. Equation 3 is known as the Single 
Index Market Model. An assumption of the model is that random or uncertain 
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• 
elements ej should be un-correlated with rm. Formally, this can be expressed as 
follows: 
Equation 4 
If e] is un-correlated with Rm, this would imply that the equation conforms to 
atleast one of the standard assumptions of regression analysis which lends 
credibility to the model. Another key assumption of the single index model is that 
e] is independent of ej for all value of i and j. This can be formalised as B( e],ej) = 
o implying that stocks vary together, systematically, due to cornmon co­
movements with the market. There are no effects beyond the market such as 
industry effects, which account for co-movement between securities. 
The single-index market model has two pnmary advantages as a returns 
generating equilibrium market model. Firstly, application of SIMM is simple. 
The approach gives us a quick and easily obtained way of modelling expected 
returns on stocks. Secondly, the fundamentals of SIMM application are rooted in 
two-parameter ordinary least square regression analysis which provides a sound 
theoretical basis for the model. 
STANDARD CAPM (SCAPM) 
Sharpe-Linter-Mossins' form of the standard CAPM, sometimes refereed to as the 
One Factor Capital Asset Pricing Model provides an alternative method of 
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forecasting stock returns under non-announcement conditions. The model 
assumes that: 
1 Investments are divisible 
2 There are no taxes 
3 Individuals cannot effect the price of stocks 
4 Investors make decisions based on expected values and standard 
deviations of returns ofportfolios. 
5 There is the availability of unlimited borrowing and lending at the risk free 
rate 
6 Expectations among investors are homogeneous 
7 All assets are marketable 
According to SCAPM, investors hold the market portfolio comprising all risky 
assets with each asset held in proportion that the percentage market value that 
asset represents of the total market value of all risky assets. For example, if IBM 
stocks represented, 5% of all risky assets, then the market portfolio would contain 
5% IBM stocks and each investor would take 5% of their investable funds and 
invest them in IBM stocks. All investors therefore hold a combination of only 
two portfolios investing in either risk-free assets or the market portfolio with the 
difference between investors being the proportion of total funds invested in either 
of the two. The expected return on our portfolio would be as follows: 
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Equation 5 
, 
where 
E(n) = Expected return on security i 
rf = The risk-free rate of interest 
E(rm) = Expected return on the market 
(Jm = Standard deviation of the return on the market portfolio 
(Jj 	 = Standard deviation ofthe return on security s 
= Correlation between returns of security sand mP<P,fl 
Although this equation establishes the return on efficient portfolios those that are 
fully diversified, it does not describe the expected retUll1 on non-efficient 
portfolios and non-efficient securities. The capital asset pricing model develops a 
method of establishing the expected returns on stocks that are not efficient. 
Through a process of algebraic substitution, we derive that the expected return on 
a security is a function of the risk free rate of interest, the market return and the 
beta of the stock. Fonnally, 
Equation 6 
where 
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Ri = Expected return on security I 
Rf = Risk-free rate of return 
Rm = Expected return on the market. 
~i = Beta of security I as defined by Equation 7 below 
Equation 7 
/3. = (JiM 
I 2 
(JM 
Equation 6 above is referred to as the Two-Factor Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
CONSUMPTION CAPM 
Other forms of the CAPM also exist. There are three cases of a multi-period 
CAPM that are considered in the literature, the consumption CAPM, a CAPM 
explicitly including inflation and a mu1ti~period CAPM. 
The consumption CAPM is based on the assumption that in a multi-period world, 
an investor is un-concerned with the maximisation of a single periods utility but 
would rather maximise utility over a life time. The model begins with the 
assumption that investors maximise their multi-period utility function and have 
homogeneous beliefs concerning the return characteristics of assets. Further, that 
there is a single consumption good and that there exists a capital market that 
allows investors to reach a consumption pattern of Pareto optimality. Proponents 
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of this model suggest that, under the above assumptions, asset returns are linearly 
related to the growth rate in aggregate consumption. Furthermore, the residuals 
for this linear relationship are un-correlated with the growth rate in aggregate 
consumption, have zero mean and are un-correlated with one another. More 
explicitly, we may say the following: 
Equation 8 
where 
Ct= the growth rate in aggregate consumption per capita at time period t 
Rit = the rate of return on asset i in period t 
E(eit) =0, the expected value of the residual 
Cov (eit,C) = 0, the covariance between the residual and the consumption index 
In this case, beta is defined by Equation 9 below as: 
Equation 9 
/3. = Cov(Rit,Ct ) 
I Var(et ) 
The model is essentially directly analogous to the simple form of the CAPM. The 
difference between what we see here and what we saw earlier is that the growth 
rate of consumption has replaced the rate of return on the market portfolio as per 
capita consumption is now the influence of equilibrium returns. 
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INFLATION CAPM 
One specific case of a multi -period general CAPM that has received particular 
attention is in the case of uncertainty in inflation. Friend, Lanskroner and Losq 
(1976) derive a general equilibrium relationship for the expected return on an 
asset under uncertain inflation, assuming that all utility functions exhibit constant 
proportional risk aversion. Their equilibrium appears similar to the simple form 
of the CAPM but both the definition of the market price of risk and the risk of an 
asset are modified. In particular, they show that, as long as the correlation 
between the rate of return on the market and the rate of inflation is positive, the 
market price of risk is higher than that depicted in the standard CAPM. 
Furthermore, they demonstrate that the risk of any asset is not just a function of its 
covariance with the market but also a function of its covariance with the rate of 
inflation. If an assets rate of return is positively correlated with the rate of 
inflation, the standard CAPM formulation overstates the risk of the asset. 
Finally, they show that CAPM will understate (overstate) the equilibrium rate of 
inflation on any asset if the correlation of asset returns and inflation is less than 
(greater then) the product of the correlation of the rate of return on the asset with 
the market return and the correlation between the market return and the inflation 
rate. 
MULTI-PERIOD CAPM 
Merton (1973) introduces a generalised inter-temporal capital asset pricing model 
in which a number of sources of uncertainty are priced. Merton models investors 
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as solving lifetime consumption decisions when faced with multiple sources of 
uncertainty. In this multi-period setting, uncertainty exists about the future value 
of securities but also about such influences as future labour income, future prices 
of consumption goods, future investment opportunities and so on. Investors will 
form portfolios to hedge away each of these risks to whatever extent possible. If 
sources of risk are a general concern to investors then these sources of risk will 
affect the expected return on securities. The inflation model shown above is the 
simplest form of a multi-beta CAPM where the expected return on any security 
can be expressed as a function of two sensitivities as follows: 
Equation 10 
This expression represents the standard CAPM plus a new term. The new term is 
the product of a new beta, which is the sensitivity of any security to the portfolio 
of securities that is held to hedge away inflation risk and the price of inflation risk. 
The multi-beta CAPM tells us that the expected return on any security should be 
related to the securities sensitivity to a set of influences. The form of the expected 
return can be shown as follows: 
Equation 11 
Rj - Rf = f3jM (RM - Rf )+ Pm (Rll - Rf )+pilili/2 - Rf)+ .... 
In this relationship, all of the RIj,s are expected returns on a set of portfolios that 
allows the investor to hedge a set of risks with which he or she is concerned. 
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Although the theory tells us that these should be additional influences present in 
pricing securities and that these influences should be related to the investors 
multi-period utility functions, it does not tell use explicitly what these influences 
are or exactly how to form portfolios to hedge whatever risks they represent. 
Some of the risks we might consider as potentially important may include default 
risk, term stmcture risk, deflation risk or profit risk. 
ARBITRAGE PRICING THEORY (APT) 
Detractors of the CAPM believe that a superior equilibrium asset-pricing model 
exists known as the Arbitrage Pricing Model. Based on the law of one price, 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) is a relatively new approach to determining asset 
prices. Unlike the CAPM approach, APT models do not depend on standard 
assumptions making it's applicability more general. APT states that stock returns 
are linearly related to a set of indices as follows: 
Equation 12 
where 
ar = the expected level of return for stock i if all indices have a value of zero 
Ij = the value of the jth index that impacts the return on stock i 
bij = the sensitivity of stock i' s return on the jth index 
er = a random error term with mean equal to zero and variance equal to cr2ei 
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The above equation is exactly what the CAPM does except that it only looks at 
the effects on returns as a result of changes in one factor, the return that the 
market portfolio generates. While the CAPM can be considered as a single-index 
model, this representation is nothing more or less than a multi-index model. APT 
is therefore a description of the expected returns that can be derived when returns 
are generated by a multi-index model. 
We may be interested to know as to what variables may be considered as 
impacting on share price returns. From the point of view of APT, there remain 
many questions that are unanswered but some advances have been made in terms 
of identifying indices which may determine an investments return. In particular, 
recent research has identified the following as important factors that effect 
security returns: 
1 Changes in the level of industrial production in the economy 
2 Changes in the inflation rate 
3 Changes in real interest rates 
4 Changes in the level ofpersonal consumption 
5 Changes in the level ofmoney supply in the economy 
USES OF DIFFERENT MODELS IN EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
The previous tables have demonstrated the usage of different equilibrium market 
models in published event study research. What is clear from the table is that the 
most highly utilised equilibrium model is clearly the single-index market model, 
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with the remainder of the available models demonstrating comparable usage. 
This chapter has served to demonstrate the continuing debate in the literature with 
regards the efficient market hypothesis. Whilst there is no doubt as to the extent 
of prolific activity in researching the efficient market hypothesis (testing goes 
back to the early part of the twentieth century), there remains an element of 
contention. There are in existence, clear methodologies that allow for the testing 
of the weak fonn of the EMH. Pioneered by Fama and Bliss (1987), Barnes 
(1986) and later by Urrutia (1995), these tests allow for the detection of historical 
price patterns in data. Generally, the literature appears to offer support for the 
weak form of market efficiency. Semi-strong form efficiency testing 
methodologies have been developed around the classical studies of Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen & Roll (1969) that tested the impact of stock splits on share prices. The 
study found that such announcements were impacted into share prices in an 
efficient and speedily manner. These findings were supported by, amongst others, 
MacDonald & Heign (1993). However, there have been several studies that have 
demonstrated inconsistency in the findings of the work of Fama et al. More 
specifically, the work of Rippington & Taffler (1995) provided compelling 
evidence that preliminary announcements atleast were no incorporated into stock 
pnces. 
Moving away for a moment from the empirical results of efficient market studies, 
the experience of short-term traders has also shown that the market can be out­
perfonned almost systematically (see Kolman (1987» and more recently, Hulbert 
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(1996) and Alpert (1997). This phenomenon would clearly not be the case should 
the market be assimilating stock price data in a fair, efficient and speedily manner. 
A further enigma is that when announcements are incorporated into stock prices, 
the work of Ajayi et al (1994) finds in favour of an over-reaction in stock price 
adjustments. These findings are further substantiated by, amongst others, the 
work of Akhigbe, Thomas and Harikumar (1998). Research in the area of strong 
form informational efficiency has certainly been less forthcoming. Since few 
studies have been able to develop a satisfactory ex-post methodology in order to 
detect for insider dealings. In terms of those EMH studies that have been 
conducted, it would appear that a significant data bias has been instigated. A 
majority of studies have been concentrated on listed companies that are quoted on 
the established stock exchange of London, New York and Tokyo. Further, 
announcements that are analysed tend to be of a financial nature relating to issues 
of earnings, dividends and stock-splits. 
The event study procedure established in a majority of semi-strong form 
efficiency studies mirrors that which is formalised by Elton & Gruber (1995). In 
computing the abnormal return, the returns generating model is typically a 
variation on a theme of the simple index market model. The frequency of use of 
one or other of the remaining returns generating models is certainly low. 
In conclusion, there appears to be innumerable references to literary research in 
the area of efficient market hypothesis. We see from the contained literature 
review that studies remain inconclusive. Whilst many studies acknowledge that 
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stock prices incorporate firm specific infonnation to the extent that the desired 
sentiment is reflected, other research finds that there are time lags between 
announcements made and consequent share price adjustments. An increasing 
volume of literature compounds this apparent contradiction at a time when market 
agents trade on announcements and pricing informational inefficiencies. 
The extent to which announcements are speedily incorporated into stock prices 
still remain an issue of contention. This contention leads us to re-examine the 
semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. Data analysis in such studies 
also proves to be heavily biased in favour of the larger stock exchanges. There is 
little academic work relating to the smaller exchanges that exist around the world. 
In a bid to redress this balance, it is imperative that semi-strong form efficiency is 
tested in the context of smaller exchanges that are typically categorised by lowly 
capitalised firms. 
The single index market model has proved to be the most utilised abnormal 
returns generating dispensation when event studies are conducted. 
Given that there are a selection of returns generating dispensations available, 
what, if any, difference does the use of these models make to our results? How 
sensitive are our efficiency results relative to the models used. However, this may 
be the reason why semi-strong form efficiency studies are producing conflicting 
results that are also at odds with the experience of day traders. Consequently, this 
work does suggest that there are several areas that need to be further addressed in 
the context of efficient market hypothesis. The issues of data bias as outlined 
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previously are certainly of concern as are the uses of variations on event study 
methodologies. Are markets generally over-reactive to announcements or are 
these over-reactions announcement and company size dependent? Such issues are 
investigated in the herein-doctoral thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4, METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
20thMethodology of scientific enqUIry m the century is dominated by 
experimentation - observation - conclusion type processes. Often the researcher 
embarks on a line of scientific enquiry with little regard for the limitations that 
scientific enquiry presents. For example, the philosophy of empiricism and 
empirical type research rests on the foundation that real-life phenomenon can be 
represented through numbers and that ordinal coefficients convey value. 
More often than not, students who are new to research attempt to replicate 
previous studies in order to gain confidence in the "tried and tested" techniques of 
previous researchers. Alternatively, researchers may generate results based on 
new data in an attempt to provide support for an established theory. (the more in­
experienced researcher often finds it difficult to distinguish between established 
theory and fact) When these results do not conform with previous studies, the less 
experienced researcher may be un-nerved. 
Feyerabend once wrote that 
"No theory can ever agree with all the facts in its domain, yet it is not always the 
theory that is to blame. Facts are constituted by older ideologies and a clash 
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between facts and theories may be proof ofprogress" 
The assumption that established theory is a representation of the real world is a 
mis-contrived one. Theories are not only limited by definition but also by 
approaches and the researchers attitude and loyalties. A researcher's given school 
of thought - whether he be rationalist, positivist or even anarchists will determine 
the methodological approach that he or she may take. Consequently, a 
researcher's view of the world will have a profound effect on the conclusion and 
any theory that may result. 
This chapter begins by examining the different schools of thought that the un­
assuming researcher should consider when undertaking research. The chapter has 
two intentions. The first intention is to create an awareness of different 
philosophical approaches to research and problem solving. In doing so, it is 
hoped that the chapter will help researchers question their methodological 
approach, begin to think out-with their existing paradigm and realise conclusions 
that are more meaningful in the context of their chosen discipline. 
The second intention of this chapter is to establish a methodology for conducting 
an analysis of the data for this thesis. Fortunately, event studies have a history. 
One of the most widely used methods of conducting event studies is by utilising 
the single index market model. As the chapter explains, this technique is a tried 
and tested technique for assessing the abnormal returns based around event 
announcements. Further more, the technique is based on the utilisation of the 
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ordinary least squares method of linear regression. Again, regression analysis is 
found to be the best tool available to this research and also demonstrates 
significant stability as a forecasting model. Parameter tests will show that the 
resultant model confonns with the underlying assumptions that linear regression 
makes. In support of the single index market model, the results of what is 
essentially a pilot study can be found in the Appendix 1. The pilot study supports 
the use of the single index market model based on regression analysis. The 
ensuing Chapter 5 applies the single index market model methodology and 
analyses the results. 
WHAT IS SCIENCE 
Before beginning to explore the different methodological approaches to scientific 
research, let us consider what the term "science" connotes. 
A widely held common-sense view of science and scientific knowledge is that 
scientific theory is proven knowledge and that such theories are derived in some 
rigorous way from the facts of experience acquired by observation and 
experiment. Science is based on what we can see, hear and touch, with personal 
opinion and speculative imaginings kept at bay. Science is considered to be 
reliable knowledge because it is supposedly objectively proven knowledge. 
This view first became popular during and as a consequence of the Scientific 
Revolution that took place mainly during the seventeenth century, brought about 
by such great pioneering scientists as Galileo and Newton. The philosopher 
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Francis Bacon and many of his contemporaries summed up the scientific attitude 
of the times when they insisted that if one wanted to understand nature one must 
consult nature and not the writings of Aristotle. The progressive forces of the 
seventeenth century came to see as mistaken the preoccupation of mediaeval 
natural philosophers with the works of the ancients, especially Aristotle, as the 
sources of scientific knowledge. Several schools of thought developed from a 
working definition of scientific enquiry which led to differing views of research 
methodology. 
ISM'S IN RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
INDUCTIVISM 
The inductivist account of science can be looked on as an attempt to fonnalise the 
popular picture of science that is outlined above. It is called inductivist because it 
is based on inductive reasoning and while, prima fascia, this seems a perfectly 
reasonable approach, it may be argued later in the chapter that this view of 
research, together with the popular account that it resembles, is quite mistaken and 
even dangerously misleading. 
According to the inductivist, scientific research starts with observation. The 
scientific observer should have normal, unimpaired sense organs and should 
faithfully record what he or she sees or hears and should do so with an 
unprejUdiced mind. Statements about the state of the world, or some part of it, 
can be justified or established as true in a direct way by an unprejudiced 
observer's use of his senses. The statements so arrived at then form the basis from 
which the laws and theories that make up scientific knowledge are to be derived. 
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Here are some examples of observation statements that are referred to in research 
as singular statements. 
1 The corporation tax paid by XYZ for the year ended December 2000 was 
£20000 
2 The r squared value of the regression equation was 0.69 
3 Harry lay drunk outside the park 
4 Mr Smith struck his wife 
5 The litmus paper turned red when immersed in the liquid 
The truth of such statements is to be established by careful observation. Any 
observer can authenticate any of the above by direct use of his or her senses. We 
can contrast this with examples that might form part of scientific knowledge as 
follows: 
1 Planets move in ellipses around their sun 
2 When a ray of light passes from one medium to another, it changes 
direction in such a way that the sine of the angle of incidence divided by 
the sine of the angle of refraction is a constant characteristic of the pair of 
media 
3 Animals in general have an inherent need for some kind of aggressive 
outlet 
4 Acids tum litmus paper red 
The above statements are referred to as universal statements and are general 
statements that make claims about the properties or behaviour of some aspect of 
the universe. Unlike singular statements, they refer to all events of a particular 
kind at all places and at all times. All planets, wherever they are situated, always 
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move in ellipses around their sun. Whenever refraction takes place it always takes 
place according to the law ofrefraction stated above. 
If science is based on experience, then by what means is it possible to get from the 
singular statements that result from observation to the universal statements that 
make up scientific knowledge? How can the very general, unrestricted claims that 
constitute our theories be justified on the basis of limited evidence comprised of a 
limited number of observation statements? 
The inductivist answer is that, provided certain conditions are satisfied, it is 
legitimate to generalise from a finite list of singular observation statements to a 
universal law. For instance, it may be legitimate to generalise from a finite list of 
observation statements referring to litmus paper turning red on being immersed in 
acid to the universal law that acid turns litmus paper red. For an inductivist to be 
satisfied that such generalisations have legitimacy, the following must be true. 
1 The number of observation statements forming the basis of a 
generalisation must be large 
2 The observations must be repeated under a wide variety of conditions 
3 No accepted observation statement should conflict with the derived 
Universal law. 
Condition (1) is regarded as necessary because it is clearly not legitimate to 
conclude that all litmus paper turns red when placed in acid on the basis of just 
one observation. A large number of independent observations will be necessary 
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before the generalisation can be justified. The inductivist insists that we should 
not jump to conclusions. Clearly, a list of observation statements acquired in such 
a way would form a very unsatisfactory basis for the respective generalisations. 
For example, for condition (2) above, the statement "All metals expand when 
heated" will only be a legitimate generalisation if the observations of expansion 
on which it is based range over a wide variety of conditions. Various kinds of 
metals should be heated, long iron bars, short iron bars, silver and copper bars, at 
high pressure and low pressure, high temperatures and low temperatures, and so 
on. If, on all such occasions, the heated samples of metal all expand, then and 
only then is it legitimate to generalise from the resulting list of observation 
statements to the general law. Further, it is evident that if a particular sample of 
metal is observed not to expand when heated, then the universal generalisation 
will not be justified. Condition (3) is essential by definition. 
The kind of reasoning that we have discussed, which takes us from a finite list of 

singular statements to the justification of a universal statement, which takes us 

from some to all, is called inductive reasoning and the process is called induction. 

We might sum up the naive inductivist position by saying that, according to it, 

science is based on the principle ofinduction, which we can state that: 

"If a large number of As have been observed under a wide variety of conditions, 

and if all those observed As without exception possessed the property B, then all 
As have the property B". 
According to the naive inductivist, then, the body of scientific knowledge is built 
by induction from the secure basis provided by observation. As the number of 
facts established by observation and experiment grows, and as the facts become 
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more refined and esoteric due to improvements in our observational and 
experimental skills, so more and more laws and theories of ever more generality 
and scope are constructed by careful inductive reason 
THE APPEAL OF NAIVE INDUCTIVISM 
The naive inductivist account of science does have some apparent merit. Its 
attraction would seem to lie in the fact that it gives a formalised account of some 
of the popularly held impressions concerning the character of science, its 
explanatory and predictive power, its objectivity and its superior reliability 
compared with other forms of knowledge. The objectivity of inductivist science 
derives from the fact that both observation and inductive reasoning are themselves 
objective. Any observer can ascertain observation statements by normal use of 
the senses. No personal, subjective elements should be permitted to intrude. The 
validity of the observation statements when correctly acquired will not depend on 
the taste, opinion, hopes or expectations of the observer. The same goes for the 
inductive reasoning by means of which scientific knowledge is derived from the 
observation statements 
The reliability of science follows from the inductivist's claim about observation 
and induction. The observation statements that form the basis of science are 
secure and reliable because their truth can be ascertained by direct use of the 
senses. Further, the reliability of observation statements will be transmitted to 
laws and theories derived from them, provided the conditions for legitimate 
induction is satisfied. This is guaranteed by the principle of induction that forms 
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the basis of science according to the naive inductivist. 
CAN THE PRINCIPLE OF INDUCTION BE JUSTIFIED? 
According to the naive inductivist, science starts with observation, observation 
supplies a secure basis upon which scientific knowledge can be built, and 
scientific knowledge is derived from observation statements by induction. Let us 
re-visit and analyse the third assumption presented above which we may find casts 
doubt on the principle of induction. 
Ifwe recall the summing up statement on the principle of induction, it was stated 
that 
"If a large number of A's have been observed under a wide variety of conditions, 
and if all those observed A's without exception have possessed the property B, 
then all As possess the property B. 
How can the principle of induction be justified? If umeliable observation 
provides insecure observation, why is it that inductive reasoning lead to reliable 
and perhaps even true scientific knowledge? The inductivist may justify the 
principle by appealing to logic or experience, a recourse that lies at the basis of his 
whole approach to science. We shall consider each of these in tum below. 
Logical arguments are characterised by the premise that, if the argument is true, 
the conclusion must also be true. Deductive argument possesses such a character 
but the principle of induction does not. Inductive arguments are not logically 
valid arguments and therefore, it is not the case that, if the premises of an 
inductive inference are true, then the conclusion must be true. It is possible for 
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the conclusion of an inductive argument to be false and for the premises to be true 
and yet for no contradiction to be involved. Suppose, for example, that up until 
today one observes a large number of ravens under a wide variety of 
circumstances and have observed all of them to have been black and that, on that 
basis, one concludes, "All ravens are black". This is a perfectly legitimate 
inductive inference, with the premises that a large number of statements of the 
kind, "Raven x was observed to be black at time t", and all these we take to be 
true. However, there is no logical guarantee that the next raven observed would 
not be pink. If this proved to be the case, then the statement "All ravens are 
black" would be false. 
While the principle of induction cannot therefor be justified merely by an appeal 
to logic, there are instances where it has been justified on the grounds of 
experience. For example, the laws of planetary motion, derived from observations 
of planetary positions have been successfully employed to predict the occurrence 
of eclipses. The foregoing justification of induction may be considered 
unacceptable because it employs the very kind of inductive argument the validity 
of which is supposed to be in need of justification. A universal statement 
asserting the validity of the principle of induction is here inferred from a number 
of singular statements recording past successful applications of the principle. The 
argument is therefore an inductive one and so cannot be used to justify the 
principle of induction. We cannot use induction to justify induction. The 
difficulty associated with the justification of induction has traditionally been 
called "the problem of induction". In addition to the circularity involved in 
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attempts to justify the principle of induction, inductivism suffers from other 
potential shortcomings stemming from the vagueness and dubiousness of the 
demand that "a large number" of observations be made under a "wide variety" of 
circumstances. 
How many observations make up a large number? Should a metal bar be heated 
ten times, a hundred times, or a thousand times before we can conclude that it 
always expands when heated? Whatever the answer to such a question, examples 
can be produced that cast doubt on the invariable necessity for a large number of 
observations. Consider the strong public reaction against nuclear warfare that 
followed the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima towards the end of 
the Second World War. This reaction was based on the understanding that atomic 
bombs caused widespread death and destruction and extreme human suffering and 
yet this generally held belief was based on just one dramatic observation. Again, 
it would take a very stubborn inductivist to put his hand in a fire many times 
before concluding that fire bums. In circumstances like these, the demands for a 
large number of observations seem inappropriate. In other situations, the demand 
seems more plausible. For instance, one may be justifiably reluctant to ascribe 
supernatural powers to a fortune-teller on the basis of just one correct prediction. 
Nor would it be justifiable to conclude some causal connection between smoking 
and lung cancer on the evidence ofjust one heavy smoker contracting the disease. 
It is clear that if the principle of induction is to be a guide to what counts as a 
legitimate scientific inference, then the "large number" clause will need to be 
qualified in some detail. 
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The inductivist position is further threatened when the demand that observations 
be made under a wide variety of circumstances is scrutinised. What is to count as 
a significant variation in the circumstances? When investigating the boiling point 
of water, for instance, is it necessary to vary the pressure, the purity of the water, 
the method of heating and the time of day? The answer to the first two 
suggestions is "Yes" and to the second two it is "No". But what are the grounds 
for these answers? This question is important because the list of variations can be 
extended indefinitely by adding a variety of further variations such as the colour 
of the container, the identity of the experimenter, the geographical location, and 
so on. Unless such "superfluous" variations can be eliminated, the number of 
observations necessary to render an inductive inference legitimate will be 
infinitely large. What, then, are the grounds on which a large number of 
variations are deemed superfluous? The variations that are significant are 
distinguished from those that are superfluous by appealing to theoretical 
knowledge of the situation and of the kinds of physical mechanisms operative. 
However, to admit this is to admit that theory plays a vital role prior to 
observation, an admission that the naive inductivist cannot afford to make. 
FALSIFICATIONISM 
The falsificitionist freely admits that observation is guided by and presupposes 
theory. He is also happy to abandon any claim implying that theories can be 
established as true or probably true in the light of observational evidence. 
Theories are construed as speCUlative and tentative conjectures or guesses freely 
created by the human intellect in an attempt to overcome problems encountered 
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by previous theories and to give an adequate account of the behaviour of some 
aspects of the world or universe. Once proposed, speCUlative theories are to be 
rigorously and ruthlessly tested by observation and experiment. Theories that fail 
to stand up to observational and experimental tests must be eliminated and 
replaced by further speculative conjectures. Science progresses by trial and error, 
by conjectures and refutations. Only the fittest theories survive. While it can 
never be legitimately said of a theory that it is true. it can hopefully be said that it 
is the best available, that it is better than anything that has come before. 
According to falsificatinism, some theories can be shown to be false by an appeal 
to the results of observation and experiment. There is a simple, logical point that 
seems to support the falsifications here. It has been shown in Inductivism, that it 
is never possible to arrive at universal laws and theories by logical deductions 
alone. On the other hand, it is possible to perform logical deductions starting 
from singUlar observation statements as premises to arrive at the falsity of 
universal laws and theories by logical deduction. For example, if we are given the 
statement, "A raven which was not black, was observed at place x at time P, then 
it logically follows from this that "All ravens are black" is false. That is, the 
argument 
Premise: A raven, which was not black, was observed at place x at time t. 

Conclusion: Not all ravens are black. 

is a logically valid deduction. If the premise is asserted and the conclusion 
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denied, a contradiction is involved. One or two more examples will help illustrate 
this fairly trivial logical point as follows. If it can be established by observation in 
some test experiment that a 10lb weight and a llb weight in free fall move 
downwards at roughly the same speed, then it can be concluded that the claim that 
bodies fall at speeds proportional to their weight is false. If it can be 
demonstrated beyond doubt that a ray oflight passing close to the sun is deflected 
in a curved path, then it is not the case that light necessarily travels in straight 
lines. The falsity of universal statements can be deduced from suitable singular 
statements. The falsificationist exploits this logical point to the full. 
FALSIFICATIONISM AND PROGRESS 
The progress of science from a falsificationist VIew may be summed up as 
follows: Science starts with problems associated with the explanation of the 
behaviour of some aspects of the world or universe. Scientists propose falsifiable 
hypotheses as solutions to the problem. Conjectured hypotheses are then 
criticised and tested. Some will be quickly eliminated while others might prove 
more successful. These must be subject to even more stringent criticism and 
testing. When a hypothesis that has successfully withstood a wide range of 
rigorous tests is eventually falsified, a new problem, hopefully far removed from 
the original solved problem, has emerged. This new problem calls for the 
invention of new hypotheses followed by renewed criticism and testing, and so 
the process continues indefinitely. It can never be said of a theory that it is true, 
however well it has withstood rigorous tests, but it can hopefully be said that a 
current theory is superior to its predecessors in the sense that it is able to 
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withstand tests that falsified those predecessors. 
RATIONALISM 
The extreme rationalist asserts that there is a single, timeless, universal criterion 
with reference to which the relative merits of rival theories are to be assessed. For 
example, an inductivist might take as his universal criterion the degree of 
inductive support a theory receives from accepted facts, whilst a falsifications 
might base his criterion on the degree of falsifiability of un-falsified theories. 
Whatever the details of a rationalist's formulation of the criterion, an important 
feature of it is its universality and a-historical character. The universal criterion 
will be invoked when judging the relative merits of the physics of Aristotle and 
Democritus, Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy, Freudian and behaviourist 
psychology or the big bang and steady state theories ofthe universe. The extreme 
rationalist sees the decisions and choices of scientists as being guided by the 
universal criterion. The rational scientist will reject theories that fail to live up to 
it and, when choosing between two rival theories, will choose the one that lives up 
to it best. The typical rationalist will believe that theories that meet the demands 
of the universal criterion are true or approximately true or probably true. 
The distinction between SCIence and non-SCIence IS straightforward for the 
rationalist. Only those theories that are such that they can be clearly assessed in 
terms of the universal criterion and which survive the test are scientific. Thus an 
inductivist rationalist might rule that astrology is not a science because it is not 
inductively derivable from the facts of observation, whilst a falsificationist might 
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rule that Marxism is not scientific because it is not falsifiable. The typical 
rationalist will take it as self-evident that a high value is to be placed on 
knowledge developed in accordance with the universal criterion. This will be 
especially so if the process is understood as leading towards truth. Truth, 
rationality, and hence science, are seen as intrinsically good. 
RELATIVISM 
The relativist denies that there is a universal, a-historical standard of rationality 
with respect to which one theory can be judged better than another. What counts 
as better or worse with respect to scientific theories will vary from individual to 
individual or from community to community. The aim of knowledge seeking will 
depend on what is important for or what the individual or community values in 
question. For example, a high status will typically be attributed to the aim of 
acquiring material control over nature within Western. However, these will be 
accredited with low status in a culture in which knowledge is designed to produce 
feelings of contentment or peace as in ancient Vedic Civilisations of the Indian 
sub-continent. 
The dictum of the ancient Greek philosopher Pythagoras, "man is the measure of 
all things", expresses a relativism with respect to individuals, whilst Kuhn's 
remark "there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community" 
expresses a relativism with respect to communities. Characterisations of progress 
and specifications of criteria for jUdging the merits of theories will always be 
relative to the individual or community that subscribes to them. 
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Decisions and choices made by scientists or groups of scientists will be governed 
by what is valued by those individuals or groups. In a given choice situation, 
there is no universal criterion that dictates a decision that is logically compelling 
for the "rational" scientist. An understanding of the choices made by a particular 
scientist will require an understanding of what that scientist values and will 
involve psychological investigation, whilst the choices made by a community will 
depend on what it values and an understanding of those choices will involve 
sociological investigation. 
Boris Hessen's account of the adoption of Newtonian physics in the seventeenth 
century as a response to the technological needs of the time can be read as a 
relativist account with respect to communities. However, Feyerabend's assertion 
that it is the "internal connectedness of all the parts of the (Copernican) system 
together with his belief in the basic nature of circular motion that makes 
Copernicus pronounce the motion of the earth as real" is a remark in keeping with 
a relativism with respect to individuals. 
INDIVIDUALISM 
From the individualist point of view knowledge is understood to be a special set 
of beliefs held by individuals and residing in ones mind or brain. That view 
certainly gains support from common usage. If one says "I know the date on 
which I wrote this particular sentence but you do not", then one is referring to 
something that is among my beliefs, and in a sense resides in ones mind or brain, 
but is not among another's beliefs. If one asks the question, "Do you or do you 
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not know Newton's first law of motion?" one is asking a question about what you, 
as an individual, are acquainted with. It is clear that the individualist who accepts 
this way of understanding knowledge in temlS of belief will not accept all beliefs 
as constituting genuine knowledge. If one believes that Newton's first law reads, 
"Apples fall downwards" then one is simply mistaken and that mistaken belief 
will not constitute knowledge. If one belief is to count as genuine knowledge, 
then it must be possible to justify the belief by showing it to be true, or perhaps 
probably true, by appeal to appropriate evidence. "Knowledge, on this view, is 
true belief properly evidenced, or some similar formula" 
If knowledge is viewed from the individualist point of view it is not difficult to 
see how a fundamental problem arises. It is the so-called infinite regress of 
reasons that dates back at least as far as Plato. If some statement is to be justified, 
then this will be done by appeal to other statements, which constitute the evidence 
for it. However, this gives rise to the problem of how statements constituting 
evidence are themselves to be justified. If one justify them by further appeal to 
more evidential statements then the problem repeats itself and will continue to 
repeat itself unless a way can be found to halt the infinite regress that threatens. 
To take a straightforward example, suppose that one is faced with the problem of 
justifying Kepler's first law, that planets move in ellipses around the sun. If one 
does this by showing that its approximate validity follows from Newton's laws 
justification is incomplete unless one can justify Newton's laws. If one attempts 
to justify Newton's laws by appeal to experimental evidence then the question of 
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the validity of the experimental evidence arises, and so on. If the problem of the 
infinite regress is to be avoided, it would seem that what is needed is some set of 
statements that do not need to be justified by appeal to other statements but are in 
some sense self-justifying. Such a set of statements would then constitute the 
foundations of knowledge, and any beliefs that are to acquire the status of 
knowledge would need to be justified by tracing them back to the foundations. 
If the problem of knowledge is construed in this way, it is not difficult to see how 
two rival traditions in the theory of knowledge, classical rationalism and 
empiricism arise. Speaking very roughly and sweepingly, we can argue as 
follows. Individual human beings have two ways of acquiring knowledge about 
the world, thinking and observing. If we give priority to the first mode over the 
second we arrive at a classical rationalist theory of knowledge, whilst if we give 
priority to the second over the first we arrive at an empiricist theory. 
OBJECTIVISM 
An individual born into this world is born into a world in which there already 
exists much knowledge. Someone who aims to become a physicist will be 
confronted with a body of knowledge that represents the current state of 
development ofphysics, much of which he will need to become acquainted with if 
he is to make a contribution to the field. The objectivist gives priority, in his 
analysis of knowledge, to the characteristics of items or bodies of knowledge that 
individuals are confronted with, independently of the attitudes, beliefs or other 
subjective states of those individuals. Loosely speaking, knowledge is treated as 
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something outside rather than inside the minds or brains of individuals. The 
objectivist emphasis can be illustrated by reference to very simple propositions. 
Given a language, propositions within it will have properties whether individuals 
are aware or believe it or not. For instance, the proposition, "my cat and I live in a 
house that no animals inhabit," has the property of being contradictory. Contrast 
that with the propositions "I have a white cat" and "today a guinea pig died". 
This statement has the property of being a consequence of the proposition "today 
my white cat killed someone's pet guinea pig" . 
In these simple examples, the fact that the propositions have the properties singled 
out should be fairly obvious to anyone who contemplates them, but this need not 
be so. For example, a lawyer in a murder trial may, after much painstaking 
analysis, discover the fact that one witness's report contradicts that of another. If 
this is indeed the case, then it is the case whatever the witnesses intended and 
whether or not they were aware of it or believed it. What is more, if the lawyer 
had not discovered the inconsistency it may have remained undiscovered so that 
no one ever became aware of it. Nevertheless, the fact would remain that the two 
witnesses' reports were inconsistent. Propositions, then, can have properties quite 
independently of what any individual might be aware of. They have "objective" 
properties. 
The maze of propositions involved in a body of knowledge at some stage in its 
development will, in a similar way, have properties that individuals working on it 
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need not be aware of. The theoretical structure that is modem physics is so 
complex that it clearly cannot be identified with the beliefs of anyone physicist or 
group of physicists. Many scientists contribute in their separate ways with their 
separate skills to the growth and articulation of physics, just as many workers 
combine their efforts in the construction of a cathedral. Just as a happy 
steeplejack may be blissfully unaware of the implication of some ommous 
discovery made by labourers digging near the cathedral's foundations, so a lofty 
theoretician may be unaware of the relevance of some new experimental finding 
for the theory on which he works. In either case, relationships may objectively 
exist between parts of the structure independently of any individual's awareness of 
that relationship. 
A strong point in favour of the objectivist position is that scientific theories can 
and often do have consequences that were unintended by the original proponents 
of the theory and of which those proponents were unaware. These consequences, 
such as the prediction of a novel kind ofphenomenon or an unexpected clash with 
some other area of theory, exist as properties of the new theory thatare there to be 
discovered by further scientific practice. 
ANYTHING GOES 
Feyerabend makes a strong case for the claim that none of the methodologies of 
science that have so far been proposed are successful. Feyerabend convincingly 
argues that methodologies of science have failed to provide rules adequate for 
guiding the activities of scientists. Furthermore, he suggests that, given the 
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complexity of history, it is most implausible to expect that science be explicable 
on the basis of a few simple methodological rules. 
F eyerabend purports 
"The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal 
rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. It is unrealistic, for it takes too simple a 
view of the talents of man and of the circumstances which encourage, or cause, 
their development. In addition, the idea is detrimental to science, for it neglects 
the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change. 
It makes science less adaptable and more dogmatic." 
Feyerabend's case against method hits at methodologies interpreted as providing 
rules for the guidance of scientists. Thus, he is able to welcome Lakatos as a 
fellow anarchist because his methodology does not provide rules for theory or 
programme choice. The methodology ofresearch programmes provides standards 
that aid the scientist in evaluating the historical situation in which he makes his 
decisions. It does not contain rules that tell him what to do. Scientists, then, 
should not be constrained by the rules of the methodologist. In this sense, 
anything goes. However, the term "anything goes" should not be interpreted it 
too wide a sense. In that passage, Feyerabend attempts to distinguish between the 
reasonable scientist and the eccentric. 
The distinction does not lie in the fact that the former ["respectable" people] 
suggests what is plausible and promises success, whereas the latter [eccentric] 
suggest what is implausible, absurd, and bound to fail. It cannot lie in this 
because we never know in advance which theory will be successful and which 
theory will fail. It takes a long time to decide this question and every single step 
leading to such a decision is again open to revision. The distinction between the 
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eccentric and the respectable thinker lies in the research that is done once a 
certain point of view is adopted. The eccentric usually is content with defending 
the point of view in its original, undeveloped, metaphysical form, and he is not at 
all prepared to test its usefulness in all those cases which seem to favour the 
opponent, or even to admit that their may exists a potential problem. It is this 
further investigation, the details of it, the knowledge of the difficulties, of the 
general state ofknowledge, and the recognition of objections, which distinguishes 
the "respectable thinker" from the eccentric. 
JUSTIFICATION OF METHODOLOGY FOR THE STUDY 
In establishing a methodology for this study, it has been decided that an empirical 
evaluation would most suitable an approach. The process of establishing a 
methodology for this study is aided significantly by the fact that event study 
methodology has a history. Below is an outline of the alternative abnormal return 
generating models and a discussion as to the rational for selecting the market 
model. In terms of the use of alternative methodological approaches, one may 
also be interested as the level of robustness in differing approaches since, if results 
are not methodologically impacted, then the selected method of research is 
immaterial. Therefore, a selection of alternative methods is utilised in the form of 
a pilot study (see Appendix 1) that serves to support the arguments that the single 
index model and the use of regression is the most appropriate aswell as being a 
tried and tested approach to this event study. A pilot study utilising a battery of 
models can be found in the appendices 
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PREVIOUS MODELS USED IN EVENT STUDIES 
The stylised approach of Elton & Gruber is contentious in the manner in which 
announcement returns are extracted from overall returns within the event window. 
Informational efficiency studies utilise equilibrium models to postulate 
deterministic relationships to forecast expected returns under "announcement" and 
"non-announcement" conditions. Unexplained returns around announcement 
dates are attributed to announcement impacts. Expected returns are compared 
with actual returns over the period, the difference being termed the abnormal 
return. Five models are used to estimate expected returns. 
SINGLE INDEX MARKET MODEL 
The Single Index Market Model, 6(SIMM) postulates a relationship between 
security returns and market returns as represented by a market index. Market 
indices represent market sentiment, thus effecting all stocks to some degree. 
Stock returns can be written as: 
R. =a +j3.RI I I m 
where 
Rj = Return on security i 
aj = the component of the security i's return that is independent of the 
market's performance 
6 A theoretical justification for adopting the single index market model can be found at the end of 
this chapter 
139 
Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
Rm = the rate of return on the market index 
~t =Beta, the constant that measures the expected change in Rr gIven a 
change in the return on the market index 
The relationship is derived by regressing historical stock returns against historical 
market returns and breaks the return into two components, that part contingent on 
the market and that part independent of the market. ~i reflects incremental 
sensitivity of a stocks return to changes in the return on the market, expressed by 
the market index and ai represents that return component independent of market 
returns. 
CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODELS 
Sharpe, Mossin and Lintner's (1964) Standard Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(SCAPM) depicts a relationship between a stock's return and its exposure to 
systematic risk as follows: 
where 
Ri = return on security i 
Rf = the risk free rate of return 
Rm = the rate ofreturn on the market index 
~l = Beta, the constant that measures the expected change in Ri given a 
change in the return on the market index. 
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This model demonstrates the markets willingness to compensate investors only for 
exposure to non-diversifiable risk exposure at the rate,~. This risk premium is 
represented by the difference between the risk free rate of return and the return on 
the market portfolio. Non-standard forms of CAPM includes the Consumption 
CAPM (CCAPM) developed on the assumption that in a multi-period world, 
investor are not concerned with the maximisation of a single periods utility but 
with the maximisation of utility over a life time. Proponents of this model suggest 
that, under certain standard assumptions, asset returns are linearly related to the 
growth rate in aggregate consumption.. Formally, this can be expressed as: 
where 
Ct = the aggregate consumption growth rate per capita at time t 
Rjt = the rate of return on asset i in period t 
E(ejt) = 0, the expected value ofthe residual 
Cov (eit,C)= 0, the covariance between the residual and the consumption index 
/3. = Cov(Rjt,Ct) 
I Var(C/) 
The new equilibrium condition is defined as: 
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where 
Y1 = the market price of the consumption beta 
Rm =the expected return on a asset with zero consumption beta. 
CCAPM replaces the market index with per capita consumption. While Friend, 
Landskroner and Losq's innovation (1976) is the inflation CAPM (ICAPM) which 
derives a general equilibrium relationship for expected returns under inflation 
conditions, Merton (1973) constructs a generalised inter-temporal CAPM in 
which several sources of uncertainty are priced. Merton models investors as 
solving lifetime consumption decisions when faced with multiple sources of 
uncertainty. In this multi-period setting, factors such as future labour income, 
future prices of consumption goods and future investment opportunities all 
contribute to expected return. Merton suggests that investors form portfolios 
hedging away against all sources of risk. The inflation model shown above is the 
simplest form of what is essentially a multi-beta CAPM where expected returns 
are expressed as a function of two sensitivities as follows: 
where 
Ri = Expected return on security i 
Rr = Risk free rate of return 
~iM = The market beta of security i when hedged against inflation 
~iI = The market price of inflation risk 
Rit = The rate of return on asset i in period t 
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Rm = Expected return on the market portfolio 
Rri = Expected return on a portfolio hedged against inflation 
This expression represents the standard CAPM plus a new beta, which measures 
the sensitivity of any security to the portfolio of securities that is held to hedge 
away the risk and price of inflation risk. Multi-beta CAPM suggests expected 
returns be correlated to securities sensitive to not one but a set of influences. 
Expected returns become 
where all betas represent sensitivities to parameters against which the investor 

wishes to hedge. Although multi-beta CAPM suggests several influences on stock 

returns, it does not tell use explicitly what these influences are or exactly how to 

fonn portfolios to hedge against them. Risks considered include default, tenn 

structure, deflation or profit risk (see Chen, Ross & Roll (1986) and Lehmann & 

Modest (1988)). 

ARBITRAGE PRICING THEORY (APT) 

Arbitrage Pricing Theory,(APT) is a relatively new approach to asset pricing and 

describes equilibrium in more general terms than by CAPM type models. APT 

models postulate stock returns as linearly related to a set of indices as follows: 
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where 
aj = the expected level of return for stock i if all indices have a value of zero 
Ij = the value ofthe jth index that impacts the return on stock i 
bij = the sensitivity of stock i's return on the jth index 
ej = a random error term with mean equal to zero and variance equal to (j'2ej 
If CAPM can be considered as a single-index model, APT can be regarded as a 
multi-index model with industrial production, inflation rates, interest rates, 
consumption levels or money supply levels as relevant indices and a set of beta's 
measuring their sensitivity. (see Chen, Ross & Roll (1986), Darrat and Brocato 
(1994)) 
As we have already seen from pages 82 to 83, different studies have utilised 
different abnormal returns generating models. 
SUITABILITY OF THE MARKET MODEL 
The case for the suitability of the single index market model (SIMM) as an 
appropriate abnorn1al returns generating model is made on three accounts as 
follows: 
1 It is a extensively utilised tried and tested approach to event study as per 
existing literature 
2 It is theoretically justifiable based on the variables included in the model 
3 SIMM is based on regression analysis and our data conforms with the 
standard assumptions of regression analysis 
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SIMM AS A TRIED AND TESTED METHODOLOGY 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, event studies have a history. Consequently, 
the utilisation of event study methodology can be found among the finance 
literature. Table 5 on page 82 shows that the use of the single index market model 
is by far the most popular approach to generating the abnormal returns. 
SIMM AS THEORETICALLY JUSTIFIABLE 
For those that consider the market to be rational in its allocation ofresources, the 
market would be seen to compensate investors for both risk and opportunity cost 
investors exposes him to. Consequently, an investor would expect to achieve 
atleast the return that is given by having placed his investable funds in a risk-free 
investment (bank account, government bond etc) and then would expect a 
compensation for the additional risk taken by engaging in the financial markets. 
However, investors cannot expect to be fully compensated for their total risk 
exposure. 
Market returns are generated on the basis of that risk exposure that is unavoidable. 
Where an investor can reduce his risk exposure by the process of portfolio 
diversification, the market would expect him to do so. This may require a 
spreading of the investable funds across several securities in order to minimise the 
variability on the total return that the resulting portfolio would generate. Investors 
are not compensated for risk that may be diversified away (often referred to as 
diversifiable or un-systematic risk) through portfolio selection but can expect 
compensation for that element of risk that is systematic to the market. As stated 
in the previous algebraic formulations, this is referred to as Beta (~). 
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We can therefore state that since the single index market model incorporates the 
variable (3, then the model is recognising that the expected return on the security 
can only be compensation for that level of risk that is non-diversifiable. In line 
with the above analogy, this is theoretically consistent - we would not expect the 
single index market model to contain any element of compensation in return that 
is reflective of the total risk that the security contains. 
The single index market model then develops to postulate a linear relationship 
between the expected returns on the security and the return on a market index. 
The form of this relationship has been stated in then give as 
RI· =a.I + fJ·RI m 
This notion itself sets it apart from models such as the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM). In the case of CAPM, there is an equilibrium model for pricing. 
The market model is not an equilibrium model for market pricing. Neither does 
the market model make any assumptions about how investors should optimise 
their portfolio. The single index market model simply makes the assumption 
about the statistical relationship between stock returns and market returns. 
Beta in equation above equation be interpreted as the gradient of the line. In other 
words, beta can predict the expected change in the return of the security relative to 
incremental changes in the return in the market. 
146 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
The idea of the model is that when there is an overall change in the performance 
across financial markets, this movement will transpire in the adjustment of the 
fortunes of the individual stocks or securities. In other words, changes in 
sentiments across the market will filter down to impact on individual changes in 
the security returns. Two questions may also arise at this point in the thesis. 
Firstly, what can have an impact on the market movement and secondly, how can 
changes in the market be measured? 
In answer to the first question, markets may move on the basis of changes that are 
announced which impact on all stocks across the financial market. This implies 
that macro-economic announcements or shocks to the system would move 
markets as a whole since firm specific announcements would only be detectable 
by changes in the fortunes of individual firms. Such shocks can include disasters 
such as the World Trade Centre attacks of 9/1 1 or as shown in the below diagram. 
(Source www.lowrisk.com) 
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Or can be as a result of significant macro-economic announcements of tax 
changes, inflation and interest rates. 
Such macro-economic announcements have a significant impact on the fortunes of 
companies. Increases in interest rates may, for example, stifle investment as the 
return on capital required by potential investors will increase. Further, interest 
rate increases wi11lead to a movement into fixed deposits as security investments 
may not be seen as offering the requisite compensation for the additional risk 
involved in the market. 
Reductions in interest rates will stimulate investment and lead to increased 
production capacity. The main point to note here is that such changes will have, 
generally speaking, either positive or negative impacts across the market and will 
not discriminate in its effects between firms. 
Other announcements that may be felt across the financial market pertain to either 
shocks or surprises that are un-anticipated but are of such magnitUde as to have a 
dramatic impact. An example of this could be the September 11th attack on the 
World Trade Centre in New York. A shock of this nature would have impacted 
on the markets across the financial exchanges rather than any specific firm 
The second issue pertains as to how one can measure the performance of the 
market? What measures are available to us? To measure the performance of a 
market (as opposed to an individual security), is to measure the sum total of the 
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performance of the individual stocks that make up that market. However, in 
practice, a market index is constructed who's constituent stocks reflect the market 
as a whole. The theoretical idea of the single index market model is to develop 
the relationship between the stock returns and a simulated market that is found in 
the form of a market index. The market index is constructed from a selection of 
stocks and in proportion that reflects the market as a whole. There are many 
different market indices that have been constructed to utilise the single index 
market model. An outline of the history of the different market indices is given 
below. 
DEFINITIONS OF MARKET INDICES USED IN SIMM 
FTSE ALL-SHARE 
Representing 98-99% of the UK market capitalisation, FTSE All-Share is the 
aggregation of the FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap Indices. 
FTSE 100 
100 most highly capitalised blue chip companies, representing approximately 80% 
of the UK market. Used extensively as a basis for investment products, such as 
derivatives and exchange-traded funds. Recognised as the measure of the UK 
financial markets. 
FTSE 250 
Comprised of mid-capitalised companIes not covered by the FTSE 100 
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representing approximately 18% of UK market capitalisation. 
FTSE SMALL CAP 
Comprised of companies with the smallest capitalisation of the capital and 
industry segments. Represents approximately 2% of the UK market capitalisation. 
FTSE UK STYLE 
Provides investors with a measure of the performance of value and growth 
companies within the FTSE 350. 
FTSE TMT 
Reflects performance of companIes m the Technology, Media and 
Telecommunications sectors. Designed to minimise exposure to individual large 
constituents by using a tiering system for eligible constituents and will therefore 
ensure there is reduced concentration risk to investors. 
NATURE OF POPULATION OF DATA 
The data used in any study is dependent on the nature of the analysis as well as 
the type of study undertaken. In the case of this thesis, an empirical approach has 
been undertaken and so statistical data is required. 
The nature of the study is to examine the impact of company announcements on 
share price data. Our first issue in beginning to consider data required for the 
study is to ask as to the frequency of the time series of data analysed? This 
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answer to this question depends very much on how specifically we wish to 
measure the price impacts. For example, it is correct to say that the impact of the 
World Trade Centre attack was felt on stock markets around the world six months 
after the attack had taken place. However, would it me meaningful to analyse 
market performance at a date six months prior to the attack and six months post 
the attack? Certainly this analysis would tell us little as to the impact of that 
attack. In the case of our study, companies continue to make announcements 
almost on a daily basis and sometimes, in the case of larger companies, there is a 
continuous flow of announcements to the stock market. 
We therefore have a choice as to the frequency of the time series that we may 
require in order to make inferences about the speed and impact of stock prices to 
new infom1ation. Ifwe consider a time series that contains monthly data, then our 
data points will be one month apart. The chances are that there will be several 
announcements that would have been made between these two points and 
therefore by taking months apart data, we would miss the activity and behaviour 
of what is happening between these two events. Another option is to consider 
real-time data i.e. analyse the impact of announcements as and when they are 
occurring. The problem with this is two-fold. Firstly there is the issue of the 
availability of data. When considering real-time event impacts, there will be a 
significant amount of data to cover even one day's analysis. Owing to practical 
reasons, real-time data is un-available to the author of this thesis due to access to 
the relevant database and the consequent cost implications. The second issue in 
this regard is that when we consider the impact of event announcements on stock 
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prices using real-time data, there is a requirement to know the exact time that the 
announcement is made. This, again is not always possible. 
So, we have ruled out the possibility of using monthly data as it is considered to 
infrequent to capture the announcement impact. With regards real-time data, 
although that would provide for a sophisticated analysis, the data availability is an 
issue. Not only is the real-time share price required but the real-time market 
index is also required for regression purposes. 
The choice of frequency of data used is daily stock price data. The closing price 
of shares traded on the Alternative Investment Market are used. The method of 
construction of the sample on which this analysis is based is discussed on page 
157 
Use of daily data has several benefits. Firstly, the data is freely available. At the 
time that the study began and when conducting the pilot study (see Appendix 1), 
the main source of data availability was Datastream™. However, since the 
beginning of this research, the internet has increased the availability of share price 
data and it can now be downloaded without charge from a selection of websites. 
The Datastream™ database allows for daily share price data to be downloaded 
into ExceFM for analysis. 
Availability of daily data was one of the reasons that daily data was used. A 
second advantage of using daily data is that the analysis would then discuss the 
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impact of the announcement over the period of days leading up to and after the 
event. In accordance with previous event studies, the event window is usually 
termed in number of days. Therefore daily stock price data would be required. A 
third advantage of using daily share price data is that the distribution of the 
resultant generated returns conformed more closely with the assumptions of 
normality as per our requirements. Share price returns are shown to follow a 
normal distribution. This is a standard requirement much in the same way as, for 
regression analysis, error terms are assumed to follow a normal distribution. 
From the final analysis sample, a random sample of 10% of companies were 
selected to see if the assumption of normality was being adhered to. The random 
selection of the sample was based on generating random numbers using the excel 
function RAND. The conditions of normality can be easily tested using a 
histogram. The returns distribution of a sample of test data is given below and as 
can be concluded, there appears to be conformance with the assumption of 
normality except in the case of outliers that appear in some of the data. This issue 
is further investigated later in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 5, DATA ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, data and analysis that forms the basis of the contribution to 
knowledge contained in the thesis is presented. The author begins by re­
oritorating the purpose, nature and scope of the study. This preamble is based on 
the discussion outlining under the title of Motivations of the Study as contained in 
Chapter 1. The chapter then discusses the data available for this study as well as 
the motivation and procedure by which the dataset is sorted in order to satisfy the 
requirements of the analysis. The analysis is then conducted in line with the 
methodological approach contained in Chapter 4 and which is supported by the 
pilot study in Appendices 1. The pilot study findings are consistent with the 
selected methodology. Namely, the single index market model using ordinary 
least squares regression is applied to daily stock returns. 
Whilst neither the managerial or theoretical implications of the findings of the 
analysis are discussed here, a detailed discussion is found in the proceeding 
chapter. It is hoped that these results will cast some light over existing areas of 
contention. The first of these areas includes the semi-strong form of the efficient 
market hypothesis. Whilst the semi-strong form ofthe efficient market hypothesis 
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questions the ability of markets to reflect company announcement information in 
a timely manner, these results assist in whether this is in fact the case. More 
specifically, these results will demonstrate as to whether stock prices reflect 
fundamental values or whether these fundamental intrinsic values are to be 
disregarded and dismissed as spurious. 
A second insight that is anticipated by results generated is the extent to which 
markets react to company announcement. A well documented and highly debated 
phenomenon is formalised as the Over-reaction Hypothesis (ORB). These results 
will attempt to enable us to consider the extent to which markets over-react and 
under-react to company specific announcements. 
Thirdly, to what extent does the nature and content of announcement impact on 
the markets ability to react. Are financial announcements more eagerly 
anticipated or do non-financial announcements create sufficient anticipation for 
shareholders to place buy and sell decisions? 
Finally, does there exist any potential scope for insider dealing in AIM listed 
companies? In order to assess if there is any scope for insider dealing, the dataset 
is re-analysed after sorting for concentration of share ownership among the 
directors of the company. Under the stock exchange Code of Conduct, Rules and 
Regulatory Guidance, there exists an ongoing and continual duty of directors to 
inform the market of any price sensitive information as soon as that information 
becomes known. This analysis will consider the extent stock price reactions 
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whilst controlling for shareholder concentration. In this way, it is hoped that 
potential insider trades may be identified. 
EXPLANATION OF DATA USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
Data comprising stocks quoted on the Alternative Investment Markee, UK is 
analysed in this thesis which is further discussed on pages 150 and page 175. 
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL 
ANNOUNCEMENTS 
Whilst the range of announcements that compames make is broad, generally 
speaking, a company announcement can be categorised as either a financial 
announcement (FA) or non-financial announcement (NFA). The category into 
which an announcement falls may be decided upon depending on whether the 
announcements satisfies anyone of the following requirements. The 
announcement should either contains information relating to an entry or entries in 
either of the profit and loss account, balance sheet or cashflows in which case it 
would clearly be considered a financial announcement. Owing to the fact that the 
announcement refers to the financial accounts, the impact of that announcement 
can be viewed as being quantifiable in terms of the financial wealth adjustment 
that shareholders are expected to undergo. An example of such an announcement 
would be a profit announcement or an earnings announcement as these relate 
7 A fuller discussion outlining the inception and development of the Alternative Investment Market 
can be found in The Alternative Investment Market Handbook published by Jordans (2001) 
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directly to entries in the profit and loss accounts or the balance sheets of. the 
business. Alternatively, the announcement may be directly related to the financial 
prospects of the company in tenns of either its prospective future cash flows or 
investor dividends. Finally, where an announcement can demonstrate any 
tangible or quantifiable increase in the financial standing of the business, this 
announcement can be considered as a financial announcement. Such 
announcements are considered to have financial impact but since they can not be 
directly related to profit and loss account or balance sheet data, their interpretation 
as being financial is largely based on the fact that they are viewed to indirectly 
impact on financial statement entries. An example of such an announcement may 
be the awarding of a large contract. This would demonstrate potentially increased 
profits albeit that these profits are yet to be realised and materialised in the 
financial statements which means that they would also be difficult to quantify at 
the announcement stage. 
It can sometime prove difficult to quantify the impact of announcement that are 
financial in nature owing to the fact that their financial impact can be difficult to 
gauge in terms of future cashflows and shareholder wealth impacts. Whilst it is 
often argued in the academic literature that the perceptions of different investors 
lead to simultaneous buying and selling pressure, thus resulting in a neutral 
change in a companies financial fortunes, in practice, most company 
announcements rarely have a neutral impact. Announcements almost always have 
either a positive or negative impact on share price returns. 
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In deciding as to which announcements are considered as non-financial 
announcements, one would consider announcements that, whilst impacting on a 
companies future outlook, prove difficult to quantify in monetary terms. In 
essence, non-financial announcements impact more on future sentiments rather 
than future performance. An example would be the appointment of a new director 
or board member or chief executive officer. Whilst the impact on profitability 
would be difficult to gauge, the sentiment that this announcement would portray 
would be evidenced by the judgement of the city on the credentials of the new 
appointee. 
REGULATORY NEWS SERVICE (RNS) ANNOUNCEMENTS 
A sample of both financial and non-financial announcements relating to the 
sample in this study are listed below. A short discussion of what has determined 
the nature of the announcement has also been presented. These announcements 
have been taken verbatim from the Regulatory News Service and appear as they 
would have been presented to the London Stock Exchange buy the relevant 
nominated company advisor (NOMAD). The announcements have also been date 
stamped. 
RNS-Director Shareholding - 04/04/2000 
Aortech Inter PLC - Directors Shareholding. AorTech International pIc (the 
Company) announces that it received notification today that on 3 April 2000 
Eddie McDaid, Director, and his wife Mrs K L McDaid respectively sold 2,500 
and 5,000 Ordinary Shares in the Company at a price of 745p per share. 
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The above is an example of an announcement that does not have any direct impact 
on the financial statements of the company to which it refers. Since it is difficult 
to see any direct link between the announcement and the financial standing of the 
business, we can not assume that this is a financial announcement. However, 
there is evidence that this announcement could be accorded non-financial status. 
The subject matter of the announcement is that the director has sold shares in the 
company. Therefore, the announcement does contain signals regards the future 
prospects. Whilst there could be personal reasons why the director has sold shares 
in the company, the remaining investors would not be instilled with confidence 
regards the future prospects in view of the directors actions. 
RNS-Other - 27/03/2000 
Aortech Inter PLC - Re Clinical Trials Completed. Completion of Clinical Trials 
for the TruCCOMS AorTech International pIc. CAorTech') the Scottish-based 
manufacturer of cardiovascular devices, announces the successful completion of 
its patient clinical trials at the Papworth Hospital in the lJK in respect of its 
Continuous Cardiac Output Monitoring System. 
This announcement relates to the successful trial of a new product for the 
company. Again, whilst there is no direct information that would relate to the 
financial statement, the successful development of a product would be expected to 
have a significant positive impact on the future growth and earnings of the 
business. Whilst the exact impact on future profits and dividends would be 
difficult to quantify, the announcement does reflect a change in sentiment and 
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would therefore be tenned a non-financial announcement. 
RNS-Results - 03/12/1998 
Aortech Inter PLC - Interim Results. AORTECH INTERNATIONAL PLC. 
Interim Results for the Six Months Ended 30 September 1998. AorTech 
International p1c, the Scottish-based manufacturer of cardio-vascular devices, 
announces its Interim Results for the six months ended 30 September 1998. The 
Company continues to achieve its objectives and since flotation has increased 
turnover, enhanced its distribution network and radically expanded its product 
portfolio. 
* 	 Turnover increased 34% to £1.25 million; 
* 	 Ultracor clinical trial data published; 
* 	 Manufacturing agreement signed with Novoste; 
* 	New tri-leaflet heart valve undergoing in-vitro trials; 
* 	 New Elastomedic material currently being evaluated by major US 
corporations; 
In the above announcement, we can see that there are some tangible references to 
entries that would appear in the Profit and Loss account (turnover for example) 
and also in the Balance Sheet of the company (Earnings Per Share). Such 
announcements are considered to be financial announcements as they are 
quantified in terms of their financial impact. 
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RNS-Results - 01104/1999 
Charlton Athletic - Interim Results RNS No 1204d CHARLTON ATHELTIC 
PLC 1 Apri11999 CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT. Introduction 
Celebrating our first season in the F.A. Premier League, I am pleased to present 
the Company's financial results for the half year to 31 December 1998. Financial 
Report. Turnover for the six months was £8.1m compared with £2.Sm for the 
comparable period in 1997. This increase is a direct result of gaining promotion 
to the F.A. Premier League with its effect on our match day operations and 
attendances, and our share of the revenues produced by the BSkyB television deal. 
Again, the above announcement demonstrates a clear and significant link between 

the content of the announcement and the impact on the financial statements. This 

would be termed a financial announcement. 

RNS-Document - 04/0111999 

Charlton Athletic - Doc re Report and Accounts. ANNUAL REPORT & 

ACCOUNTS 1998 A copy of the above is available for inspection from the 

Company Announcements office of the Stock Exchange, London. 

The above announcement represents a disclosure issue. Whilst it is clear that this 

announcement represents the disclosure of the financial statements, disclosures 

are considered to have other, less financial connotations. For example, the 

disclosure of accounts may also serve to confirm the sentiments that investors and 

speculators have already built up in the time period leading to the final 
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disclosures. 
RNS-Results - 20/0211998 
Charlton Athletic - Interim Results RNS No 3459n CHARLTON ATHLETIC 
PLC 20th February 1998 CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT. Introduction 
I have pleasure in presenting the financial report for the company for the six 
months to 31 December 1997. Financial results 
The period saw the operating loss before interest reduced to £377,000 from 
£510,000 in the corresponding six-month period to December 1996. The turnover 
before player transfers was £2,491,000 (1996 £2,113,000). This included 
television receipts from four nominated Sky Television games, three of which 
were at. The Valley, and contributions from the new hospitality facilities, which 
came on line in late October. 
In addition to the above, the transfer account produced a deficit for the period of 
£107,000 with the purchase of Matthew Holmes from Blackburn Rovers being 
partially offset by the sale of Brendan O'Connell 
This again is a clear and direct financial announcement smce it reflects the 
financial position of the company. 
RNS-Contract - 27/0411999 
AFA Systems PLC - Contract Awarded. AFA SYSTEMS PLC (AFA or the 
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Company) Award of Contract The Directors of AFA are pleased to announce a 
further sale ofMusketeer, the Company's integrated treasury and risk management 
product, to a major Israeli bank. The total value of the contract is $2. 7 million 
(approximately £1,687,500). The contract is in three stages. The first stage, with 
a consideration totalling $19 million (approximately £1,187,500), will be received 
on the achievement of certain implementation milestones over the next eleven 
months. The exact timing of phase two and three deliveries totalling $350,000 
(approximately £219,000) and $450,000 (approximately £281,000), respectively, 
is to be agreed as part of phase one. 
The awarding of a contract to a company is considered as a fmancial 
announcement. The reason for this is because it is with some accuracy that we are 
able to quantify the impact to the financial statements of the awarding of such 
contracts. The methodology by which this is done is called the Net Present Value 
(NPV) method. This method allows companies to discount the expected 
cashflows from the contract awarded and discount at the cost of capital rate. The 
net present value gives us the ability to quantify what the impact on shareholder 
wealth ought to be. Thus, it is a tangible, albeit estimate, of the financial impact 
to the company shareholders. 
RNS-Chairmanship - 08/03/2000 
Highams Systems - Re Letter from Chairman, etc 
HIGHAMS SYSTEMS SERVICES GROUP PLC Chairman's letter to 
shareholders Highams Systems Services Group pIc, a leading supplier of IT 
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services to the insurance and finance sectors, today posted the attached letter from 
the Chairman to its shareholders, commenting on current trading, new business 
initiatives and board changes. The Company expects to announce its preliminary 
results for the year in early June, as usual. Copies of this letter will be available 
from the Company's registered office: Hammond House, 33/45 Croydon Road, 
Caterham, Surrey CR3 6PB for the next fourteen days. For further information, 
please contact: Nigel Graham Maw Chairman, Highams Systems Services Group 
1962779275 Rick Thompson Director, Teather & Greenwood Limited 020 7426 
9000 Issued by Haggie Financial Limited 020 7417 8989. 
Dear Shareholder This letter is to bring you up to date with events since our half­
year results annOlllcement in November 1999. 
Letters from the Chairman can be considered as either financial or non-financial 
announcements depending on the nature of the content of the letter. In the above 
example, we see that there is a general reference to past trading and future 
financial outlook. The announcement that forthcoming preliminary figures that 
are due for release will inject a level of certainty into the stock price returns. All 
announcements do convey informational content to a greater or lesser degree and 
that degree is determined by the level and strength of the signals that they portray. 
The sooner the releases are made, the more the likelihood that this certainty can be 
traded upon. However, since there is no direct reference to the financial 
statements, this would be considered as a non-financial statement. 
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RNS-Dividend - 14/06/1999 
Highams systems - final dividend final dividend company name highams 
systems services pic security title *ord shs mnemonic code *hss sedol code*425­
197 dividend amount* 1.1p period*year to 31-03-99 provisional ex date *21-06-99 
record date*25-06-99 payment date*27-08-99 div/scrip option*yes notes 
A dividend announcement is perhaps the clearest financial announcement that is 
analysed in this thesis. The strongest signal that a company can send regards its 
financial position is the dividend announcement. Unlike announcements that 
relate to financial statements of earnings and profitability, the dividend 
announcement is not open to the same level of SUbjectivity. Dividend is payed out 
of cash which is not a disputable entity. The level of cash balance in the bank is 
not subject to creative manipulation and therefore the signal regards dividend is 
strong both in current clarity and in terms of generating expectation regards the 
future. 
RNS-Placing - 2110312000 
Just Group PLC - Placing of Shares 
ruST GROUP COMPLETES #7. 3M PLACING TO FUND NEXT PHASE OF 
GROWTHJust Group PLC (the Company), the integrated media business, 
announced today that Teather & Greenwood Limited has placed on behalf of the 
Company 63,739,367 New Ordinary Shares of 1p, including 61,470,000 shares to 
12 leading City institutions. 
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The Placing announcement referred to above demonstrates the raising of capital 
for the purposes of investment. Whilst there will be a clear change in the capital 
level on the balance sheet of the company, the announcement itself is considered 
as non-financial on the basis that the capital raised cannot be exactly correlated 
with tangible increases in earnings, profitability or dividends. The announcement 
does, in effect, only alter the sentiment of the future expectation. Increases in 
capital raised on the market would be expected to generate returns at some point 
in the future. 
RNS-Agreement - 03/03/2000 
Just Group PLC - Broadcast Agreement Signed JUST GROUP ANNOUNCES 
BROADCAST AGREEMENT FOR JELLABIES WITH RTL DISNE. Just 
Group pIc, the international integrated entertainment company, announced today 
that an agreement has been signed between its co-production partner Winchester 
Television (Winchester) and RTL Disney (Super RTL) for the rights to broadcast 
its Jellabies TV series in all German-speaking countries in Europe. 
Again, the above is evidence of non-financial announcements on the basis that 
there would be sentiment changes (unlike in the case of contract awards) that 
would impacted on future performance. In the case of direct contract awards, 
these announcements are considered as financial announcements on the basis that 
the present value of the future profits can be calculated and thus the tangible 
(albeit probalistic) returns can be computed. An agreement to distribute a product 
in an untested market cannot be so easily translated into tangible cashflows. 
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RNS-Directorate - 13/03/2000 
Majestic Wine PLC - Re Directorate MAJESTIC WINE PLC APPOINTMENT 
OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR - Simon Burke - Chief Executive of 
Hamleys PIc. The board of Majestic Wine PLC (the Company) are pleased to 
announce the appointment of Simon Burke as non- executive Director with effect 
from 10th March 2000. The Directors believe his extensive retailing career 
experience will provide a valuable contribution to the Company. 
The above is a clear example of a non-financial announcement as it does not 
pertain directly to any specific financial statement or quantifiable monetary 
performance measure. The abilities of the newly appointed non-executive director 
can cause consternation's among the existing shareholders and so sentiment 
changes will take place leading us to consider this announcement as a non­
financial announcement. 
RNS-Holding - 22/09/1998 
Epic Multimedia - Holding in Company. RNS No 3287e. EPIC MULTIMEDIA 
GROUP PLC 22nd September 1998 SUBSTANTIAL SHAREHOLDING The 
Company was today informed that on 18 September 1998, James Brathwaite, a 
substantial shareholder in the Company, sold 437,000 ordinary shares in the 
Company. This sale has reduced his holding from 1,952,381 shares, representing 
8.4 per cent., to 1,515,381 shares, representing 6.5 per cent. ofthe ordinary issued 
share capital in the Company. 
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The above announcement can be seen as a non-financial announcement on the 
basis that there is no tangible or quantifiable impact of the change on the financial 
statement. However, one would consider the reasons and motivations for a 
substantial investor to reduce his shareholding by such a significant amount. This 
change in shareholding would clearly have a significant signalling impact on the 
remaining shareholders and so sentiments would clearly be impacted upon. The 
announcement is therefore non-financial in nature. 
THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET (AIM), UK. 

AIM is the London Stock Exchange's global market for smaller, growing 

t companies where companies from different sectors and different countries attain 
listing status. Since AIM opened in 1995, more than 850 companies have been I 
I 
f 
admitted to listing on the Alternative Investment Market and collectively, these 
companies have raised more than 10 billion US dollars through flotation and 
initial public offerings. 
There are, of-course, costs associated with listing on AIM. As mentioned earlier 
on in this thesis, once admitted to AIM, a company has certain ongoing disclosure 
requirements and needs to retain a nominated adviser at all times. Ordinarily, once 
a company has been on AIM for 2 years it will have the opportunity to seek 
admittance to the main market by using a special expedited procedure. However, 
before highlighting the developments that AIM has enjoyed since its inception in 
1995, the below commentary highlights some of the benefits of attaining AIM 
listing status. 
169 

••a 
Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis 	 October 2004 
Flotation in general on a public market is first and foremost an opportunity to 
raise funds for further growth. However, there are many reasons why a company 
might consider becoming publicly listed as follows: 
• 	 To provide access to capital for growth, gIVIng a company the 
opportunity to raise finance for further development - both at the time of 
flotation and later, through further capital raisings 
• 	 To create a market for a company's shares, broadening the shareholder 
base and potentially giving existing shareholders the chance to exit 
• 	 To place an objective market value on your company's business 
• 	 To encourage employee commitment by making share schemes more 
attractive, which can act as an incentive for employees' long-term 
motivation 
• 	 To increase a company's ability to make acquisitions, using quoted 
shares as currency 
• 	 To create a heightened company profile, stemming from increased press 
coverage and analysts' reports, helping to maintain liquidity in a 
company's shares 
• 	 To enhance status with customers and suppliers, who are reassured by 
the regulatory processes, involved in a company's quotation on AIM. 
AIM provides the benefits of being traded on a public market and also allows 
companies to develop within a flexible regulatory environment. In a recent study 
of the perceived benefits that companies have highlighted, below are some 
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reasons why companies have chosen to join the Alternative Investment Market: 
• 	 Easier entry criteria, giving a wide range ofcompanies access to a public 
market at an earlier stage oftheir development 
• 	 A less stringent regulatory regime, allowing businesses to learn to 
experience life as a public company without the full disciplines of the UK 
Listing Authority's rules 
• 	 Easier acquisition rules, facilitating growth through acquisition 
• 	 Certain tax benefits which may be an advantage for some companies 
To date, and according to the recent issue of the primary factsheet (2003), there 
are a total of703 companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market. 
The below Figure 2 charts the recent development of the Alternative Investment 
Market since its inception on the 19th June 1995. 
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Figure 2 Number Of AIM Companies (1995-2003) 
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A further proxy of the development of the AIM is represented by the increased 
market capitalisation as shown in the below Figure 3 
Figure 3 Increase In Market Capitalisation Of AIM. 
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Finally, a further indicator of growth and development of this market is found by 
monitoring the extent to which there has been an increase the number of shares 
that have been traded on the market. Figure 4 below demonstrates a significant 
increase in the volume of shares that have been traded on this exchange since its 
inception in June 1995. 
Figure 4 Increase In Trading Activity on AIM. 
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NEED FOR DATA MODIFICATION. 
The initial sample data that has been selected is made up of a total of 345 
companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock 
Exchange as at April 2001. In usual circumstances, one would like to be able to 
analyse all the data that exists within the sample. Since the sample is made up of 
all companies listed on AIM over the period analysed, the sample in this case 
would constitute what is referred to in statistical terminology as the" population". 
2001 2002 2003 to Feb 
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In order to analyse the impact of announcements on daily stock returns, one is 
required to calculate daily stock returns for each day and for each company. 
However, the problem with this analysis is that while some companies have 
attained listing status that coincides with the inception of AIM, other companies 
have only managed to attain listing status later on in AIMs development. A 
further complication is that some companies have remained listed on AIM while 
others have been withdrawn from AIM (they may have either failed to maintain 
listing credentials or moved onto the main listing of the London Stock Exchange). 
Data on daily stock prices and announcements are only available (and, indeed, of 
relevance to our study) in cases where the stock is still traded on the exchange. In 
essence, if we consider the population data as all companies listed on the stock 
exchange over the maximum length of time, some company data will fall short of 
being available for this period. 
Let us begin by assigning a number to each observation such that we let the 
coefficient, 1, = the first observation. Since the first trading day of AW related to 
23rd June 1995, observation 1 will correlate with the first days closing stock price 
for all companies that were listed on AIM on its first opening day of trading. A 
company by the name of Athelney Trust, an investment trust dedicated to 
portfolio investments, was listed on AIM on 23 June and remained so up to and 
beyond the 3rd of April 2000 which indicates the cut-off period of the population 
data. However, not all other companies contained in the population data are listed 
throughout this period. 
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THE PROCESS OF DATA MODIFICATION 
There are several benefits of ensuring that the period over which the study is 
conducted is constant and continuous. There may be several economic wide 
factors that have moved stocks in a particular direction (economics shocks for 
example as demonstrated by the diagram on page 169) and so if the period under 
study is the same for all stock, such macro-economic events will be common to 
all. This will assist in ensuring stable parameters in models that are used to 
forecast future stock directions and extrapolate market specific reactions. 
Let us consider Athelney Trust again. Since this stock has been listed on the stock 
market over the period 23rd June 1995 to 3rd April 2000, and since the first days 
closing stock price is our first observation, there are a total of 1247 observations 
(1 to 1247). Observation 1 corresponds to the initial data point at time period 23rd 
June 1995 and observation 1247 corresponds to the time period 3rd April 2000. 
Our second step would be to consider expanding our dataset to include another 
company. Let us consider in our sample, a company called Voss Net. Voss Net 
was fonned in 1992 to develop and exploit e-commerce systems. The company 
began to trade on the Alternative Investment Market on the 11th August 1995 and 
remained listed to the end ofthe sample period of the 3rd April 2000. What would 
be the implication of including this company in our dataset? Ifwe assign the first 
day of trading of AIM stocks as observation 1 (23rd June 1995), Voss Net's first 
observation begins on 11th August 2000 which is observation number 36. We 
have the following illustration. 
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Altheney and Voss Net Trading Observations 
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Whilst on the one hand we wish to include Voss Net in our data sample, for us to 
ensure that our time series of share prices covers the same period, we would have 
to omit the first 36 Athelney Trust daily share price observations from the study. 
This is demonstrated by the dotted line in the above diagram. However, we also 
had an objective that dictates that the time series and consequent test period 
analysed should be as long as possible. 
Simultaneously, we are trying to include as many companies as possible in the 
analysis. We could therefore say that the "cost" of including our second company 
in the analysis is to reduce the number of observations and subsequent length of 
the time series by approximately one month (36 observations). 
Let us say that we are happy to make this tradeoff if it results in doubling the size 
of our sample dataset (from 1 to 2 companies). Now let us consider including 
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another company in our sample dataset. We shall consider including a company 
called Print Potato.Com. This company specialises in personalising printed matter 
such as promotional products and stationary. Print Potato.Com obtained listing on 
the Alternative Investment Market on the 18th February 2000 and remained listed 
up to and beyond April 2000. Should this company be included in the dataset? 
We can see that there is a possibility of including the company Print Potato.Com 
since there is a trading period common to all three stocks. We have Figure 5 
below. 
Figure 5 ,Altheney, VosNet and Print Potato Observation Period 
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What are the costs (in tenns of lost data) and what are the benefits of including 
this company within our dataset. We would increase our dataset from 2 to 3 
companies which is certainly a welcomed increase. On the other hand we would 
have to reduce the overall time period that the time series covers. The time period 
common to all three begins at observation number 1216 which corresponds to the 
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18th February 2000 and ends on the 4th April 2000. Whilst on the one hand, the 
benefit of including this company within the sample would be to increase the 
sample size from 2 to 3 companies, the disadvantage is that we would have to 
reduce the size of the time series. With our previous 2 companies, the total 
number of observations that were common to both companies was equal to 121l. 
This allowed the test period to be equal to over 54 months. However, by 
including the third company, Print Potato.Com, our total test period goes from 
1211 observations to 31 observations. Certainly the cost of increasing the size of 
the dataset by 1 company is too high since only 31 observation time periods 
remain common to all 3 companies. We would therefore reject Print Potato from 
the study sample. 
The decision as to which company to accept and which to reject is purely a 
normative one. Who is to say whether the benefit of an incremental increase in 
the dataset (i.e. 1 more company included in the study) outweighs the cost of 
reducing the study period of the sample time series analysed? However, it can be 
stated beyond a shadow of a doubt that reducing the sample datset time period to 
almost 3% of its original size for the sake of inclusion of a single company is 
clearly a price too dear to pay. The cost of the incremental increase in the sample 
dataset exceeds the benefit of the increase. 
On the basis of the above logic, we can proceed to exclude those companies that 
listed on the Alternative Investment Market late and whose inclusion in the 
sample datset would prove too costly in terms of the required reduction in the 
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overall test period. 
As a result of the first phase of exclusion, a total number of 97 out of a possible 
345 companies were excluded from the original dataset. By excluding 97 
companies, the remaining sample contains 248 companies. 
The dataset is still excessively large in view of announcements available and so 
we shall continue to reduce the dataset still further. Phase 2 exclusion is 
performed to reduce the dataset still further. The current dataset of 248 
companIes will be problematic to analyse since trying to obtain accurate 
announcement data on all 248 companies is not possible. The dataset spans a 
period of 23rd June 1995 to 4th April 2000. This period of study is too long since 
it will also be difficult to obtain announcements made by these companies over 
the past 5 years or so. Both the parameters of data size (number of companies) 
and length of time series can be satisfied simultaneously by excluding those 
companies with the greatest number of observations first. Consequently, the data 
size is reduced as is the length of time over which the remaining dataset spans. 
Currently we have a total of 248 companies with a maximum number of 1246 
observations. 
Let us now proceed to remove all companies that have share price observations 
throughout the test period. This equates to a total of 55 companies (using the 
count command in Excel). The total number of companies remaining in the 
sample now equates to 193 companies. Our data sample now looks as per Figure 
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6 below. 
Figure 6 Company And Observation Period For 193 Companies 
Number of Observations for 193 CompanIes 
2500 
2000 
Nu 
mb 
er 
1500~ of 
Ob 
58r 
1000 
vat 
500 
o 
,. .. ... .... ,., ,. ~ ... ... ,., .. .. ... ... 
Company Number 
The current dataset is now more manageable in the sense that there are 193 
companies included in the dataset which is a large number and represents, by 
proportion, almost 70% of all companies listed on the Alternative Investment 
Market over the period analysed. In our third phase of data refining, we shall 
attempt to exclude those companies that have only been listed for short periods of 
time. Judging diagrammatically by the representation as shown in Figure 6 above, 
it would appear that the average number of observations is around 800. 
Calculation of the arithmetic average actually demonstrates that the average 
number of observations is infact 820. Let us now proceed to exclude all those 
companies that have, say, less than 751 observations. Phase 3 of our exclusion 
demonstrates that the remaining companies number 134. 
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Is this data sample representative of the population that is under analysis? In 
terms of representation, one can first consider the duration of the period under 
consideration. The resultant data sample covers, in terms of observations, from 
observation 752 to 1246. 
When removing all those companies that have less than 752 observations, what 
are we left with in terms of the remaining data time series? The resultant dataset 
spans the period from 23rd June 1995 to 3rd April 2000 and the total number of 
companies included within the dataset number 134. We can analyse the range of 
sectors included within the dataset to see if a range of sectors are represented but 
before we do this, let us analyse the break-up in terms of how many companies 
have maintained listing status throughout the duration of the listing period. 
The following illustrations represents the frequency diagram and related 
histogram output for our resultant dataset. 
Bin Fregyencl. Cumulative % 
753 1 .75% 
797.9090909 11 9.02% 
842.8181818 11 17.29% 
887.7272727 13 27.07% 
932.6363636 13 36.84% 
977 .5454545 9 43.61% 
1022.454545 18 57.14% 
1067.363636 8 63.16% 
1112.272727 4 66.17% 
1157.181818 9 72.93% 
1202.090909 26 92.48% 
More 10 100.00% 
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Histogram of Frequency Distribution pf Observations 
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From these outputs we can consider some of the summary statistics that validate 
the resultant data as a dataset that is relatively representative of the Alternative 
Investment Market. For example, the first illustration demonstrates that the 
cumulative percentage distribution output, indicates that 92.48% ofthe dataset has 
observations of between 0 and 1202. In terms of data for our dataset, if we 
consider the period of analysis as 23rd of June 1995 to 31 st of January 2000,92% 
of our data will be captured within this time period. By changing the dataset to, 
say, considering all observations contained within the period 23rd June 1995 to the 
1022nd observations (23/6/95 to 24/05/99), we would, in effect, only be capturing 
57.14% of the available dataset. We would have excluded the remaining 42.86% 
of the data. Furthermore, if we were to extend the period under consideration to 
include the period 23/6/95 to the 1112th observation, two thirds of the dataset 
would be included in the experimental period. By increasing the number of 
observations within the dataset, we expand the parameters within which the time 
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series is examined as per Figure 7 
Figure 7 Updated Trend Line Of Observations 
New Trend Line For Updated Dataset 
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Figure 7 demonstrates that as we increase the number of observations in the 
dataset, the percentage of the total available data analysed increases. At this point 
it would appear that there is potential to reduce the overall dataset still further in 
terms of the size and the number of companies. 
The below Figure 8 demonstrates the marginal Increase m the number of 
observations that can be anticipated as there are incremental increases in the size 
of the dataset itself 
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Figure 8 Impact Of Marginal Increases In Dataset 
1m pact Of Marginal Increases In Dataset 
1400.00 
1200.00 
800.00 
600.00 
400.00 
4 6 
Number Of Companies Added 
The output in the form of Figure 9 on page 184 demonstrates that the incremental 
impact of including those observations that fall within the extreme ends in terms 
of the number of observations is not encouraging. Infact, what we see is 
consistent with the Theory of Diminishing Marginal Returns. We find that on a 
cost benefit basis, it may prove detrimental to the studies efficiency. The net 
benefit of including all companies that have datasets covering the entire period is 
outweighed by the cost of inclusion. 
Figure 9 Impact Of Outliers 
Bin Fre9.uenc~ Cumulative % Bin Frequenc~ Cumulative % 
753 1 .81% More 28 22.76% 
793.0909091 11 9.76% 993.5455 17 36.59% 
833.1818182 11 18.70% 1033.636 13 47.15% 
873.2727273 9 26.02% 793.0909 11 56.10% 
913.3636364 11 34.96% 833.1818 11 65.04% 
953.4545455 7 40.65% 913.3636 11 73.98% 
993.5454545 17 54.47% 873.2727 9 81.30% 
1033.636364 13 65.04% 953.4545 7 86.99% 
1073.727273 4 68.29% 184 1153.909 7 92.68% 
1113.818182 4 71.54% 1073.727 4 95.93% 
1153.909091 7 77.24% 1113.818 4 99.19% 
More 28 100.00% 753 100.00% 
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Whilst the number of companies included increases dramatically, the total number 
of new observations included within the study do not increase by any significant 
amount. The perceived marginal benefits are exceeded by the perceived marginal 
costs of inclusion. We shall therefore proceed to exclude those companies that 
have been listed throughout the entire period. There are a total of 10 companies 
that have over 1200 observations in the dataset. We shall proceed to remove them 
from the current dataset, which will mean that the remaining dataset has 
companies which have a maximum of 1194 observations. In this case, Philippine 
Gold is the longest time series that is analysed. Philippine Gold is a company that 
specialises in the exploration, mining and processing of precious and base metals. 
Figure 10 demonstrates the summary statistics of the frequency distribution of the 
data once outliers are omitted on the basis of all companies who's observation 
count exceeds 1247. 
Figure 10 Histogram Of Summary Statistics When Outliers Omitted 
Histogram Of Summary Statistics (outliers omitted) 
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The cumulative frequency distribution of the resultant data demonstrates that in 
excess of 75% of the data can be captured and analysed within the observations 1 
to 1153. All 100% ofthe data time series can be analysed if the whole time series 
takes into account the period 23/06/95 to 3104100. However, since the maximum 
number of observations is 1153 and since all companies within the dataset have 
observations up to the end of the dataset, this would imply that the first 
observation is recorded on the 53rd day ofthe beginning ofthe dataset. Fifty-three 
plus 1153 = 1247, which corresponds to the total number of observations that are 
possible within the dataset. We can therefore proceed to reduce the dataset by 53 
observations starting at the first date of the observations i.e. observation number 
one. 
The resultant dataset now comprises of 134 companies. There are a total of 134 
companies represented within the dataset and the time series spans the period 
06/09/95 to 07/04/00. The total number of daily share prices contained within the 
dataset number 121516. Let us now consider whether the dataset is representative 
in terms of: 
A Sectorial representation 

B Range of announcements analysed 

C 
 Market capitalisation spread 
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REPRESENTATIVENESS OF RESULTANT DATASET. 

Owing to the nature of this work, no single measure is available to gauge the 

extent to which this resultant dataset is representative and appropriate to develop 

the study. Whilst daily share prices are available from 06/091195 to 07/04100, 

RNS announcement availability covers the period 1 July 1997 to 1st May 2000. 

One of the salient features of this work is that since inferences will be made 
regarding the semi-strong form of informational efficiency of the Alternative 
Investment Market in general, the resultant sample needs to demonstrate 
representation of the market as a whole. There ought, therefore, to be a wide 
range of sectorial representations made. A second facet of the contained study is 
that a range of both financial and non-financial announcements is being 
considered. A third issue incorporated in this study involves the idea that 
company size may offer an insight into our findings and that director shareholding 
may also instigate information leakage's to the market. A range of market 
capitalisation's with respective shareholding concentrations would also therefore 
be of use. 
In order to satisfy the study as mentioned in Chapter 1 and also the insights that 
the results will render, the resultant dataset needs to demonstrate the following 
dimensions in order to vindicate its robustness and suitability in making 
inferences relating to the Alternative Investment Market as a whole as follows: 
Event announcements must be available 
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2 Dataset must represent all industrial sectors comprising the Alternative 
Investment Market 
3 Dataset must represent a wide range of market capitalisation's so as to 
check if this affects our results 
4 Announcements analyse must reflect the available range of 
announcements 
5 The absolute number of announcements analysed must be large 
We now have our dataset of 134 companies. To satisfy constraint number one, we 
have to ensure that the time series comprising the dataset corresponds with the 
availability of the announcements for that particular time period. Our company 
announcements as per the Synergy Software database are only available for the 
period 01107/97 to 01105/2000. Companies for which Regulatory News Service 
announcements are unavailable are excluded from the sample. 
We are therefore left with 105 companies for the analysis. We are left with 105 
companies and a total of 75600 daily stock price observations [720*105]. A 
further benefit from this also means that all companies are listed throughout the 
examined time period. Our second constraint will now be addressed in order to 
ascertain as to whether the nature of the companies is such that they are reflective 
of all industrial sectors within the Alternative Investment Market. 
A total of 105 compames have been considered in this study. Appendix 2 
represents a list of all companies along with the respective sectorial allocation, 
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country of origin and market capitalisation. Figure 11 demonstrates the frequency 
distribution ofthe sectors analysed 
Figure 11 Frequency Distribution Of Sectors Analysed 
Freq uency Distribution of Sectors Analysed 
This figure demonstrates the frequency with which sectorial representation has 
been achieved in order to increase the integrity of the result. The primary aim of 
the herein contained results and consequent analysis is to be able to make 
inferences with respect to the overall exchange. 
It would appear that Leisure Facilities is the sector that is most representative with 
9 out ofthe 105 companies belonging to this sector. This would imply that 9% of 
the sample is made up of Leisure Facility companies. If we view the list of AIM 
stocks in February 2002, we find that the 634 companies listed as at 21st February 
2002, 51 companies faU within the Leisure Facilities sector. This provides 
anecdotal evidence that the sectorial composition of the sample is not significantly 
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different from the sectorial composition of the popUlation. To take another 
example, we can take the percentage makeup of the market in regard to internet 
stocks as compared to the percentage makeup of the current AIM market when 
compared to the current test sample. Again, Figure 11 demonstrates that of the 
105 companies included within the dataset, 2 were internet stocks [Netcall and 
Vossnet]. This represents 2/105 = approximately 2% of the market. Of the 634 
companies listed on AIM on 21 st February 2002, 20 were internet companies 
representing approximately 3.2% of the AIM stock market. Again this does not 
represent a significant divergence in terms of the difference in the composition of 
the actual AIM market and the test sample. 
Our third constraint is that we need to be able to demonstrate that our test sample 
contains a large range of market capitalisations. Market capitalisation's are 
limited by the regulatory requirements of the AIM admissions documentation. 
We may be interested in this so that we can detect for any firm size effect that 
may be taking place in the data of small firms. 
We can again compare the frequency distribution of companies by market 
capitalisation within our dataset with the current frequency distribution of 
companies that are listed at the year beginning 2002. The website of AIM listed 
companies on 21 st February 2002 reported the following summary statistics for 
the frequency distribution of market capitalisation of listed companies. A graph 
of these figures can be seen as per Figure 12 on page 191 
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Figure 12 Market Capitalisation Frequency Histogram 
Market Capitalisation Frequency Distribution Of AIM Companies 
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The figure demonstrates that as at 21 st February 2002, the majority of companies 
listed had a market capitalisation of less that pounds SOm. In actual fact, whilst 
the mode market capitalisation was between £Sm and £10m pounds, only 47 out 
of a total of 643 companies had a market capitalisation of more than £SOm. The 
remainder all had market capitalisation of less than £SOm i.e. 92% of the market. 
Figure 13 on page 192 demonstrates the frequency distribution of market 
capitalisation of the test dataset. 
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Figure 13 Market Capitalisation Of Data Analysed 
Market Capitalisation Frequency Distribution Of Data Sample Analysed 
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Given that we wish to ensure that there is consistency between the distribution of 
market capitalisation in the AIM market and the test sample, we can now proceed 
to test as to whether there is any statistical difference. To do this, an appropriate 
test of statistical difference of distribution can be employed. The F test as 
outlined by Fisher is utilised. In this case the degrees of freedom is equal to 6 
since there are 7 ranges of categories within which the capitalisation fall. 
The resultant F Test output is shown below and the highlighted value IS 
insignificant and a 95% confidence interval. 
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F-Test Two-Sample for Variances 
Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 89.85714286 15 

Variance 2242.809524 78.66666667 

Observations 7 7 

df 6 6 

F 28.51029056 

P(F<=f) one-tail 0.000369606 

F Critical one-tail 4.283862154 

The results show that we would reject the hypothesis that there is a significant 
difference in the dataset at a 95% confidence interval. 
Having demonstrated the consistency of the test dataset (its reflectiveness relative 
to the range of market capitalisation in the AIM market) a further opportunity 
arises that allows us to assess as to whether there is any impact of the 
capitalisation rate on the extent of semi-strong form efficiency result. This shall 
be discussed later. 
Our third constraint so as to authenticate out test sample is to switch our 
concentration to the announcements themselves. Weare required to satisfy 
ourselves that the nature of announcements analysed is reflective of the range of 
announcements companies make to inform current and perspective investors 
about future expectations. The below Table 11 illustrates which announcements 
fall into which categories. 
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Table 11 Definition Of Financial And Non-Financial Announcements 
RNS Announcement Discriptor 
Acauisition 
AGM 
Allotment 
AODointment 
Chairmanshio 
Contract 
~ector Sharei10lding 
~,,£!grat~. 
~nd 
Docu_f!1~_! 
EGM._____ 

Holding 

Listing 

Offer 

Other 

Results 

Tradina Statement 

Nature Of Announcement 
AcquIsition of a com pany in whole or 

in part or in shares of a given 

The calling of an Annual General 

Meeting in accordance with the 

shares to the stock market for 

The appointment of new member(s) 

to the board 

The announcement of the 

Chairmens' statement 

The awarding of new contracts or the 

agreem ent on new sales 

e no I Ica :Ion unoenne conaon 
Stock ExchanQe Yellow Book of 
The inform ing of a change to the 
Directorate of the com panv 

interim or final dividend to existina 

The submission of disclosure 

documents to the Exchanoe 

The announcent of the calling of a 

Extra-ordinarv General Meeting 

Announcement of significant capital 

chances 

The agreem ent of listing of new 

shares 

inten't~o~Vt~ '~~;~v~~~e ~haur~: ;~the 
(notification of a third parties stake 
Announcement of interim. 
I prelim inarv and final results 
Announcement of tradin outlook 
Financial (F) or Non-Financial (NF) 
NF 
NF 
NF 
NF 
NF 
F 
NF 
NF 
F 
F 
NF 
F 
NF 
F 
F 
I 
F 
F 
Having established that the range of announcements analysed is covered within 
the test sample, this observation is still insufficient in satisfying our requirements. 
We must also ascertain that the frequency of the announcements is sufficient so as 
to make inferences with regards to the market as a whole. We must now test the 
frequency of announcements analysed. Constraint number 4 demonstrates that 
frequency of announcements must be high. Figure 14 on page 195 demonstrates 
that the total number of announcements considered = 8114. It also demonstrates 
the frequency with which each announcement appears in our dataset. 
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Figure 14 Number Of Announcements Analysed 
RNS Announcement [ Nature Of Announcement Financial (F) or Non·Financial (NFl Total 
Acquisition of a com pany in whole or in part or 
Acquisition insharesofagivencompany 
The calling of an Annual General Meeting in 
NF 215 
AGM accordance with the Companies Act (1987) NF 90 
The allotment of newly Circulated shares to 
Allotment the stock market for commencement of N F 
The apPointm ent of new m em ber(s) to the 
Appointment board 
The announcement of the Chairmens' 
N F 45 
Chairmanship statement 
The awarding of new contracts or the 
NF 
Contract agreementonnewsales 
The notification under the I_cndon Stock 
F 32 
DirectorShareholding Exchange Yellow Book of Practices & 
The Informlng of a change to the Directorate 
NF 591 
Directorate of the company 
The announcem ent of either the interim or 
NF 263 
Dividend final dividend to existing shareholders 
The subm ission of disclosure docum ents to 
213 
Document the Exchange 
The announcent of the calling of a Extra­
250 
EGM ordinary General Meeting NF 93 
Holding Announcement of significant capita! changes 1025 
Listing The agreement of listing of new shares 
The notification of an offer of intention to 
NF 249 
Offer purchase shares in the company 89 
Miscellaneous announcements (notification of 
Other a third parties stake Increase, product 426 
Announcement of interim. preliminary and 
Results final results 735 
Announcem ent of trading outlook and future 
Trading Statement sales prospects etc 27 
As can be seen both Figure 15 on page 196, the announcement with the highest 
frequency represent director shareholding changes and changes in the respective 
holding of the shares of the company under consideration. The next most frequent 
announcements are the declaration of interim/preliminary and final results. 
Amongst the least frequently analysed announcements are notification of 
allotment changes, chainnanship announcements, notification of new 
appointments and annual general meetings notices. It would therefore not be 
unreasonable to conclude that the number of announcements are indeed 
significantly large and that from the results of the study, one would feel confident 
about making inferences pertaining to the extent of semi- strong fonn efficiency 
on the Alternative Investment Market as a whole. 
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Figure 15 Histogram Of Frequency Of Announcements 
Frequency of Announcements Tested, 105 Companies 
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Nature of Announcements 
A second scope of this work was formalised as being able to comment on any 
short-tenn over-reactions that may be seen in the market. The Over-Reaction 
Hypothesis does demonstrate that there is a tendency for investors to act 
irrationally and place excessive buying and selling pressures on the market that 
are unjustified in view ofthe announcements that companies may make. 
One could test for over-reactions by considering the extent to which stocks exhibit 
mean-reversion at the end of event windows. For this to be investigated, it is 
essential that not only are stock returns available for the event window under 
consideration, the returns ought to be available for the period leading up to the 
event announcement and after it. Since our dataset covers the period 01107/97 to 
03/04/00 and since the stock returns are available over this period in a continuous 
manner, detection for the over-reaction hypothesis is infact possible. 
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The third scope of this research relates to detecting as to whether financial 
announcements were more easily incorporated into stock prices as opposed to 
non-financial announcements. It could be that non-financial announcements, by 
their very nature, appear somewhat ambiguous and therefore their may be a delay 
in their incorporation into stock prices since investors hesitate to place trades. In 
our sample data, sample announcements are split into those announcements that 
are financial and those that are non-financial Figure 16 demonstrates that of the 
14 announcement types analysed, the split of the announcements is such that 
almost 64% of announcements are non-financial as opposed to 36% being 
financial in nature. 
Figure 16 Split Of FinanciallNon-Financial Announcement Analysed 
Split of Financial and Non Financial Announcements for the Test Dataset 
Non-financial Annelunce,men1 
64% 
Financial Announcement 
36% 
Our final requirement from the sorted data is that we need to be able to make 
inferences about the possibilities of insider trading and whether there is any 
significant differences in our results when we control for director ownership. In 
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order for us to be able to do this, it is important that we are aware of any stakes 
that a director may have in a given company. Figure 17 below shows the 
frequency distribution of concentration of ownership of directors of the company. 
Figure 17 Frequency Distribution Of Shareholder Concentration 
Sum Total % Holding Of Market Capitalisation 
(Top 5 Directors Holding) 
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ANALYSIS OF SEMI-STRONG FORM OF MARKET EFFICIENCY 
Having sorted the data into a form that is conducive to analyse, we begin our 
analysis by considering the semi-strong form of market efficiency_ To do this we 
shall consider the following four elements of the study: 
1 For each announcement type, what was the average abnormal return for 
each of the days covering the event window? 
2 For each announcement type, what was the cumulative abnormal return 
over the five day event window period? 
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For each pair of announcements, are any of the abnormal returns for each 
of the days in the event window significantly different from each other? 
So, for exan1ple, we can take a column of all t-2 returns for ACQ and test 
to see if they are significantly different from a column of t-2 returns for 
AGM. Then test to see if al1 t-2 returns for ACQ differ significantly from 
all returns for t-2 ALL. Do this for a1l pairs and for all days in the event 
window. 
A total of 701 announcements have been analysed and the frequency distribution 
of the different announcements can be seen in the below illustration. 
Announcement Type Frequency 
Acquisition 37 

Annual General Meeting 24 

Allotment Changes 2 

Appointment 12 

Chairmanship 4 

Contract 6 

Director Shareholding 96 

Dividend 45 

Document 59 

DS 110 

EGM 22 

Holding 84 

Listing 58 

Results 142 
For point 1 above, we can now proceed to calculate the average abnormal return 
for each announcement type for each of the days covering the event window. 
These results are displayed in Figure 18 below. 
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Figure 18 AAR Per Announcement For The Event Window 
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Announcement 
Acq 
Ag 
AP 
Ch 
Co 
Dir 
Div 
Doc 
OS 
EG 
H 
L 
R 
Day 
Average Abnormal 
-2 -1 0 1 2 
0.291860.05498 0.50959 1.65268 -
1.675921.27407 ­
0.59109 - 0.67890 
0.02549 0.0122 - 0.03 
3.79170 - 0.406640.84814 
0.066470.49060 
0.18082 0.61434 ­
0.14445 -
0.09015 - 0.44422 2.07967 
0.18919­
0.23611 0.20701 -
MARKET MODEL BASED REGRESSION RESULTS. 
Before we begin to translate and comment on the results that have been generated, 
it is important to pause for considering the statistical properties of the empirical 
output of the regression model. 
The error terms of the regression model under the Single Index Market Model 
methodology are considered as a proxy for the abnormal retums that cannot be 
explained by the model and these are attributed to the impact of the 
announcements around the time of the event window under consideration. Since 
the abnormal returns are regression based, there is an expectation for the abnormal 
returns (referred to as error terms) to conform with several standard assumptions 
of regression analysis. The output must, for example, be tested to see if the 
normality assumption has been adhered to. Again, a random sample of selected 
companies are selected and tested as per below. 
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R SQUARED REGRESSION RESULTS 
The first test is to consider the regression equations R2 values8. The R2 will tell is 
the extent of variation in the y variable that can be explained by the variation in 
the x variable. In the context of this study, that tell us the extent of variations in 
the share price returns that are captured by changes in the market index. The R2 
also gives us a good indication of the power of the regression equation. We 
would like to see high values of R2 which would indicate that the model, at the 
very least, seems to fit the existing data although it does not necessarily follow 
that fitting the existing data means that it has a high predictive power. The 
resultant regression may fit the existing data well but prove in-effective in its 
predictive ability. If the R2 statistic is low, this could as a result of simple chance 
in the data selection process. However, a more likely outcome is that the 
regression model is mis-specified. This would mean that whilst there may be a 
relationship between stock returns and the market index return, there is another or 
several other factors that explain this relationship. Parameter mis-specification 
would mean that the predictive power of the model is diluted as a result of 
omitting an important factor. Perhaps, for example, inflation rates or 
unemployment rates9 also have an impact on stock returns. 
A summary statistics of R2 regression Excel output for a sample of the data 
pertaining to the single index market model is presented below 
8 R2 is also commonly often referred to as the co-efficient of determination. 

9 These variables should already have been factored into the market return to a limited extent. 
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R Squared Output 
AORTECH CALADONIAN CHARLTON HIGHAMS 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.342408756 0.815182627 0.736557324 0.584761582 
R Square 0.117243756 0.664522716 0.542516691 0.341946108 
Adjusted R Square 0.006899226 0.622588055 0.485331278 0.259689372 
Standard Error 0.335642877 0.582812792 0.69307826 0.929352319 
Observations 719 719 719 719 
JUST GROUP MAJESTIC MULTIMEDIA NEWMARK 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.57891616 0.491558828 0.874485685 0.440580113 
R Square 0.33514392 0.241630081 0.764725213 0.194110836 
Adjusted R Square 0.25203691 0.146833841 0.735315865 0.093374691 
Standard Error 0.934143246 0.277558577 0.164841908 0.21548788 
Observations 719 719 719 719 
PILATECH TRINITY WESTMOUNT 
Re<;.ression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.248403853 0.466378245 0.873231856 
R Square 0.061704474 0.217508667 0.762533875 
Adjusted R Square -0.05558247 0.119697251 0.73285061 
Standard Error 0.293033311 0.251521311 1.56488639 
Observations 719 719 719 
From the above, there are several issues that ought to be bought into context 
within the framework of this research. Firstly, it should be noted that there 
appears to be a significant variation amongst the coefficient of R2 on each of the 
regression equations. The R2 values range from 6% to 76% which is clearly 
significant. We can therefore conclude that whilst in certain circumstances there 
appears to be a significant "goodness of fit" when running the regression analysis, 
there are circumstances whereby the regression model may appear not to be 
capturing the full relationship between the stock returns and the market returns. 
Y INTERCEPT REGRESSION RESULTS 
The below diagram represents the Y intercept of the single index market model 
regression equation for a sample of companies. 
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Y Intercept Output 
AORTECH CALADONIAN CHARLTON HIGHAMS 
Y Intercept -0.17816001 0.038582329 -0.007642422 0.146552594 
JUST GROUP MAJESTIC MULTIMEDIA NEWMARK 
Y Intercept 0.080999873 0.001308244 -0.039817041 0.108657868 
PILATECH TRINITY WESTMOUNT 

Y Intercept 0.139567085 0.014730821 -0.007858735 

The y intercept in the context of this study would translate as the returns that 
investors could expect should there be no return to be had in the market. The y 
intercept would be at the point where the value of our x variable, the return on the 
market index, would equal zero. In all cases, we would expect that the sign on 
the y intercept would be positive. The reason for this relates to the fact that the 
market index is not a single investment but rather a highly diversified portfolio or 
collection of security investments. The consequence of constructing a portfolio is 
that there is a risk reduction propertylO as a result of spreading investments across 
stocks rather than concentrating investable funds within the same company. Since 
risk, in financial terms, is measured by the variability of stock returns, a spreading 
of investments, would mean that while some share performed well, other may not 
but the mean return would remain stable. Shares that are perfectly negatively 
correlated would provide the most stable risk reduction property. 
As we can see from the table of y intercept values for our sample data, all but 
10 For a fuller discussion of market portfolio risk reduction I recommend The Market Gurus by 
Reese and Glassman. Dearborn Trade (2002) ISBN 079315953 
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three of the y intercepts are positive. Intuitively, this implies that when the market 
index return is close to or equal to zero, the return on the security is positive. This 
is consistent with financial theory. Since there is an inherent risk with investing 
in securities, then we would expect a positive percentage return compensation for 
any risk that is undertaken. 
GRADIENT OF THE REGRESSION RESULTS 
We shall now consider the slope of the regression equation. In tenus of ordinary 
least squares based results, the slope of the regression line represents the 
incremental impact on the dependent variable to changes in the independent 
variable. In tenus of our returns data, the coefficient on x would measure the 
sensitivity of a company's returns to changes in the returns on the market. This is 
referred to as the Beta (~) of the company. The output of the gradients of the 
sample regression equations for the sample of companies is given below. 
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Co-efficient on x Output 
AORTECH CALADONIAN CHARLTON HIGHAMS 
Gradient 0.396435914 0.026861249 0.10465794 0.498897133 
JUST GROUP MAJESTIC MULTIMEDIA NEWMARK 
Gradient 1.033144652 0.126977785 0.287397586 0.178721518 
PILATECH TRINITY WESTMOUNT 
Gradient -0.09382337 0.039294386 0.227145814 
Beta and its stability are often considered as important with regards to time series 
data. The reason for this is that within regression, there may be evidence of jump 
and shift parameters in the regression model. By considering sections ofthe time 
series rather than the time series as a whole, we would expect to find that there is 
no significant difference in the beta values as compared with the above figures. 
KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TEST OF RESIDUALS NORMALITY 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test gives a good indication of the extent to which the 
residual or the abnormal returns follow a normal distribution as per the 
assumptions of linear regression. The below Table 12 gives the output for the 
Kolmogorov-Smimov test. The section of the output that is of importance is the 
first and third column. The test statistic in the Kolmogorov-Smimov test is 
required to be, generally speaking, close to two. It is accepted as a rule of thumb 
that a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic that is either below 1 or greater than 3 
are cause for concern. The test has been conducted at a 95% confidence interval. 
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Table 12 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Of Normality 
Statistic df 	 Sig. 
760 .000AORTECH .344 
760 .000CALADONI .471 
760 .000CHARLTON .397 
760 .000HIGHAMS .411 
760 .000JUSTGROU .474 

.000
MAJESTIC .404 760 

.000
MULTIMED .350 760 

.000
NEWMARK .338 760 

.000
PILATECH .407 	 760 

760 
 .000TRINITY .382 

.000

.415 760WESTMOUN 
The data in the above table seems to suggest that our test statistic for our sample 
data is close to 1. We would therefore reserve opinion, based on the sample, as to 
whether the residuals exhibited normality. 
SKEWNESS/KURTOSIS 
A further consideration may be to test the skewnesslkurtosis of the abnormal 
returns. The below table indicates large variations in the distribution skewness. 
CALADO CHARLTO HIGHAMS JUSTGRO AORETCH 
719719719719719N Valid 
0 0000Missing 
.372
-2.469
-2.4694.924
-5.105Skewness 
.091
.091
.091
.091
.091Std. Error 
39.83539.83594.10850.630Kurtosis 

.182

.182
.182Std. Error 
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MAJESTIC MULTIME NEWMAR PILATECH TRINITY 
N Valid 719 719 719 719 719 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 
Skewness 
-2.789 9.337 -.319 -.583 2.847 
Std. Error .091 .091 .091 .091 .091 
Kurtosis 27.306 276.401 36.729 48.249 49.969 
Std. Error .182 .182 .182 .182 .182 
Output highlighting any graphical divergence from nonnality can be fOl.Uld in 
Appendix 3 
WHITE'S TEST OF HETEROSCEDASTICITY 
Testing for Heteroscedasticity can be done using White's Test (1980) (utilising 
cross-products), applying the Goldfeld-Quandt Test or Breusch Pagan Test. The 
presence of Heteroscedasticity will lead, amongst other things, to the co-efficient 
estimates of the OLS regression being unbiased aswell as standard errors being 
biased. Thus, spurious inferences are made. The Breausch Pagan test relies on 
residuls exhibiting nonnality. Since it is fair to say that our data may not conform 
with this principle, the White Test may be more appropriate as it does not make 
this assumption. 
Coutts et a1 (1995) and (1997) utilised the White Test when looking at the impact 
of Management Buy Outs and found strong evidence in support of the existence 
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of heteroscedasticity in the market model. 
DURBIN WATSON TEST OF INDEPENDENCE / AUTOCORRELATION 
IN RESIDUALS 
The following illustration tabulates the Durbin Watson statistic computed on the 
basis of the regression analysis. This test statistic aims to assess the level of auto 
correlation in the residuals. The output generated is shown below. Durbin­
Watson statistics close to 2 would imply that our residuals are un-correlated (ie 
the abnormal returns are un-correlated) 
Model Summary 
Model R R Adjusted R Std. Error of Durbin-Watson 
Square Square the Estimate 
Aoretch .016 .000 -.001 1.0533 1.776 
Caladonian .000 .000 -.001 1.0534 1.777 
Highams .000 .000 -.001 1.5604 1.660 
Just Group .000 .000 -.001 6.3329 1.868 
Majestic .000 .000 -.001 1.6985 1.562 
Multimedia .000 .000 -.001 7.8295 2.047 
Next, we are required to calculate the cumulative abnormal return for each 
ruIDolmcement type over the total duration of the event window. The result of the 
analysis of the CAR's for each announcement type over the period of the event 
window is demonstrated in 
Table 13 below. 
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Table 13 CAR For Each Event Over The Event Window 
Announcement Type 

Acq 

Agm 

AP 

Ch 

Con 

Dir 

Div 

Doc 

OS 
EGM 

H 

L 

R 

CAR For The Event Window 
2.441388205 
1.186631359 
0.802515225 
-7.259660703 
1.568515923 
-2.3783546 
-0.575458098 
-1.103819133 
-2.120146568 
1 .568115543 
-1 .478903725 
-0.917239197 
-0.3946102 
Analysis is then conducted to test the difference for all pairs of announcement 
combinations for each of the days covering the event window. A full set of data 
output generated from this analysis can be found in the Appendices. Some sample 
output and a summery of the statistics can be found in the below Figure 19 and 
Figure 20. 
Figure 19 Comparison Of Difference Of Means 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for 
Means 
Mean 
Variance 
Observations 
Pearson Correlation 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T<=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
t-2 
AGQ AGM 
0.328123723 -0.69942383 
2.327339308 5.712721896 
25 25 
0.079142665 
o 
24 
1.880693079 
0.036101251 
1.710882316 
0.072202503 
2.063898137 
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Figure 20 Summary Of Average Return Critical Values 
ACO AGM ALL AP CH CON DIR DIV DOC DS EGM H L R 
ACQ 	 Pearson Correlation 0,079143 -0.79051 0.235143 ·0.11927 0.925781 0,063234 0.004911 ·0.08765 ·0,07156 0,31362 0.13328401 -0.18982 -0.00815 
t Sial -1.BB069 1.460119 ·0.7102 ·0.66892 2.315406 -0.36455 -1,2279 -0.98967 ·0.87009 -2.01416 ·0.783487819 -0.00466 -0.24287 
I Crilicallwo-Iail 2.063898 4.302656 2.178813 2.776451 2.364623 2.02619 2.02619 2.02619 2,02619 2.073875 2.026190487 2.02619 2.02619 
AGM Pearson Correlation 0.0791427 0520871 ·0.08718 -0.16684 0.134998 0.021154 -0,07718 -0.03585 0.059987 0.039694 -0.036322312 -0.53419 -0.02063 
t Stat 1.8806931 2,458116 ·0.5294 0.693301 1.744736 0.329703 0.373889 0.969698 0.585519 -0.0165 1.383769163 1.599658 0.367646 
t Critical two-tail 2.0638981 4.302656 2.178813 2.776451 2.364623 2.063898 2.063898 2.063898 2.063898 2,073875 2.063898137 2.063898 2.063898 
ALL Pearson Corretation -0.790512 0.520871 -0.82508 -0.86915 -0,45759 ·0.97933 0.810476 -0,33265 0.066803 -0.20326 -0,001187115 -0.99996 -0.65861 
I Slat ·1.460119 -2.45812 -2.01569 -0.28539 0.002622 1.417578 -1.176B1 -0.37029 -1.0777 -0.51305 0.988604385 -0.60439 -0.92365 
t Crilicallwo-Iail 4,3026557 4,302658 4.302656 4.302655 4.302656 4.302656 4.302656 4,302656 4.302656 4.302656 4.302655725 4,302656 4.302656 
AP Pearson Correlation 0,2351427 ·0,0871 B -0.82508 ·0,62412 0.222847 -0.16722 0.191978 0.139475 -0.18968 0.071114 0.187583885 -0.12357 0.133976 
t Stat 0.7101964 0,529398 2,015686 -0.52012 1.843666 0.215983 -1.45322 -0,57944 -0.88454 -0.56283 0.13914399 0.29957 -0.1866 
t Critical two-lail 2,1788128 2,178813 4.302656 2.776451 2,364623 2.178813 2.178813 2.178813 2.178813 2.178813 2.178612792 2.178813 2.178813 
CH Pearson Correlation ·0.119275 -0.16684 ·0.86915 -0.62412 -0.30124 0.828411 -0,54927 -0.2858 0,514168 0.002964 0.584808313 0.023396 0.393664 
t Sial 0,6689225 -0,6933 0285388 0.520122 1.470993 1,289332 -1.24814 -0.30673 -1.21466 1,129415 1,541664906 1,092962 -1.31245 
I Crilicallwo-Iail 2,7784509 2,776451 4.302656 2.776451 2.776451 2.776451 2.776451 2.776451 2.776451 2.776451 2.776450856 2.776451 2.776451 
CON Pearson Correlation 09257809 0.134998 -0.45759 0.222647 ·0.30124 -0.37837 0.082719 -0.05783 -0.16183 0.812547 0.092518504 .0.16097 -0,11086 
t Stal -2.315405 -1.74474 -0.00262 -1.84387 -1.47099 -1.65753 -2.26631 -1.78786 -1.83394 -2,08809 -1.600325774 -1,88254 -1.69964 
I Crllical two·laU 2.3646226 2,364623 4.302856 2,364623 2.776451 2.354623 2.364623 2.364623 2.364623 2.364623 2.36462256 2,364623 2,364623 
DIR Pearson Correlation 0.0632344 0.021154 -0.97933 ·0.16722 0,826411 -0,37837 0.021935 -0,06205 0.100839 -002582 0.036385788 0.03325 0.208722 
I Stal 0,3645517 -0.3297 -1.41758 -0.21598 -1,28933 1.657533 ·0,23698 -0.4731 0.054261 -0,30355 ·0.056663508 0.536341 0.491905 
t Critical two-Iail 2.0261905 2 063898 4,302656 2,178813 2,776451 2.364623 2,014103 2,000997 1.984986 2.073875 1,968610165 2.001716 1.984986 
DIV Pearson Correlation 0.004911 -0,07718 0,810478 0.H11978 -0.54927 0.062719 0.021935 -0.12267 0.003675 -0,17815 -0.072365695 -0.00118 0.211352 
t Stal 1 2278969 -037387 1.178815 1.453218 1.248136 2.266307 0.236976 0.479927 0.171666 -0,23558 1,142155356 1.372054 0.353984 
t Crillcat two-I ail 2.0261905 2.063898 4,302656 2,178813 2,776451 2.364623 2.014103 2.014103 2,014103 2,073875 2.014103302 2.014103 2.014103 
DOC Pearson Correlation -0,087655 -0,03585 ·0.33265 0.139475 -0.2858 -0.05783 ·0,06205 -0.12267 -0,02323 0.230586 -0,096645904 -0.07099 0.067321 
I Sial 0,9896684 ·0.9697 0.370287 0.579438 0.306731 1.78786 0.473101 -0.4799:! 0.648975 -1.14725 0.835130061 1.436222 0.570806 
t Crilical two-tail 2.0261905 2,063898 4.302656 2,178813 2,776451 2,384623 2,000997 2.014103 2.000997 2.073875 2.000997483 2.001716 2.000997 
DS Pearson Correlation -0.071583 0,059987 0.066803 -0.18968 0.514168 ·0.16183 0.100839 0.003675 -0.02323 -0.05953 ·0.045423137 ·0.24928 0.073619 
I Slat 0,8700886 -0,58552 1,077697 0.884536 1.214661 1.833945 -0.06426 -0.17167 -0.64898 -0.55198 -0.174294571 0.404018 0.33731 
t Crilical two-Iail 2,0281905 2063898 4.302656 2.176813 2,776451 2,364623 1.984986 2,014103 2,000997 2.073875 1.988610165 2.001716 1.981766 
EGM Pearson Correlallon 0,31362 0.039694 ·0.20326 0.071114 0,002964 0,812547 -0,02582 _0.17815 0,230586 -0.05953 0.309047157 -0.20434 ·0.38327 
I Sial 2,0141562 0,016499 0.513047 0,582835 -1.12941 2.088087 0,303553 0.235577 1.147254 0.551978 1.735373328 1.870762 0.200116 
t Critical two·tail 20738753 2,073875 4.302656 2.178813 2,776451 2,364623 2.073875 2,073875 2.073875 2.073875 2,073875294 2.073875 2.073875 
Pearson Correlation 0.133284 ·0,03632 -0.00119 0,187584 0.564806 0.092519 0.036386 -0.07237 -0,09665 -0.04542 0,309047 0.093793 ·0.13363 
t Slat 0.7834878 -1 38377 _0.9888 ·0,13914 -1,54166 1,600326 0.056684 -1.14216 ·0.83513 0.174295 ·1.73537 1.027129 0.114686 
I Critical two-Iall 2,0261905 2.Q63898 4,302656 2178813 2776451 2,384623 1,98861 2.014103 2.000997 1.98861 2.073875 2.001716 1.98861 
Pearson Correlalion -0,189823 -0,53419 ·0.99996 -012357 0,023396 -0.16097 0.03325 _0.D011S -0.07099 -0.24928 ·0.20434 0,093793215 0.033435 
I Stat 0.0046568 -1,59966 0,604395 -0.29957 -1,09296 1.682543 ·0,53634 -1.37205 -1.43622 -0.40402 -1.87076 ·1.027128634 -0.59268 
I Critical two-I ail 2.0261905 2.063898 4,302656 2,178813 2,776451 2,364623 2.001716 2.014103 2.001716 2.001718 2.073875 2,001715984 2,001716 
R Pearson Correlallon -0,008146 -0.02063 -0.85861 0,133976 0.393664 -0.11086 0,208722 0.211352 0.067321 0.073619 -0,38327 -0.133627904 0.033435 
I Sial 02428727 ·036765 0,923649 0.186605 1,312453 1.699643 -0.4919 -0,35398 -0.57081 -0.33731 -0.20012 -0.114686222 0.592682 
I Critical two-tail 2.0261905 2063898 4.302656 2,178813 2.776451 2.364623 1.984966 2,014103 2.000997 1,981766 2,073875 1.988610165 2.001716 
ANALYSIS OF OVER-REACTION AND MEAN REVERSION 
With respect to the analysis ofmean reversion, we shall consider the following: 
1 What IS the mean return for each type of announcement after the 
announcement date? 
2 What is the behaviour of the returns after the event day. 
3 What is the correlation between the return on the event day t and t+ 1, t and 
t+2 and also for t1 and t+2? If there IS a strong negative correlation 
between any of these pair of returns, then this suggests that there IS 
evidence of mean reverSIOn S111ce a strong negative correlation may 
suggest that a corrective mechanism is taking place. 
Table 14 We shall therefore investigate each of the above points III tum. 
generated by each of thedemonstrates the average abnormal returns 
announcements over each of the days comprising the event window. 
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Table 14 Average Abnormal Return For Each Announcement 
.f.mJ..mmrtT}1» [ltjs -2 -1 o 1 2 
Aq 0231ffi74ffi Q~ QB:IHffi!4 1.EmB:t21 .QC67748445 
.tgn .Q95197ffi:T2 1.6Bf2 1Zl4JlfJ1Zj .Q3Ji1ill743 -Q8J3751775 
~ .Q<mi93731 -Q2i'43fS:O) QE91aD701 .Q19nXID:l Q67'iID1ffi3 
Cl1 Qa5WiB Q012JID12 ~Q311J57LQ Oamm:r2 -7.3l257'J)4 
On 3.7917(ID£ ~~ -3.ZH51847 O~ 0M31419iB 
Dr .Q~ -1.2B11:m3 -1.3!J?ffi3iB QCl.:647'3344 049:RBi"J3 
OIl .Q:Hii£I6( Q1a:s::9J21 Q614349E1- .QS'12M5 -0443?1Xffi) 
[b:; .Q4:fffB157 ..@ffi31LQ2 -O.ffi:l3i'91i1 O~ -OCllffBfil 
D3 -O.2i'9J31ffi5 -Q~5 -Q727ffUl31 -O~ -QLIDffiQ2 
B3v1 .Q73rfQ719 QCID1$Zi9 ~31dID775 Q~2.~ 
H .Q1ffi.B47t8 -Qffi:1.1924ffi -Cl231178J:B -O:Q7493143 -00m74418 
I 
i L Q1OO19:1241 ~ ~B3 -OCB7!ID'ID -O~ 
R -O.1a:0011 02E113:ID 02J7017ffi -0116410125 -06J1CB1ffi3 
In Table 15 below, the mean return of each type of announcement for each day 
included in the event window after the announcements day is shown but that is 
after the announcement day to have been tabulated. 
Table 15 Post Announcement AAR 
Announcement Type Average Abnormal Return 
Days 0 t+1 t+2 
Acq 0.509598924 1.652684 -0.06775 
Agm 1.274070725 -0.30763 -0.50375 
AP 0.591090701 -0.159 0.678902 

Ch -0.031135742 0.036 -7.30226 

Con -3.23851847 0.406645 0.848142 

Dir -1.339786378 0.066474 0.490604 

Div 0.614349384 -0.57128 -0.4437 

Doc -0.566379941 0.144459 -0.00681 

DS -0.727850931 -0.55052 -0.20047 

EGM -0.312853775 0.444225 2.079679 
H -0.281175958 -0.3275 -0.63997 
L -0.297536158 -0.08756 -0.47626 
R 0.20701758 -0.11641 -0.60108 
We shall now consider if there are and to what extent there is evidence of negative 
correlation between the returns on the event day and the return on each of one and 
two days following the event announcement. 
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The results in the form of a correlation matrix have been presented in the Table 16 
below. 
Table 16 Correlation Matrix Of AAR 
Correlation Matrix 
Day o t+1 t+2 
o 1 -0.12333 -0.19445 

t+1 -0.12333 1 0.129299 

t+2 -0.19445 0.129299 1 

REACTION OF FINANCIALINON-FINANCIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS 
We shall now consider what if any differences there appear to be between the 
reaction of the Alternative Investment Market to financial announcements as 
opposed to non-financial announcements. For the sake of this analysis, we shall 
define financial and non-financial as previously defined in Table 11 on page 194. 
By considering the abnormal returns generated for each of the event windows, we 
can detect as to if there have been differences in reactions between financial and 
non-financial announcements. 
Table 17 below tabulates the abnormal returns for each type of announcement, 
financial and non-financial, over all days considered in the event window. 
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Table 17 AAR For Financial And Non-Financial Announcements 
Non-Financial Announcements 
Announcement Acq Agm AP Ch Dir OS EGM L 
Event Time 
Days 
-2 0.291867496 -0.951975842 -0.0338 0.025493 -0.33653 -0.27906 -0.73309 0.189194 
-1 0.054986209 1.675922 -0.27468 0.01224 -1.25911 -0.36224 0.090158 -0.24508 
0 0.509598924 1.274070725 0.591091 -0.03114 -1.33979 -0.72785 -0.31285 -0.29754 
1.652684021 -0.307633749 -0.159 0.036 0.066474 -0.55052 0.444225 -0.08756 
2 -0.067748445 -0.503751775 0.678902 -7.30226 0.490604 -0.20047 2.079679 -0.47626 
Average 0.488277641 0.237326272 0.160503 -1.45193 -0.47567 -0.42403 0.313623 -0.18345 
Financial Announcements 
Announcement Con Div Doc H R 
Event Time 
Days 
-2 3.791702936 -0.355656767 -0.42656 -0.19606 -0.12025 
-1 -0.239455754 0.180829021 -0.24853 -0.03419 0.236113 
0 -3.23851847 0.614349384 -0.56638 -0.28118 0.207018 
1 0.406645232 -0.57127885 0.144459 -0.3275 -0.11641 
2 0.848141978 -0.443700886 -0.00681 -0.63997 -0.60108 
Average 0.313703185 -0.11509162 -0.22076 -0.29578 -0.07892 
We can now conduct an analysis of the extent to which the abnormal returns differ 
between announcements that are financial and announcements that are non-
financial by conducting a t-test of difference of means. However, before we 
proceed to do this, we shall consider the actual means of the returns generated by 
each ofthe two samples. 
Table 17 illustrates the average abnormal return for each of the announcements 
and the average abnormal return for each of the events. Table 18 below has been 
generated for assessing the difference in the means of the abnormal returns for 
financial versus non-financial announcements. 
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Table 18 Assessing Difference Between Financial And Non-Financial Returns 
Test of difference of means Financial versus non-financial 
z-Test: Two Sample for Means 
Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 
-0.166918768 -0.079371009 
Known Variance 1 1 
Observations 8 5 
Hypothesized Mean Difference o 
z -0.153568928 
P(Z <=z) one-tail 0.438974803 
z Critical one-tail 1.644853 
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0.877949606 
z Critical two-tail 1.959961082 
We shall begin by testing as to whether there is any difference between each 
financial announcement and non-financial announcements using standard ttest 
methodology. Our first step in analysing any differences in the abnormal return 
generated by financial or non-financial announcements it to assess the average 
level of abnormal returns for each type of announcement. We find the results in 
the below Figure 21. 
Figure 21 Comparison Of Financial And Non-Financial AR's 
Average Abnormal returns 
Non-Financial Announcements -0.17 
Financial Announcement -0.08 
We can see that the non-financial announcement abnonnal return is almost half as 
much as the financial abnormal return. 
214 

Fa 
Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
IMPACT OF SHAREHOLDER CONCENTRATION 
We shall now consider the impact of the above analysis m the context of 
shareholder concentration. We begin the analysis by addressing the extent to 
which the results of the semi-strong form of market efficiency tests conducted 
above differ after the analysis is controlled for shareholder ownership and 
concentration. Typically, the factor of shareholder ownership need not be of 
significance in the case of larger companies that are traded on the main 
exchanges. This is due to the fact that since these companies are highly 
capitalised, the relative importance of even the largest of shareholders would be 
minimal. The following analysis will consider what, if any, is the impact of our 
semi-strong form efficiency tests on lowly capitalised firms when we control for 
shareholder concentration. The methodolo gical approach as is consistent with the 
existing paradigm relating to such studies is to group the dataset in order of 
shareholder concentration. 
Each company is assigned a letter that denotes the percentage of the total market 
capitalisation that is held by the sum of the top five largest investors. The source 
of this data can be accessed from the F .AME® Electronic Database (Financial 
Analysis Made Easy). This database gives historical financial data in terms of 
Profit & Loss and Balance Sheets for UK listed companies. The range of 
percentiles with the corresponding letter denoting the range to which the company 
belonged can be shown in Figure 22 below. 
<, 
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Figure 22 Shareholder Concentration Percentiles Used 
Percentage Held By Top 5 Shareholders Code 
~2 a 
~4 b 
4-6 c 
6-8 d 
8-10 e 
10-12 f 
12-14 9 
14-20 h 
20 + I 
The frequency distribution of the announcements corresponding to each different 
concentration of shareholder ownership is illustrated in Figure 23. 
Figure 23 Frequency Of Shareholder Concentration 
Announcements Frequency Of Percentage Held By Top Five Shareholders 
0-2 2-4 ~ 6-8 8-10 10-12 12-14 14-20 20+ 
ACO 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 
AGM 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 
AP 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 
CH 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
CON 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
DIR 6 4 4 4 0 1 18 19 15 
DIV 14 13 0 0 0 0 0 8 10 
DOC 8 6 0 0 0 0 0 7 13 
OS 7 6 0 0 0 0 0 10 7 
EGM 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 
H 15 21 0 0 0 0 0 16 32 
L 17 8 0 0 0 0 0 8 25 
R 41 22 0 0 0 0 8 26 45 
We can now proceed to conduct a test of the difference of means and variances of 
the abnonnal returns between any two pairs of shareholder concentration for each 
of the days comprising the event window. Sample tests results are shown in the 
below Figure 24 and full output is available in Appendix 4 
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Figure 24 Mean Variance Controlling For Shareholder Concentration 
Announcement analysed ACO 
Mean Variance t Stat t Critical two-tail 
Shareholder concentration 
comparison 
Event Window =t-2 a versus b 0.473891 4.921755 0.645994 2.262158887 
Event Window =t-1 a versus b 1.012252 5.34182 1.510243 2.16036824 
Event Window =t-O a versus b -0.62514 6.297353 -0.85379 2.228139238 
Event Window =t+1 a versus b 0.473891 4.921755 0.645994 2.262158887 
Event Window =t-6 a versus b 0.473891 4.921755 0.645994 2.262158887 
Event Window =t-2 a versus h 0.473891 4.921755 0.151904 2.109818524 
Event Window =t-1 a versus h 1.012252 5.34182 1.804573 2.228139238 
Event Window =t-O a versus h 0.97479 7.744528 0.005086 2.262158887 
Event Window =t+1 a versus h 0.473891 4.921755 0.645994 2.262158887 
Event Window =t-6 a versus h 0.473891 4.921755 0.645994 2.262158887 
We can now conduct an analysis of the shareholder concentration. We have 
analysed to see if there are any differences in the means abnormal returns of any 
pairs of shareholder concentration groups for any announcements over the event 
windows. 
IMPACT OF FINANCIAL VERSUS NON-FINANCIAL WHEN 
CONTROLLING FOR SHAREHOLDER CONCENTRATION 
We shall now analyse the extent to which there are differences within the two 
sample groups where announcements are split into financial and non-financial 
announcements and when we control for shareholder concentration. 
Figure 25 on page 218 displays the summary mean and variance analysis statistics 
derived when financial and non-financial abnormal returns are compared in cases 
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where the announcements belong to the same shareholder concentration. A full 
output ofresults can be found in Appendix 3. 
Figure 25 Summary Of Mean And Variance Analysis 
Table analysing the difference of means and variances of event retums 
Event Window:;:; t-2 
Event Wi ndow =t-1 
Event Window:: t-O 
Event Window =t+1 
Event Window:: t-6 
Event Window:: t-2 
Event Wi ndow :: t-1 
Event Window:: toO 
Event Window =t+1 
Event Window:: t-6 
Event Window::= t-2 
Event Window::= t-1 
Event Window::= toO 
Event Window ::= t+1 
Event Window:: t-6 
Event Window:: t-2 
Event Window = t-1 
Event Window:: t-O 
Event Window = t+1 
Event Window:: t-6 
Event Window:: t-2 
Event Window:: t-1 
Event Window = toO 
Event Window = t+1 
Event Window:: t-6 
For different shareholder concentration co-efficients 

Announcement analysed =Acquisition Announcements 

Mean Variance t Stat t Critical two-tail 
Shareholder concentration 
comparison 
a versus b 0.473891 4.921755 0.645993881 2.262158887 
a versus b 1.012252 5.34182 1.510242592 2.16036824 
a versus b -0.62514 6.297353 -0.85378662 2.228139238 
a versus b 0.473891 4.921755 0.645993881 2.262158887 
a versus b 0.473891 4.921755 0.645993881 2.262158887 
0.473891 4.921755 0.151904009 2.109818524a versus h 
1.012252 5.34182 1.804572822 2.228139238a versus h 
0.97479 7.744528 0.005085761 2.262158887a versus h 
0.473891 4.921755 0.645993881 2.262158887a versus h 
0.473891 4.921755 0.645993881 2.262158887a versus h 
Table analysing the difference of means and variances of event retums 

For different shareholder concentration co-efficients 

Announcement analysed :;:; Annual General Meetings Announcements 

Mean Variance t Stat t Critical two-ta 
Shareholder concentration 
comparison 
-0.08608 0.148146 -1.03437266 2.262158887a versus b 
0.867369 6.495949 0.587229702 2.228139238a versus b 
3.085508 54.97933 0.947823492 2.446913641a versus b 
-0.24829 0.81748 0.060476728 2.228139238a versus b 
-0.99443 6.963754 0.000448936 2.16036824a versus b 
-0.08608 0.148146 1.77184842 2.306005626a versus h 
0.867369 6.495949 -1.38144973 2.178812792a versus h 
3.08;;508 54.97933 0.289778917 2.178812792a versus h 
-0.24829 0.81748 0.179910815 2.228139238a versus h 
-0.99443 6.963754 -0.87083525 2.306005626a versus h 
2.2281392380.383818 1.481699 2.055415778bversus h 
32.74663 -1.51924247 2.144788596
-0.44851b versus h 
0.399576 1.409367 -0.73454336 2.262158887 b versus h 
3.688479 0.03569457 2.306005626-0.29426b versus h 
-0.99509 9.393236 -0.80978479 2.262158887 b versus h 
218 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
We can now consider if any relationship exists between the size of a firm and the 
abnormal returns that it may generate when we control for shareholder 
concentrations. Figure 26 shows the extent of linear association or correlation 
between the abnormal returns for a given announcement and the market 
capitalisation. Shareholder concentration has now been controlled for and 
remains constant. In other words, we have kept shareholder concentration as a 
constant. Those values that are highlighted demonstrate statistical significance of 
such correlation at a 95% significance level. 
Figure 26 Correlation Matrix Of Financial And Non-Financial Returns 
Correlation between abnormal returns and market capitalisation. 
Values highlighted denote statistical significance 
Announcement Event Window Considered 
-2 -1 0 1 2 
nf ACO -0.01905 -0.24414 0.300513 0.117703 -0.27703 
nf AGM -0.4779 0.353256 0.018972 -0.03125 0.188643 
nf AP 0.083874 -0.01368 0.073022 -0.12105 -0.39549 
nf CH -0.62509 -0.60824 -0.496 -0.47987 0.097197 
f CON 0.163101 0.237036 -0.33939 0.216005 0.188757 
nf DIR -0.06015 -0.00857 -0.05267 0.045326 0.034262 
f DIV -0.01999 -0.03171 -0.09487 0.021552 -0.08017 
f DOC -0.148 0.000105 -0.27077 0.052606 -0.05456 
nf OS -0.06736 -0.04718 -0.00217 -0.00446 0.06026 
nf EGM 0.008209 -0.11253 -0.34289 0.048745 -0.16251 
f H 0.000777 0.004681 0.018734 0.021648 0.071576 
nf L -0.06984 -0.00743 0.208281 -0.06848 0.152283 
f R 0.033748 -0.04346 -0.05064 -0.07964 -0.00817 
We can now consider if any relationship exists between the size of a firm and the 
abnormal returns that it may generate when we control for shareholder 
concentrations. Figure 27 below shows the extent of linear association or 
1 ' 
correlation between the abnormal returns for a given announcement and the 
market capitalisation. Shareholder concentration has now been controlled. In 
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other words, we have kept shareholder concentration as a constant. Those values 
that are highlighted demonstrate statistical significance of such correlation at a 
95% significance level. (f = financial announcement and nf = non- financial 
announcements) 
Figure 27 Correlation Matrix Of Returns And Market Capitalisations 
Correlation between abnormal returns and market capitalisation. 
Values highlighted denote statistical significance 
Announcement Event Window Considered 
-2 -1 0 1 2 
nf ACO -0.01905 -0.24414 0.300513 0.117703 -0.27703 
nf AGM -0.4779 0.353256 0.018972 -0.03125 0.188643 
nf AP 0.083874 -0.01368 0.073022 -0.12105 -0.39549 
nf CH -0.62509 -0.60824 -0.496 -0.47987 0.097197 
f CON 0.163101 0.237036 -0.33939 0.216005 0.188757 
nf DIR -0.06015 -0.00857 -0.05267 0.045326 0.034262 
f DIV -0.01999 -0.03171 -0.09487 0.021552 -0.08017 
f DOC -0.148 0.000105 -0.27077 0.052606 -0.05456 
nf OS -0.06736 -0.04718 -0.00217 -0.00446 0.06026 
nf EGM 0.008209 -0.11253 -0.34289 0.048745 -0.16251 
f H 0.000777 0.004681 0.018734 0.021648 0.071576 
nf L -0.06984 -0.00743 0.208281 -0.06848 0.152283 
f R 0.033748 -0.04346 -0.05064 -0.07964 -0.00817 
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION AND RESULT IMPLICATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
As set out at the beginning of Chapter 5, the analysis component of this research 
sets out to address the market efficiency contention from several angles. The 
research and consequent data analysis begins by assessing the general level or 
extent to which the market is informationally efficient in the semi-strong form 
sense. Whilst attempting to achieve this, our first objective, the opportunity is 
also taken to assess the extent of mean reversion that takes place since, according 
to Higgens et al (2003), the process ofmean revision is seen as a proxy for market 
over-reactions. 
In terms of our second objective, a study of the impact of announcements on stock 
price returns was conducted after sorting these announcements in terms of the the 
nature into which they fitted. For example, some announcements are clearly of a 
financial nature while other are of a non-financial nature. The reason for this is to 
identity if market traders react differently to announcements that are of a financial 
nature as opposed to announcements that have no apparent and direct financial 
implication. 
Thirdly, an analysis is conducted to assess the possibility of the extent to which 
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opportunities exist that would allow for major stock holders to participate in 
insider dealing. This analysis is conducted by assessing if the concentration of 
shareholding has an impact on our stock market efficiency studies. 
DISCUSSION OF SEMI-STORY FORM OF EMH RESULTS 
Below detailed is a discussion of the results that were generated by this doctoral 
research. The results have been discussed individually as has the significance of 
the abnormal returns that were generated. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF ABNORMAL RETURNS 
In analysing our Semi-Strong Form of Market Efficiency results, three separate 
analyses were actually conducted. The first issue under consideration was to 
tabulate the average abnormal returns for each of the 5 days that covered the event 
window. A total number of 1464 announcements were analysed as demonstrated 
in Figure 15 on page 196. The average abnormal return for each of the 
announcements comprising the event window are illustrated in Figure 18 on page 
200. A test of statistical significance was conducted on these abnormal return and 
the below Table 19 on page 223 shows the results. Those values that were 
significant (in this case, those abnormal returns that were statistically significant) 
are highlighted. 
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Table 19 Significant Abnormal Returns Over The Event Window 
Announcement Type Average Abnormal Return 
Day -2 -1 0 1 2 CAR 
Acq 0.291867 0.054986 0.509599 1.652684 -0.067748 2.441388 
Agm -0.951976 1.675922 1.274071 -0.307634 -0.503752 1.186631 
AP -0.033799 -0.274678 0.591091 -0.159 0.678902 0.802515 
Ch 0.025493 0.01224 -0.031136 0.036 -7.302257 -7.259661 
Con 3.791703 -0.239456 -3.238518 0.406645 0.848142 1.568516 
Dir -0.336533 -1.259112 -1.339786 0.066474 0.490604 -2.378355 
Div -0.355657 0.180829 0.614349 -0.571279 -0.443701 -0.575458 
Doc -0.426558 -0.248531 -0.56638 0.144459 -0.006808 -1.103819 
OS -0.279062 -0.362245 -0.727851 -0.550523 -0.200466 -2.120147 
EGM -0.733093 0.090158 -0.312854 0.444225 2.079679 1.568116 
H -0.196065 -0.034192 -0.281176 -0.327496 -0.639974 -1.478904 
L 0.189194 -0.245076 -0.297536 -0.087564 -0.476258 -0.917239 
R -0.120249 0.236113 0.207018 -0.11641 -0.601082 -0.39461 
ACQUISITION ANNOUNCEMENTS 
As can be shown from the above Table 19, acquisition announcements had little 
impact on the average abnormal returns over the event window except at time 
period to which appeared to show a statistically significant abnormal return when 
the acquisition announcement was made. In view of this result, it is surprising 
that an average abnormal return is evident in such a case since, for larger firms, 
the tendency is to see average abnormal return leading up to acquisition 
announcements rather than in the post announcement period. Interestingly 
however, it would appear that acquisition annOlmcements relating to lowly 
capitalised AIM stock show little or no reaction in the days leading up to the 
announcements. 
There could be many reasons for this result. Firstly, this could be a simple 
example of lowly capitalised companies managing acquisition announcement 
information in an efficient manner and investors failing to pick up on signals of 
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forthcoming acquisitions which means that in the period leading up to an 
acquisition announcement, there is little or no significant abnormal return. 
Clearly, small cap investors are interested in trading on acquisition 
announcements since there is a significant abnormal return on the day of the 
announcement. It is just that anticipation acquisition is either non-existent or fails 
to excite investors unless and until there is certainty regarding the announcement 
itself. Once the announcement is made, trading takes places speedily and the 
impact of the announcement is absorbed within a day of the announcement 
release. Post acquisition announcement abnormal returns are not significant 
implying that investors are confident in their ability to accurately measure the 
required trading activity. 
Another reason that may be causing this announcement impact only on the day of 
the announcement itself could be that while companies do inform investors 
regarding the anticipated acquisition, they fail to do so in a clear manner that 
informs the investment decisions of the shareholder. It could be that such 
announcements cause confusion in interpretation. This would lead to investor 
uncertainty increasing as a result of following anticipating the announcement 
rather than reducing uncertainty and leading to better informed decisions. 
ANNUAL GENERAL MEETINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
Even when the announcement is made, there appears to be a delay in the reaction 
of traders of atleast one trading day. In terms of announcements of annual general 
meetings, there appears to be significant abnormal returns leading up to the 
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announcement of such meetings, in some cases, almost of two to three days prior 
to the official armouncements taking place. However, once such an 
announcement has taken place, the subsequent abnormal return appear to be 
statistically insignificant which suggest either little or no trading on an aprior 
basis. 
In the context of the empirical evidence we would conclude that investors in 
lowly capitalised firms delay in reacting to the announcement of annual general 
meetings. This could be as result of investors being full of anticipation in 
expectation of such armouncements being made or because they may not be 
following AGM mmouncements closely. If we consider that the former holds 
true, we may therefore conclude that investors are well appraised of the event that 
are due to take place within the company. AGM announcements may be expected 
at certain times of the year, in which case one would not expect for their to be any 
significant reaction when the AGM is announced. It is a periodic announcement 
that is required under the Companies Act and Stock Exchange regulation which 
would imply that little or no significant reaction should be anticipated. After-all 
the surprise element of an AGM announcement should by very small. In 
comparison, one would expect that the investor reaction to EGM announcements 
should be quite significant. 
The delayed reaction to AGM announcements tend to suggest that investors are 
indifferent to announcements. This could be for one of several reasons and the 
implication could be that attendance at AGM's is low. The immediate impact of 
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this would result in less infonned investors who are invested in the major events 
that take place but are indifferent to the routine meeting of stock holders as a 
means of being infonned about the development of the company. Better infonned 
investors would lead to a better-informed market and therefore small companies 
should consider ways of increasing participation at AGM's. 
ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHAIRMEN'S STATEMENT 
In terms of the announcement of the Chairman's Statement, the results are indeed 
interesting. The Chainnan's Statement is thought, theoretically to be of great 
significance in view of its context. This standard provides shareholder and other 
stakeholders with an overview of how the organisations outlook appears to be in 
the context of the previous trading year, world economics and the company 
specific market. However, and perhaps more importantly, it provides an insight 
into those elements of disclosure that cannot be captured through accounting 
disclosure regulation. It provides the chairman with an opportunity to convey not 
only the financial state-of-play but the spirit and the sentiment of future optimism 
and outlook. In view of this, one would expert that although the Chairmen's 
statement is categorised as a non-financial disclosure, the impact of such an 
announcement would be significant. However, it appears from the results of the 
abnonnal returns that the Chainnan's Statement generates very little interest from 
investor. Figure 28 on page 227 shows that there are insignificant abnonnal 
returns two days prior one day prior and on the event day itself. Even on the day 
after the announcement is made, this is little or no impact of the Chainnan's 
Statement where as at the tail end of the even window, there is a significant 
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abnormal return recorded. 
Figure 28 AAR For Each Announcement For Each Event Window Day 
~Type AVff2{Ja Pb"ron3I R3tLm 
CBys -2 -1 0 1 2 
Ax1 0.291007 O.0548f£ 0.fm19 1.65aX34 -O.00TT5 
Pgm .{).95198 1.67!m2 1.274071 -O.~763 -O.~75 
pp 
-0.0338 -0.27468 0.591001 -0. iff) 0.6789:12 
01 0.025493 0.01224 -0.03114 0.036 -7.30226 
Coo 3.791703 -0.23946 -3.23852 0.4Cffi45 0.848142 
Dr .{).33653 -1.25911 -1.33979 0.066474 O.49Bl4 
Dv -O.3ffff3 O.1al329 0.614349 -0.57128 -0.4437 
Ox -0.42656 -0.24853 -O.!XE38 0.144459 -O.0l381 
C6 .{).279J6 -0.36224 -0.72785 -0.50052 -0.3))::1.7 
EGI'v1 .{).73309 OJlX)158 -0.31285 0.444225 2.079679 
H -0.1ffiX3 -0.03419 -0.28118 -0.3275 -O.ffffJ7 
L 0.189194 -O.24a:B -0.29754 -0.00756 -0.47626 
R -0.12025 0.236113 0.207018 -0.11641 -0.00100 
One would anticipate that the reaction to a Chairmen's statement would be 
significant as compared with other announcements. The general conclusion that 
can be derived in this regard is that the Chairman's statement has little value or 
informational content. From the point of view of investors, again this is almost in 
complete contradiction to what one would have expected in view of the fact that 
the Chairman's statement provides an opportunity for the Chairman to convey his 
or her sentiment of the future directions of the company. The significant 
abnormal return that is recorded at the tail end of the event window does seem to 
suggest that whilst little attention is paid to the views of the Chairman on the day 
of the announcement itself, a delayed reaction is recorded. It seems that investors 
take their time to interpret the statement itself and try and read between the lines 
as it were, in order to distil exactly what the message of the Chairman actually is. 
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A further possible conclusion can also be postulated in that the clarity of the 
statement may be bought into question. One may ask the question of as to why it 
takes up to two to three trading days for investors to react to the statement of the 
Chairman. If at all the statement is being monitored, this would lead one to 
suggest that the clarity of the statement is questionable. 
The implication of their being little or no reaction the Chairman's statement 
suggests that the problem ofless informed investors could be mitigated. It may be 
recommended that the Chainnan's statement be utilised more fully as a tool for 
conveying the message that the company board of directors wishes to portray. 
A more encouraging conclusion may also be derived from the point of view of 
investor rationality. If the clarity of the Chairman's statement can be 
demonstrated then the conclusion is that investors take time not to distill the 
statement but to interpret what the implication ofthe statement actually are. 
Rather then just to involve a "knee jerk" reaction to the Chairman's Statement, 
investors take the opportunity to fully understand what the implication of the 
statement is for the long-term future of the company. Thus, investors in small 
companies may actually be more rational and well informed than one first 
thought. The fact that their is a reaction to the statement suggest that the 
statement is viewed as having informational content and the delay suggest that an 
interpretation process is being undertaken 
228 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
CONTRACT AWARDS 
The next announcement that is considered is the allocation or the awarding of a 
contract to a company. This announcement is categorised under our methodology 
as a financial announcement since the announcement is of direct financial 
consequence to the business. Interestingly, this announcement appears to generate 
asymmetric results surrounding the event window. In general, these are 
significant abnormal returns (in this case, abnormal gains) to be made in the event 
window leading up to time period zero, the day of the announcement of the 
contract awards. Further the extent of the abnormal gain is far more significant in 
the two days prior to the announcement being made with a significant negative 
return being achieved on the day prior to the announcement being made. This 
phenomenon (referred to in the literature as mean-reversion) may be as a result of 
an over-reaction mechanism in trading activity that leads to a stabilisation of 
investor activity in the post event aJ.lliouncement period. 
The timing of the abnormal returns surrounding contract awards suggests that 
there may be some kind of leakage in this announcement. Investors appear to be 
able to anticipate the announcement of contract awards very well and before the 
announcement itself is made. It would appear that investors are well appraised of 
the possible outcomes of this type of financial announcement and the results are 
well anticipated. Investors are sensitive and abnormal returns show a marked 
adjustment up to two days prior to the announcement being made public. It 
further suggests the possibility of over-reactions by investors since, towards the 
end of the event window, the results show a significant reversion in their fortunes. 
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The implications of the contract award announcement suggests that there may 
indeed be leakage's in the system of announcing how the company has faired. 
This leads to reducing the level of infonnational efficiency and can lead to 
investors leaving the market if they feel that the balance of infonnation is not in 
their favour. The over-reaction also suggests an inability to correctly interpret and 
link the financial impact of contract awards to a company's progress. Perhaps a 
recommendation ought to be made that when contracts are awarded, the reporting 
of contract awards should spell out more clearly what the implication of the 
contract award is. 
DIRECTOR CHANGES 
Looking now at the impact of changes in directorship of AIM companies on 
abnormal returns generation, it would appear that these are significant abnormal 
returns to report on all days comprising the event window. What our results show 
are negative abnormal returns for two and one day prior to announcements being 
made and also a statistically significant negative abnormal return on the day of the 
announcement itself. Interestingly, this phenomenon does not continue 
throughout the event window but rather reverses to show positive abnormal 
returns at the tail end of the event window. In terms of dividend announcements 
there is again an interesting result generated from an analysis of the abnormal 
return that was generated. First and possibly foremost in this analysis, we can see 
that almost no abnormal returns in the even window are of statistical significance 
at all. In the days leading up to the announcement of dividends, there appears to 
be very low abnormal returns generated. If we consider the two days after the 
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announcement, again their appears to be abnormal returns that are not of statistical 
significance. However, if we consider the time period to, the day of the 
announcement itself, we see that there is a significant abnormal return generated. 
The abnormal returns that result from changes to directorship appear to cause 
significant uncertainty for investors in the days leading up to the announcement. 
Negative returns are recorded followed by no changes on the day and then 
positive returns which seem to suggest that investors anticipated such 
announcement eagerly. AIM stock-holders do react negatively to changes in 
directors in the days leading up to the announcement. This level of uncertainty 
puts downward pressure on stock prices and the market re-values the outlook of 
the firm in the face of uncertainly. However, what is an interesting conclusion is 
that the market appears least interested. It is a change in the directorship of the 
company that investors are concerned with rather then whether or no the new 
directorship appointment will be better for the company then the old one. 
In a more general sense, it would be fair to say that AIM investors are generally 
unhappy with boardroom level changes. In the period leading up to the time of 
the announcement of changes to the directorship, abnormal returns are negative. 
On the day of the announcement itself, the uncertainty over what the new 
announcement will bring disappears and the research shows that the returns 
stabilise. AIM investors seem to reward certainty in the boardroom. Not only do 
stock returns stabilise once the directorship announcement is made but the 
abnormal returns that are subsequently generated are positive which demonstrates 
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confidence in a stable boardroom. 
Companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market should try, as far as 
possible to avoid changes to existing directorship or appointment of new directors. 
It appears from the results that appointment of new directors contributes to 
uncertainty which then leads to downward pressures on the stock price. If it is 
inevitable that changes to the directorship have to take place then it is 
recommended that investors are kept as fully informed as possible so as to reduce 
uncertainty in the financial market. 
DOCUMENT SUBMISSION 
Submission of disclosure documents is one announcement activity that is termed 
as financial in nature owing to the view that the context of the documents is itself 
financial in nature. These documents are often attached or appended to the 
Chairman's Statement and so one would expect for their to be some sort of 
correlation between the reaction of investors to the Chairman's Statement and the 
reactions to Document Submissions. 
DIRECTOR SHARE DEALING 
If we consider the reaction of investors to directors shareholding, we find that the 
abnormal returns are in stark context to that which was found under document 
disclosure. Regarding the disclosure requirements of the Alternative Investment 
Market, directors share dealing are regulated (somewhat loosely vis a vis the main 
London Stock Exchange) such that intentions to sell stocks need to be declared. 
From the abnornlal returns generated across the event window it would appear 
232 

A 
Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
that all abnormal returns leading up to the announcement of director shareholding 
are statistically significant. On the day of the announcement itself, there would 
also appear to be significant abnormal returns as their are on the day after the 
announcement is made. However any time period beyond the one day proceeding 
the announcement day appears to show no significant abnormal returns. One 
further innovative finding appears to be that all those abnormal returns recorded 
over the event window (whether significant or otherwise) were negative. 
The announcement of directors share dealing seems to suggest that this 
announcement has significant informational content. Investors of lowly 
capitalised firms read deeply and follow closely the action of their directorship 
both in terms of changes (as was seen earlier) and the terms of the share-dealings 
that they may participate in. The signals that director's share-dealing conveys 
appears to have a significant informational content since the abnormal returns are 
statistically significant. A further conclusion that can be drawn is that directors 
share-dealing can be anticipated up to two days prior to the announcement itself. 
The sign of the abnonnal return over this period suggests that the market views 
directors share-dealing as positive as the abnonnal returns are both significant and 
greater than zero. The Alternative Investment Market seems to be informationally 
efficient when incorporating the effects of director share-dealing. This fact is 
further bore out by the empirical evidence which shows that after the 
announcement is made, their is little or no abnormal return recorded. 
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ANNOUNCEMENT OF EXTRA-ORDINARY MEETINGS 
Moving on to EGM announcements that were recorded, the resulting abnormal 
returns bare stark contrast to the abnormal returns generated by the annual general 
meeting. In the case of the annual general meeting, no statistically abnormal 
significant return was recorded at any time over the event window other then for 
time period t2, t),. In the case of the EGM's, statistically significant abnormal 
returns were recorded in all days comprising the event window. 
Furthermore, the general trend in reaction to abnormal returns was largely reactive 
in the days leading up to the announcement and on the day of the announcement 
itself. It would appear that there is a process of mean revision that punctuates the 
trend of previous abnormal returns with positive abnormal returns in the tail end 
of the event window. 
Investors seem to follow stock prices and financial performance of AIM listed 
companies more closely than previously appreciated. The evidence of extra­
ordinary general meetings recorded all resultant abnormal returns as being 
statistically significant over all days covered within the event windows. This 
would suggest that investors are responsive to BGM announcements and they 
react by anticipating the outcomes of EGM's and adjusting their portfolios 
accordingly. In the case of BGM's, not only in their as significant reaction, their 
is a process of mean revision which provides anecdotal evidence of over-reaction 
to BGM announcement. 
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HOLDING CHANGES 
Holding changes are not viewed as statistically significant in teImS of the resultant 
abnoImal returns that they generated at any point surrounding the even window. 
Furthermore, (and as expected) there appears to be little or no abnormal returns 
generated on the back of announcements made regarding the agreement of listing 
of new shares. The statement is however, true, with the exception of the 
beginning of the event window, where we see a statistically significant abnonnal 
return. A more surprising result (discussed later) is the perceived impact of 
trading results on the abnonnal returns generated throughout the even window 
Figure 28 on page 227 indicates the their is little or no significant abnormal return 
generated over the whole of the event window in spite of the fact that the nature of 
the results announced is infact financial in nature. However, the only significant 
abnormal return reported is in the event window, which corresponds to the day of 
the announcement itself. 
Holding changes produces an interesting result in that their is no reaction to any of 
the holding changes at any point in the five day event window. For all of the 
announcements analysed, there has been some detection of some abnormal return 
at some point in the event window. This would suggest that investors have 
interpreted other announcements in some manner and have, through this 
interpretation, adjusted their portfolios accordingly. This trading has lead to a 
change in the stock price and thus generated an abnoImal return. The 
conclusions that can be drawn from this in that holding changes mean little to 
investors in small companies. The intrinsic nature of the process is technical in 
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companson to directorship changes, contract awards and dividend 
announcements. 
Holding changes can be seen as changes to the gearing of a company, changes to 
equity levels through the issue of new shares or through buying back shares that 
are currently in circulation. Transactions of this type may be difficult to 
comprehend by investors and investors are even further removed from the 
implications that such announcement may have. As a result we find that their is 
little or no share dealing that is motivated by changes in holding status. This 
result may further give rise to several other conclusions. If it can be demonstrated 
that in the case of the larger capitalised firms, holding status changes have 
infonnational content, then their could be a case for the advancement of what is 
know in the finance literature as the Clientele Effect. It may be the case that less 
sophisticated investors tend to invest in more lowly capitalised firms. These 
investors are less infonned about the impact of holding stocks charges and are 
therefore in a disadvantageous position to make an informed decision about what 
the impact of holding status changes will be. Ifwe put this finding in the context 
of the overall reactions to announcements, we do find that for all other 
announcements a reaction of some sort is registered at some point in the event 
window. Since no reaction is registered, it would suggest that investors are not 
sufficiently sophisticated to interpret the signals that holding changes convey and 
therefore do not adjust portfolios accordingly 
Since holding changes signify little or no abnonnal return generation, it IS 
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recommended that companies try harder in order to educate investors as to the 
mechanism and implication ofholding changes on the finances of the company. 
Having discussed the result of the individuals abnormal returns that cover the 
event window, we shall now consider the statistical significant of the cumulative 
abnormal returns that each of the announcements displayed. Figure 29 below 
demonstrates the cumulative abnormal returns for each announcement over the 
entire period covering the event window. 
Figure 29 CAR's For Each Announcement Over The Event Window 
Announcement Type CAR For The Event Window 
Acq 2.441388205 
Agm 1.186631359 
AP 0.802515225 
Ch -7.259660703 
Con 1.568515923 
Dir -2.3783546 
Div -0.575458098 
Doc -1.103819133 
DS -2.120146568 
EGM 1.568115543 
H -1.4 78903725 
L -0.917239197 
R -0.3946102 
The output demonstrates that the resultant cumulative abnormal return for 
acquisition ruIDouncements, appointments of new members to the board, the 
announcement of new contracts and also (somewhat surprisingly) dividend were 
certainly not statistically significant. If one were to consider the cumulative 
abnormal returns that arise from annual general meetings and extra-ordinary 
general meetings, it would appear that these cumulative abnormal returns are 
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infact statistically significant. A further point of relevance here is that the actual 
cumulative abnormal returns are positively impacted by the announcement of 
these meetings. Interestingly, these meetings are not classed as having any direct 
financial implication but the abnormal returns do suggest that investors react to 
such announcements, which is an indication of informational content. 
Of further interest, is the sign of the cumulative abnormal returns that are 
generated. Figure 29 shows that both Annual General Meetings and Extra­
ordinary General Meeting are viewed by investors as having a positive 
informational content thus leading to a positive abnormal return. Of all the 
financial announcement made, one would expect a significant cumulative 
abnormal returns to be generated by the dividend announcement. However, the 
results ofFigure 29 do not seem to point in this direction. The results suggest that 
whilst the agreement to increase the circulation of new shares on the open market 
yields little or no cumulative abnormal return of statistical significance, results 
announcements do fair better. The announcement of results, be they interim, 
preliminary or general, lead to positive abnormal returns on the event day itself 
whilst generating overall negative cumulative abnormal returns over the 5 days 
comprising the event window. 
DIFFERENCES IN ABNORMAL RETURNS 
Our next step was to analyse whether there is any statistical difference in the 
abnormal returns for each pair of announcements. Of further interest may be to 
analyse if their is any evident correlation between any pairs of announcements. 
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Both these questions can be addressed by computing a t statistic test of the 
statistical difference between pairs of abnonnal returns aJ.U1ouncements. 
We begin by considering abnormal returns generated through acquisition 
announcements as compared with when annual general meeting are called. The 
results indicate that there is a strong significant correlation between these two 
announcements. The correlation coefficient is positive which suggests that the 
resultant abnonnal returns that transpire from these announcement appear to 
convey the same sentiment. 
There is however, no evidence of difference between the pair of abnormal returns 
that are generated in this case. When comparing acquisition returns over the event 
window with return generated under the announcement of appointment of new 
board employees, again we find a significant correlation between the pair of 
returns of these two announcements. What we do not find is an instance of 
statistically different abnonnal coefficients when compared with abnormal returns 
under the Chairman's Statement. This suggests a significant correlation. 
However, we also find that whilst the extent of the correlation is strong, it is found 
to be in a negative direction. 
It would appear that the interpretation by investors of announcements of 
acquisition is dichotomous with the interpretation by investors of the Chairman's 
Statement. If we consider the relationship between acquisition announcements 
and abnonnal returns generated by the announcement of awards of contracts, their 
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appears to be no significant statistical correlation between these two 
announcements. However, what we do find is that there is a significant difference 
in the abnonnal returns that these two announcements generate. 
The results show a significant correlation between acquisition announcements 
informing about a change of directors. This correlation is also detected as 
positive. Interestingly, there would appear to be no statistically significant 
correlation's between acquisition announcements and dividend announcement, 
which is certainly something of a surprise. This matter will be further discussed 
in the following Chapter 7 and its conclusions will be derived. There also appears 
not be any statistical difference between the abnormal returns that are generated 
by the two announcements over the event window. Similarly when we analyse 
the different abnormal returns generated by the submission of disclosure 
documents to the Stock Exchange, no correlation is found and no statistically 
significant difference is detected. In contrast to this, comparisons of acquisitions 
versus directors shareholding activity demonstrate that their is certainly a 
significant correlation between these two announcements abnormal returns. 
It would appear that the sentiment that is portrayed by the announcements are 
negative such that the abnormal returns generated are negatively correlated. Their 
would also appear to be a significant difference in the abnonnal returns that are 
generated. Their is a strong correlation between the abnormal returns generated 
by acquisition announcements and the announcement of the extra-ordinary 
general meeting. However, whilst the correlation is positive, their is no 
significant difference in the resultant abnormal returns generated by these two 
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announcements. 
The analysis of the results showed no statistical correlation between acquisition 
announcements and changes to holding or capital changes. However, their does 
appear to be a significant negative correlation between acquisition announcement 
abnormal returns and the announcement oflisting of new shares. No difference of 
returns was reported. Moving on we shall consider what if any statistical 
relationship exists between the returns generated by annual general meetings and 
all other announcements analysed. 
There appears to be a significant correlation co-efficient between the returns of 
annual general meeting and the appointment of new board members. However, 
the correlation coefficient is negative which indicates that sentiments of each of 
the announcements dichotomous relative to each other. The same type of 
relationship appears to exhibit itself when we compare the annual general meeting 
abnormal returns with that of the amlouncement of the Chairman's Statements. In 
both cases however, we fail to be able to demonstrate any significant difference 
between the abnormal return that each of these generate. Moving onto compare 
the relationship between the annual general meetings and the announcement of 
contacts, we find that no statistical correlation exists between these two variables. 
Further, that there appears to be no significant statistical difference between either 
of these announcements in terms of abnonnal returns. Under our classification 
system, the annual general meeting and directorate changes are both considered as 
non-financial announcements. It is therefore not surprising that we find a 
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significant correlation between these two returns. The correlation coefficient is 
positive which indicates that the resultant abnormal returns from these two 
announcements appear to convey the same sentiment to investor's vis a vis further 
expectations. Interestingly, no apparent difference can be detected in the return 
that these announcements generate. Moving on to dividend announcements, this 
announcement is classed as a very clear and specific financial announcement and 
their is no evidence to suggest that their is significant statistical correlation 
between either of these two variables. Neither is there any evidence that there is a 
statistical difference in the abnormal returns that these announcements generate. 
In terms of document submission, again we find that neither correlation nor 
statistically significant difference can be detected. However, no statistically 
significant difference can be detected. When we compare the directors share 
dealings announcements with abnormal returns generated under annual general 
meetings announcements, we find that their is significant positive correlation in 
the abnormal returns that are generated. There is no statistical difference between 
the two returns. In the case of comparing the annual general meeting with the 
extra-ordinary general meeting, we find that, as expected, their are significant 
correlation's identified and that those correlation are positive. 
Furthermore, we find that their are significant differences in the returns that are 
generated. This seems to imply that whilst the sentiment of both annual general 
meetings and extra-ordinary general meetings are considered to be the same 
(demonstrate by the positive correlation), the informational content of these two 
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announcements are different. Otherwise, we would not see the difference in the 
abnormal returns. When comprising the annual general meeting with changes to 
the holding of the company, we fail to find any other correlation between the two 
return or any statistical difference in the abnormal returns generated. In the case 
of annual general meetings as against listing announcements, we find that there 
does appear to be a correlation between the abnormal returns generated by these 
two announcements. Further more, it would appear that this correlation is 
negative. We do however, fail to find any significant difference in the abnormal 
l returns generated. Comparing the results of the annual general meeting with the 
annolllcement of results (interim and final), we find that, whilst their appears to 
be no statistically significant correlation, their does appear to be evidence that 
their is a statistical difference in the abnormal returns that are generated. Moving 
on, comparison between announcements regarding the appointment of new board 
members and directors as compared with all other announcements, we find that 
their does appear to be a significant correlation between appointment 
announcements and the announcement of acquisitions. This correlation is 
positive. 
However, their does not appear to be any significant difference in the mean 
abnormal returns that each of these ann0U11cements generated. When comparing 
the appointment of new financial and board members with the annual general 
meeting announcements, we also find strong correlation in the abnormal returns. 
However, it would appear that the extent of this correlation is negative which 
would imply that the sentiments expressed by each of the announcements is in the 
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opposite direction. Comparisons of appointments to board level and the 
announcement of the awarding of contracts does not appear to demonstrate any 
correlation in tenns of the abnonnal returns. Furthermore, there does appear to be 
a significant· difference in the mean abnonnal return generated. Moving on to 
compare the appointment of new board members with director's changes, there 
does appear to be a strong negative correlation between these two variables. No 
significant difference in the mean abnormal returns can be reported. Comparison 
of dividend announcement with appointment announcements does not appear to 
show any relationship either in terms of correlation, be it positive or negative or 
difference of means. 
Analysis of the returns under document submission as compared to the 
appointment of new directors does not seem to demonstrate any extent of 
correlation relationship among the returns or any significant difference in the 
returns. 
Comparisons of appointment announcements with the announcement on directors 
intentions to deal shares and adjust their portfolios seems to suggest that 
significant correlation exists between these two announcements. Further more, 
their is also evidence to suggest that no significant difference can be found 
between the abnormal returns that are generated by either of these two 
announcements. If we were to compare the appointment of new board members 
announcements with that of the announcement of the extra - ordinary general 
meeting, we again find that their is a significant correlation between the returns of 
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these two announcements. No evidence of their being a difference in the mean 
abnormal return can be found in this instance. If we compare the relationship 
between the returns on the announcement of new appointment of directors or 
board members with that of the alIDouncement of changes in holdings of the 
company we find that their is no statistical evidence to suggest that any such 
relationship exists. 
Moving on to a comparison of the reaction in terms of the abnormal returns 
generated between the announcement of new board appointments with that of the 
listing ofnew shares, we also find that their is evidence of correlation and that this 
correlation is negative in nature. This would suggest that there is a difference in 
the sentiments that these two announcements are conveying. When one compares 
the abnormal returns relating to new appointments with that of the announcement 
of results, be they final or interim,we find it difficult to support any evidence that 
their is any statistical correlation between these two announcements. 
In terms of the Chairman's Statement, we can now consider the abnormal returns 
that it generated as compared with returns generated under the awarding of 
contracts. The empirical evidence suggests that it is difficult to justify the 
existence of any type of statistical relationship based on the correlation that exists 
between the two returns. However, we do not find quite the some story when we 
consider the relationship between the abnohnal returns generated under changes 
in the directorship of companies as compared with the returns generated under the 
announcement of the Chairmen's Statement. 
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When we move on to consider the relationship between the abnormal returns 
generated under the Chairmen's Statement, as compared with the announcement 
of dividend by the companies considered in the dataset, we find that their is little 
evidence to suggest that their is any correlation between these sets of abnormal 
returns. However, what we do find is that whilst their appears to be no 
statistically significant correlation between the abnormal return of these two 
variables, their does appear to be a significant difference in the abnormal returns 
that result from them. Of further interest may be to consider what, if any, 
evidence their is to suggest that their is any significant correlation between the 
abnormal returns that are generated as a result of the submission of documents 
requested under the listing procedures dictated by the Stock Exchanges disclosure 
rules. 
CORRELATION OF ABNORMAL RETURNS 
Surprisingly, we find that their is little evidence to suggest that their is any 
correlation between the returns generated under document submission relative to 
contract onwards. Similarly, we find the same results and implications when we 
assess the relationships that exist between abnormal returns generated under the 
conditions of announcements of extra-ordinary general meetings and contract 
announcements. The results show a significant correlation between contract 
announcements and the declaration of adjustments to changes in holding and 
capital levels. The results postulate a positive relationship in this regards that is 
similar to the analysis of dividend. However, these results bear stark contrast to 
the results found when we analyse any existing relationship between the abnormal 
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returns generated under contract announcements relative to the announcement of 
results. What we find is that their is strong statistical evidence that suggest a 
negative correlation between the abnormal returns generated under contract 
announcements and the abnormal returns generated under the announcement of 
results. This negative correlation suggests an inverse relationship between these 
two variables which would mean that the sentiment expressed by these two 
amlouncements is dichotomous. Surprisingly, the results show that their is no 
correlation between the returns generated under changes to listing status as 
compared with contract awards. 
Our next analysis concerns the extent of correlation between directorate changes 
and dividend aID1ouncements. We find that their is neither a relationship in terms 
of linear association or correlation between the abnormal returns that these two 
aID10uncements make and their is also no evidence to suggest that their is any 
significant difference in the abnormal returns that are generated. Similarly, we 
find that their is no relationship between the abnormal returns generated under 
document submissions relative to abnormal returns generated under directorate 
changes. 
We now look to any of the relationship between abnormal returns generated under 
either the announcement of directors share dealing or under the announcement of 
extra-ordinary general meetings. When one compares this returns with that which 
is generated under changes to directorates, we find that under both circumstances 
their is evidence of strong correlation but in the case of directors share dealing, 
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the linear association IS positive whereas in the case of extraordinary 
shareholding, the relationship is negative. If we compare the abnormal returns 
generated under holding and capital changes to changes at the directorate level, 
we are unable to justify any correlation. There is no correlation between these to 
variables and their is also very little evidence to suggest that their IS any 
significant difference between the abnormal returns that are generated. 
Looking at the submission of listing documentation and the abnormal returns that 
this type of statistical evidence generates, there is support of strong positive linear 
association. There is, however, no evidence of any significant difference in the 
abnormal returns that this may generate. 
We also fail to find any statistical evidence in support of any linear association 
between the abnormal returns generated under the submission of results relative to 
the armouncement of changes at the directorate level. 
Our next step is to consider the extent of correlation or linear association that can 
be found between the abnormal returns generated by document submission as 
compared with the abnormal returns generated by the announcement of dividends. 
One would suspect that their would be an extent of linear association between 
these two results and that this would be positive. It is important to point out that 
certainly the extent of linear association is indeed significant but surprisingly, we 
find that the association itself is negative. In other words, while abnormal returns 
generated under both of these conditions are significant, the extent of this 
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association demonstrates that the sentiments conveyed are infact opposite. With 
regards the analysis of the abnonnal returns generated by directors shareholding, 
we also find that their is no significant extent of linear association between these 
two variables. Furthermore, we also fail to see any significant difference in the 
abnormal returns that are generated in this instance. 
Similarly, we also find that their is no evidence to suggest that their is any 
relationship between the abnormal returns generated under conditions of 
announcements of extra-ordinary general meetings and the submission of 
documents for disclosure purposes. However, it is interesting to compare the 
results of abnormal returns generated under changes to the holdings of the 
company with comparisons of submission of documentation. What we find is that 
their is evidence of significant correlation between the abnormal return that are 
thus generated. More significantly, we find that the extent of the correlation is 
negative. This would imply that the markets sentiment, expressed in tenns of 
trading, is opposite in each of these cases. More interestingly, we also find that 
the extent to which their is a difference in these abnormal returns is zero. The 
results seems to demonstrate that their is no significant difference between the 
generated abnormal returns. When considering the extend of linear association 
between the abnormal returns generated under announcements pertaining to 
listing changes as compared with document submissions, the findings are also 
interesting. In such a case, we fail to find any statistical evidence that suggests 
that their is any linear association between any of the returns generated by either 
ofthese announcements. 
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However, what is certainly of interest to us is the output generated when we 
consider any relationship that exists between the average abnormal returns 
generated from announcements pertaining to release or submission of 
documentation. What we find in this case is that their is strong statistical support 
for an inference that their is a linear association between the average abnormal 
returns of these two variables. According to our methodology, both of these two 
announcements are financial in nature which provide anecdotal evidence of a 
suggestive link between the abnormal returns that would be expected. We find 
that their is linear association and also that this association is positive in nature. 
What we fail to find is any evidence of significant differences in the abnormal 
returns that are generated. 
Moving on to our next level of results analysis, we examine the extent of linear 
association that exists between the abnormal returns under condition of director 
shareholdings as compared with the average abnormal returns generated under 
conditions of extra-ordinary general meetings. In both cases, the nature of the 
announcements is such that they are both non-financial in nature. What we find 
from the results is that their is evidence of linear association in the results that are 
generated. Of more significance is the fact that the association itself is found to 
be negative in nature. 
This result is surprising in view of the fact that the comparison itself deals with 
two announcements, both of which happen to be of a nOll-financial nature. We 
also find that, on closer analysis, their is also little evidence to suggest that their is 
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any significant difference between the abnonnal returns that are generated. 
Moving on to the comparison of returns generated by changes in holdings as 
compared to director share dealings, we are interested to find that their is indeed 
evidence of linear association between the abnormal returns generated by each of 
these two announcements. Interestingly, we find that this association is negative 
in nature which, at first hand, should not surprise us. The reason for this is that if 
we consider the nature of the announcements themselves, we find that these 
announcements belong to both financial and non-financial categories respectively. 
The extent of the association is indeed negatives which should not be of surprise 
owing to the dichotomous nature of the announcements themselves. What is 
perhaps more surprising then this is that we find no evidence of any significant 
difference between the average abnormal returns associated with the 
announcement of changes in holding as compared with announcements of director 
share dealing intentions. 
Moving on to assess the impact of listing status announcements as compared with 
that of announcements of directors intentions to share deal, again we find that 
their is significant liner association. This would suggest that the abnormal returns 
associated with each of these two announcements do follow some kind of pattern 
or relationship. The strength of the linear association in significant albeit negative 
and on testing the extent of any differences in the abnormal returns, we find little 
evidence to substantiate the fact that abnormal returns differences fail to emerge. 
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Next we analyse the extent of association between the abnormal returns emerging 
from results announcements such as earning and profits as compared with the 
results of abnormal earnings associated with the announcement of intentions of 
directors to share deal. What we find in this analysis is that their is little statistical 
evidence to suggest any type of linear association between the returns associated 
with the announcement of results as compared with director share dealing 
intentions. In the testing procedure, we also fail to find any significant difference 
in the abnormal returns that these announcements generate. Next we move on to 
analyse the extent of linear association between the abnormal returns associated 
with holding changes as compared to extra-ordinary general meetings 
announcements. Again, the results of the study fail to find any significant link or 
liner association between the return that each of these announcements instigate. 
The results of this comparison are of interest to us on two accounts. Firstly, we 
find that their is evidence of significant linear association between the returns 
generated in this regard. The nature of both of these announcements is such that 
they are non-financial in nature and we would therefore expect some extent of 
association. More interestingly however is the fact that this association is 
negative. The correlation co-efficient is seen as negative which is surprising to 
us. 
One would expect that in cases where their is a extent of linear association, we 
would expect announcements of the same nature to portray similar sentiments to 
each other. In this case however, we find that the sentiments portrayed by each of 
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these announcements are infact dichotomous from the point of view of investors. 
It would appear that the negative correlation co-efficient is as a result of the 
different sentiments that these announcements portray. Interestingly, we also find 
that when a test is conducted pertaining to the relative differences in the abnonnal 
returns that are generated, the results show that their is sufficient evidence to 
support the fact that there are statistically significant differences between the 
abnormal return generated. Moving on to the comparison of abnonnal returns 
generated by means of comparing the results of extra-ordinary general meetings 
with the announcements ofresults (profits and earnings), we also find that their is 
no evidence of any linear correlation between these two announcements. Also, 
our analysis failed to detect any difference in the abnonnal returns when 
comparing the results of listing announcements with holding changes. Also, the 
same was the case when comparing results announcements with listing status i.e. 
little or no evidence to suggest either linear association or significant differences 
in the abnormal returns. However, what we do find is that is the case of 
comparisons of results with changes to holding status, their is evidence to suggest 
that a strong linear association does exist between these two variables. 
Furthermore, although both of these announcements are of a financial nature, it 
would appear that the sentiment expressed by each of these is very different since 
the correlation co-efficient is negative. Furthennore, there is strong evidence to 
suggest that the difference in the abnormal returns is significant. 
OVER-REACTION AND MEAN REVERSIONS 
We begin the discussion of the extent to which over-reaction and mean reversion 
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in stock prices take place around the time of announcements. The analysis as per 
Figure 30 demonstrates the average abnormal returns for each of the 
announcements for each of the five days that covered the event window. 
Figure 30 Average Abnormal Returns Per Announcement 
Announcement Type Average Abnormal Retum 
Days 0 t+1 t+2 
Acq 0.509598924 1.652684 -0.06775 
Agm 1.274070725 -0.30763 -0.50375 
AP 0.591090701 -0.159 0.678902 
Ch -0.031135742 0.036 -7.30226 
Con -3.23851847 0.406645 0.848142 
Or -1.339786378 0.066474 0.490604 
Oiv 0.614349384 -0.57128 -0.4437 
Doc -0.566379941 0.144459 -0.00681 
OS -0.727850931 -0.55052 -0.20047 
EGM -0.312853775 0.444225 2.079679 
H -0.281175958 -0.3275 -0.63997 
L -0.297536158 -0.08756 -0.47626 
R 0.20701758 -0.11641 -0.60108 
The first event analysed was the announcement of acquisitions. Figure 30 
illustrates that the reaction to acquisition announcements post announcement date 
is clearly much greater then in the time leading up to the announcement itself. 
The evidence seems to suggest that there is a phenomenon of over-reaction by 
investors to announcements of acquisition immediately in the days that proceeds 
the announcement. 
The empirical evidence shows that the abnormal return on the day proceeding the 
event window is approximately 1.7% as compared with the days leading up to the 
event which showed average abnormal returns that were close to zero. What is of 
further interest in the case of acquisition announcements is that in the days leading 
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up to the announcement itself (i.e. Ld the extent of the abnormal return was lower 
then at any point in the days covering the event window. It would also be note­
worthy to highlight the fact that in the period leading up to the announcement 
itself there is a general trend that demonstrates a slow but sustained increase in the 
abnormal returns. These peak on the day following the rumouncement of the 
acquisition but then fall drastically. We may wish to consider the role that mean 
reversion has to play in this whole reaction. To do this, we should consider the 
behaviour of the abnormal return after the data of the announcement itself. As is 
evident from the diagram illustrating the behaviour of the abnormal return that a 
sharp reduction in the average abnormal return suggests an aggressive process of 
reversion in the fortunes of the return. The significant mean reversion 
demonstrates two things to us. Firstly, it suggests that the original reaction was 
related to the announcement itself. Secondly, that there is a suggestion that the 
process of over-reaction to the announcement is detected by investors in a short 
period following the over-reaction itself. As a result, investors become more 
aware of the reaction being disproportionate to the level and extent of the 
announcement. Thus, the process of mean reversion in and stock returns in the 
following period adjusts to reflect the change in sentiments of the market. 
Moving on now we can consider the extent of over-reaction experienced when 
annual general meetings are announced. Figure 30 appears to show a somewhat 
anticipated reaction in the sense that in the days leading up to the announcement, 
we see a steady increase in the average abnormal return. The average abnormal 
return goes from being negative in time period t2 to 2% in 1-1 and then back down 
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to 1.4% on the day of announcement. Again we would suggest that their is 
empirical evidence of over-reaction. However the difference in this case is that 
the over-reaction in anticipated prior to the official announcement ofthe event and 
then we see the mean-reversion taking place after the announcement is officially 
made. In the case of announcements of the annual general meeting post-event 
day, their is a significant reversion in the fortunes of the abnormal return. In 
summary, it does therefore appear that there is a phenomenon of over-reaction 
followed by a period of mean reversion. 
In the case of AP's, the results appear at first glance somewhat inconclusive. The 
abnormal returns shows that their is negative abnormal return at the beginning of 
the event window followed by a greater negative abnormal return followed by a 
large positive abnormal return and then a reduced negative abnormal return 
followed by a large positive abnormal return. The even window therefore finishes 
with the largest positive abnormal return of any day included within the event 
window. 
We can consider the impact of CH announcement in terms of the abnormal return 
and find that there is indeed very little reaction to the announcement itself. We 
find that the abnormal returns generated for time period t-2 to t+1 are statistically 
close to zero. This would seen to suggest that there is hardly any reaction to the 
announcement of CH over the event window with the exception of the last-day 
time period 42. On the last day of the event window, we find that there is a 
significantly large and negative abnormal return recorded. Since there is little or 
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no reaction to the announcement in the days of the event window itself, it can be 
concluded that there is no empirical evidence of mean reversion. I order to assess 
if their has been an over-reaction to this announcement, one would have to 
consider the direction that the announcement took after the end of the event 
window itself. Whilst we can ascertain that their is indeed a significant reaction at 
the end of the event window, it is again difficult to ascertain as to whether this 
reaction is an over-reaction or not. Indeed, as has been highlighted in the 
Reflections and Limitation Chapter of this thesis that an extension of the event 
window would certainly prove to be of use to the analysis. The reaction to CH 
returns two days after the announcement takes place which does seem to suggest 
that their is a significant time lag between CH announcements and investor 
reactions. 
Moving on to consider DIR announcements over the event window we find that 
their are significant abnormal return in the days leading up to the event window 
and the trend in these return is such that these return are increasing. However, 
what the empirical evidence also suggests is that once the announcement is made, 
the negative returns reverse and become positive. This would suggest that there is 
evidence of mean reversion in that the direction of the abnormal return reverses 
once the announcement is made. This is anecdotal evidence in support of over­
reaction and mean reversion. 
In the case ofDIR announcements, an interesting situation presents itself. What is 
clear is that there is a significant reaction that takes place on the day of the 
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announcement itself. For time period to, there is a daily return registered that is no 
greater than half of one percent. However, it is also interesting to note the trend in 
the abnormal return in the days leading up to the announcement. We find that in 
the two days prior to the announcement, their is a steady increase in the abnormal 
returns that peaks on the day of the announcement itself. After the announcement 
is made we find that their is infact a reversal in the fortunes of the abnormal return 
and it becomes negative again. The dividend therefore stabilises post 
announcement. 
In the case ofDOC announcements, we fail to see any evidence ofmean reversion 
in days that cover the event window. Looking now to the announcement ofDOC, 
we find that their are negative abnormal returns for the whole time period leading 
up to the announcement and on the day of the announcement itself. However, 
what we do find is that after the announcement itself is made, their is a reversal in 
the abnormal returns that become positive on the day after announcement and then 
negative two days after the announcement is made. The extent to which their is 
variation in the abnormal returns prior to the announcement being made is greater 
then the variation that is experienced on a post announcement basis. This result 
suggests a degree of anticipation in the announcement leading up to the event day, 
a significant reaction and then a reversion towards a close to zero abnormal return. 
In the cases of DS announcements, the empirical evidence suggests that again, 
there is a reaction to the announcement on the day of the event itself. After the 
reaction has been experienced in terms of significantly negative abnormal returns, 
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the trend shows an increase in the abnormal returns and a reverSIOn m the 
direction as the abnormal return trend towards zero. 
In the case of EGM announcements we find that in the time period leading up to 
announcement, their is a significant change in sign from negative to positive on 
the day of the announcement. Once the event announcement is made, we find a 
delayed reaction on the day of the announcement itself to, followed by a 
significant increase in the abnormal returns at the end of the event window itself. 
One would therefore conclude that the extent of reaction to EGM announcements 
in delayed, gradual and proportionate as opposed to an over-reaction. 
Announcements of H are considered to be slow and gradual and this is borne out 
by the empirical evidence shown in the results section of this thesis. Certainly 
there is no evidence to suggest an over-reaction and neither is there any evidence 
to suggest a mean reversion process. 
Moving on now we can compare and contrast the difference in the reactions of L 
announcements and R announcements. The first observation to note is that the 
sentiments adopted by each of these announcements is dichotomous. Whilst R 
announcements are received as positive L announcements are negatively 
perceived by investors. In terms of mean reversion, whilst their is no evidence of 
a change in the direction of the abnormal return surrounding L changes, their most 
certainly does appear to be evidence of mean reversion in the example of R 
announcements. The data and results show a change in the direction of the 
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abnonnal returns where abnonnal returns go from highly positive on the day of 
the announcement to negative on the day proceeding the announcements. This 
trend continuous after the announcement for a further two days. This leads one to 
infer that a mean reversion process has taken place as a result of over-reaction on 
the event day to the announcement. 
IMPACT OF SHAREHOLDER CONCENTRATION. 
From the results generated we can identify those announcements whose abnormal 
returns were impacted upon as a result of the shareholder concentration. Our first 
observation is that dividend announcements are certainly sensitive to the 
concentration of stock holding. In this case, all days that cover the event window 
generated results that suggest that there is a correlation between shareholder 
concentration and abnonnal results. In the case of R announcements, we also 
found that the results suggest a statistically significant correlation between 
abnormal returns and shareholder concentration. In the case of H announcements, 
their is a suggestion that shareholder concentration has an impact on the abnormal 
returns generated except in the case of the first day of the event window. For time 
period t-2, it appears that the level of shareholder concentration does not have an 
impact on the abnonnal return generated. For all announcements it would appear 
that the abnonnal return generated on the last day of the event window 42, are 
statistically significant in all case for all announcements, financial and non­
financial. In the case of acquisition announcements only the beginning and end of 
the event window returns show signs of correlation with the abnormal returns. 
The same result can be concluded for AGM meeting announcements whilst in the 
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case of AP announcements, only the end of the event window t+2, shows 
significant statistical correlation. In the case of DIR announcements we find that 
their are no statistically significant correlation between abnormal returns and 
shareholder concentrations. For DOC, DS and EGM announcements, again we 
find little correlation between announcements generated made abnormal returns 
and shareholder concentration. 
The overall observation seems to suggest that positive correlation can be detected 
between the abnormal returns of fmancial announcements and shareholder 
concentration. 
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CHAPTER 7, CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, this chapter brings together some 
contemporary strands of Corporate Finance theory in the context of informational 
efficiency and EMH by summarising some of the lessons that contemporary 
finance teaches us. Secondly, these opportunity is taken to reflect on some of the 
limitations that this Doctoral thesis has in terms of informing future research 
agendas in this and related areas. It should be noted that these findings can be 
considered in the context of efficiency studies and developments in the emerging 
markets. Lessons of reaction to information can be fully transferable to these 
markets. It would be worthy to re-oritorate the scope that this research 
encompassed as stated in Chapter 1 
The scope of the research was explained as being multi-dimensional with the 
focus begin on the extent to which stock prices reflected announcements that 
companies made to the stock market. The study looked to assess the reaction of 
share prices relative to these flows of information. This concept is referred to as 
the Semi-Strong Form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The scope ofthe study 
looked first to assess the level to which the Alternative Investment Market was 
Semi-Strong Form Efficient. Whilst this school of thought measures the extent of 
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responsiveness of stock prices, the scope of the research progressed to assess the 
extent, if any, of over-reactions that may exist. The over-reaction hypothesis is 
well documented in the financial literature and detection of its presence in our 
sample was another of the research aims. 
Thirdly an assessment was to be made of any significant differences in the 
response of stock prices to financial and non-financial announcements. 
, 
A final scope for the work was to consider if the extent of shareholder 
concentration had any impact on the reaction of stock prices. Shareholder 
concentration may be viewed as a proxy for the possibility that where significant 
concentration of shareholders existed, the possibility for control of information 
f 
was possible and thus the potential for informational asymmetric increased. I 
~ We begin with the lessons that market efficiency has taught us to date and then f, 
consider whether these lessons hold in the context of lowly capitalised AIM listed 
stocks. 
EXISTING INVESTOR BEHAVIOUR 
DO INVESTORS RESPOND SLOWLY TO NEW INFORMATION? 
Whilst there are significant anomalous phenomenon found in the stock market and 
that have been well documented in the literature, the size effect that postulates an 
inverse relationship between stock returns and market capitalisation is one of the 
more well known of such anomalous patterns. Size and market capitalisation is 
relevant in this study since AIM stocks are lowly capitalised. There are, however, 
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no shortage of other puzzles and anomalies, some ofwhich relate to the short-term 
behaviour of stock prices. For example, returns appear to be higher in January 
than in any other month of the year and seem to be lower on a Monday than on 
other days of the week with most of the daily generated returns coming at the 
beginning and end of the day. 
In order to be able to generate an abnormal return from such short-term patterns, 
one needs to be a professional trader who has an aggressive stance on trading and 
who is proactive in trading enough transactions in order to generate that abnormal 
return, thus beating the market. The policy implications of such phenomena from 
the point of view of the corporate financial manager may also be of interest since 
these short-term patterns in stock prices provide intriguing conundrums. They 
are, however, unlikely to change the major financial decisions about which 
projects to invest in and how they should be financed. The more troubling 
concern for the corporate financial manager is the possibility that it may be 
several years before investors fully appreciate the significance of new 
information. The studies of daily prices movements (contained in this study) and 
hourly price movements that are often referred to may not pick up long-term mis­
pricing. To date, we have seen evidence of speculative bubbles and fundamental 
correction in the IT and telecommunication markets. This mis-pricing has 
obviously emerged over a period of years. Below are two examples of an 
apparent long-term delay in the reaction to news as per existing literature. 
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NEW ISSUES 
When finns first issue stock to the public through an initial public offering, 
investors typically rush to buy thus resulting in an over-subscription. UK. 
evidence in the early 1980's certainly pointed to this with the change in the 
political administration and the coming of the conservative government. On 
average, those able to receive stocks in some allocation or other realised an 
immediate capital gain. However, Loughran and Ritter, (1995) who studied new 
issues between 1970 and 1990, found that these early gains turned into losses. In 
total over the five years following an initial public offering, shares in newly 
privatised firms performed about 30 percent worse than a portfolio of stocks of 
firms of similar size. Loughran and Ritter went on to look at issues of stock by 
firms that were already publicly traded and found similar substandard 
performance over the five years after the issue. 
EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
The earnings announcement puzzle investigated by Bernard & Thomas (1989) 
showed stock performances following the announcement of unexpectedly good or 
bad earnings during the years 1974 to 1986. They found that 10 percent of the 
stocks of firms with the best earnings news outperfonned those with the worst 
news by more than 4 percent over the two months following the announcement. It 
seems that investors failed to appreciate immediately the full significance of the 
earnings announcement and became aware only as further information arrived. 
Studies are, however, still inconclusive with regards to longer-term market 

anomalies. In the meantime, members of the academic world continually cast 
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around for an alternative theory that might explain these apparent anomalies. 
Some argue that the answers lie in behavioural psychology. For example, ist is 
widely accepted by psychologists that individuals commonly overreact to past 
information. If that is so, one may be able to understand why the euphoria with 
which investors greet a company's first issue of stock seems to be followed by a 
gradual reduction in stock prices. Whilst this tendency to overreact may hold 
empirically, it does not help to explain other long-term puzzles such as the under-
reaction of investors to earnings announcements. Unless there exists a theory of 
human nature that allow us to anticipate when investors are likely to under-react 
and when they are likely to over-react, we are just as well off with the effi­
cient-market theory that tells us that under-reactions and overreactions are equally 
likely. 
THE CRASH OF 1987 
On Monday, October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 23 percent 
on a single day. Immediately after the crash, market analysts began to pose two 
searching questions. Firstly, what was the cause of this dramatic drop in stock 
price reductions? Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the question was 
I 
! 
asked as to what extent it could be said that stock prices reflected fundamental 
values. 
Index arbitrageurs that trade back and forth between index futures and share 
stocks comprising the market index were seen as the cause. On Black Monday 
futures fell first and fastest because investors found it easier to bailout of the 
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stock market by way of futures than by selling individual stocks. This pushed the 
futures price below the stock market index. Arbitrageurs tried to beat the speed of 
the falling index by selling stocks and buying futures but found it difficult to get 
up-to-date quotes on shares. Thus the futures and stock markets were for a time 
disconnected. Arbitrageurs contributed to the trading volume that swamped the 
New York Stock Exchange, but it would be unreasonable to consider that they 
were the ones that had caused the crash itself. They were the messengers who 
tried to transmit the selling pressure in the futures market back to the exchange. 
A second suspect was large institutional investors who were trying to implement 
portfolio insurance schemes. The selling pressure that drove prices down on 
Black Monday led portfolio insurers to sell still more. One institutional investor 
on October 19 sold stocks and futures totalling £1.7 billion. The immediate cause 
of the price fall on Black Monday may have been a herd of elephants all trying to 
leave by the same exit. 
Perhaps some large portfolio insurers can be convicted of disorderly conduct, but 
why did share prices fall world-wide when portfolio insurance was significant 
only in the United States? Moreover, if sales were triggered mainly by portfolio 
insurance or trading tactics, they should have conveyed little fundamental 
information, and prices should have bounced back after Black Monday's 
confusion had dissipated. 
So why did prices fall so sharply? There was no obvious, new fundamental 
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infoffilation to justify such a sharp and widespread decline in share values. For 
this reason, the idea that the market price is the best estimate of intrinsic value 
seems less compelling than before the crash. It appears that either prices were 
irrationally high before Black Monday or irrationally low afterward. Could the 
theory of efficient markets be another casualty of the crash? The events of 
October 1987 remind the financial world of how exceptionally difficult it is to 
value common stocks from scratch. 
Suppose that in November 2002 one wished to assess if common stocks were 
fairly valued. At least initially, one might have used the constant-growth formula 
as postulated by Myron Gordon (268). The annual expected dividend on the 
Standard and Poor's Industrial Index over this period was about 16.7. Suppose 
this dividend was expected to grow at a steady rate of 10 percent a year and 
investors required an arumal return of 11.4 percent a year from common stocks. 
The constant-growth fonnula gives a value for the index of around 1193. This is 
reasonable since the actual level of the index in mid-November 2002 was 1150. 
However, how confident would one be about any of these figures? Perhaps the 
likely dividend growth was only 9.6 percent per year. This would produce a 22 
percent downward revision in our estimate of the right level of the index, from 
1,193 to 928. In other words, a price drop like Black Monday's could have 
occurred in November 2002 if investors had suddenly become 0.4 percentage 
point less optimistic about future dividend growth. The extreme difficulty of 
valuing common stocks from scratch has two important consequences. Firstly, 
investors almost always price a common stock relative to yesterday's price or 
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relative to today's price of comparable securities. In other words, they generally 
take yesterday's price as correct, adjusting upward or downward on the basis of 
today's information. 
If information arrives smoothly, then as time passes, investors become more and 
more confident that today's market level is correct. However, when investors lose 
confidence in the benchmark of yesterday's price, there may be a period of 
confused trading and volatile prices before a new benchmark is established. 
Second, the hypothesis that stock prices always equal intrinsic values is nearly 
impossible to test, precisely because it's so difficult to calculate intrinsic value 
without referring to prices. Thus the crash didn't conclusively disprove the 
hypothesis, but many people now find it less plausible. 
However, the crash does not undermine the evidence for market efficiency with 
respect to relative prices. Let us take a US example as outlined by Breadley & 
Myers. Shares in Quaker Oats sold for £53 per share in June 1998. Could it be 
demonstrated that the true intrinsic value is £53? This is unlikely, however, we 
could be more confident that the price of Quaker Oats should be close to that of, 
say, Heinz (£52) since the two companies had almost the same earnings per share, 
paid a similar dividend, and had similar prospects. Moreover, if either company 
announced unexpectedly higher earnings, one could be quite confident that its 
share price would respond instantly and without bias. In other words, the 
subsequent price would be set correctly relative to the prior price. The most 
important lessons of market efficiency for the corporate financial manager are 
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concerned with relative efficiency. We shall consider this statement further when 
we discuss the empirical implications of this study in the context of AIM traders 
and AIM stock price adjustments. 
MARKET ANOMALIES AND THE FINA.t~CIAL MANAGER 
Financial managers need to be confident that when firms issues new securities, 
they can do so at a fair price. However, there are 2 compelling reasons why this 
may not be the case. Firstly, the strong form of the efficient-market hypothesis 
may not be completely true and financial managers may have information that 
other investors do not have. Alternatively, investors may have the same 
information as management but be slow to react to it. We described above some 
evidence that new issues of stock tend to be followed by a prolonged period of 
low stock returns. 
One may often hear that managers of companies that have highly priced shares 
, can raise finance capital cheaply. The logic of this may be that the high stock 
price gives the manager a big advantage over our competitor companies who 
could not justify investing in such a project. This logic however is flawed since if 
ones stock is truly overpriced, one should help current shareholders by selling 
additional stock and using that cash to invest in other capital market securities. 
However, one should avoid issuing stocks to invest in a project that offers a lower 
rate of return than you could earn elsewhere in the capital market. Such a project 
would have a negative NPV. Investors can always do better than investing in a 
negative NPV project. 
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However, does the reverse apply? Suppose that investors are aware that a stock is 
under-priced. In that case, it certainly would not help existing shareholders to sell 
additional stocks to invest in other fairly priced stocks. Ifthe share is sufficiently 
underpriced, it may even pay to forego an opportunity to invest in a positive :N1>V 
project rather than to allow new investors to buy into your firm at a low price. 
Financial managers who believe that their firm's stock is under-priced may be jus­
tifiably reluctant to issue more stock, but they may instead be able to finance their 
investment program by an issue of debt. In this case the market inefficiency would 
affect the firm's choice of financing but not its real investment decisions. 
CORPORATE PARADIGMS IN MARKET EFFICIENCY 
Being able to address all the market efficiency issues would certainly take further 
discussion and there is an attempt to relate such issues to the empirical data in this 
study. However, not withstanding the empirical work of this thesis, there is now 
widespread agreement that capital markets function sufficiently well that 
opportunities for easy profits are rare. When contemporary economists come 
across instances where market prices apparently do not make sense, there is often 
a reluctance to disregard the efficient-market hypothesis. Instead, they think 
carefully about whether there is some missing ingredient that the theory ignores. 
One may suggest that financial managers assume, at least as a starting point, that 
security prices are fair and that it is difficult to out-perform the market on a 
systematic basis. This has some important implications for the financial manager. 
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WEAK FORM EFFICIENCY HOLDS 
The weak form of the efficient-market hypothesis states that the sequence of past 
price changes contains no information about future changes. Economists express 
the same idea more concisely when they say that the market has no memory. 
Sometimes financial managers seem to act as if this were not the case. For 
example, studies by Taggart (1985) and others in the United States and by Dimson 
and Marsh (1986) in the United Kingdom show that managers generally favour 
equity rather than debt financing after an abnoID1al stock price increase. The 
rationale for this is to, in some way catch the market while it is high. Similarly, 
managers are often reluctant to issue stock after a fall in price. They are inclined 
to wait for a rebound. However, there is evidence that the market has no memory 
and that the cycles that fmancial managers seem to rely on do not exist. 
Sometimes, financial manager may have inside information indicating that the 
firm's stock is over or under-priced. Consider, for example, that there is some 
good news which the market does not know but a trader does. The stock price 
will rise sharply when the news is revealed. Therefore, if the company sold shares 
at the current price, it would be offering a bargain to new investors at the expense 
of present stockholders. Naturally, managers are reluctant to sell new shares 
when they have favourable inside information. However, such information has 
nothing to do with the history of the stock price. The firms stock could be selling 
at half its price of a year ago, and yet one may have special information 
suggesting that it is still grossly overvalued. Alternatively, it may be undervalued 
at twice last year's price. 
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THE FAIR GAME MODEL HOLDS 
In an efficient market you can trust prices, for they impound all available informa­
tion about the value of each security. This means that in an efficient market, there 
is no way for most investors to achieve consistently superior rates of return. To 
do so, one not only needs to know more than anyone else but also one needs to 
know more than everyone else. This message is important for the financial 
manager who is responsible for the firm's exchange-rate policy or for its purchases 
and sales of debt. 
The company's assets may also be directly affected by management's faith in its 

investment skills. For example, one company may purchase another simply 

because its management thinks that the stock is undervalued. On approximately 

half the occasions the stock of the acquired firm will with hindsight tum out to be 

undervalued. However, the other half of such companies will be overvalued. On 

average the value will be correct and so the acquiring company is playing a fair 

game except for the costs of the acquisition. 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS HAVE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT 

If the market is efficient, prices impound all available information. Therefore, if 

we can only learn to read the entrails, security prices can tell us a lot about the 

future. For example, it can be shown how a company's financial statements can 

help the financial manager to estimate the probability of bankruptcy. But the 

market's assessment of the company's securities can also provide important 

information about the firm's prospects. Thus, if the company's bonds are offering 
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a much higher yield than the average, you can deduce that the firm is probably in 
trouble. A further example can also be considered. Suppose that investors are 
confident that interest rates are set to rise over the next year. In such a case, 
investors would prefer to wait before they make long-term loans commitments 
and any firm that wants to borrow long-term money today will have to offer the 
inducement of a higher rate of interest. In other words, the long-term rate of 
interest will have to be higher than the one-year rate. Differences between the 
long-term interest rate and the short-term rate reveal something about what 
investors expect to happen to short-tenn rates in the future. 
INVESTOR INDIFFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUENT OF WEALTH 
I In an efficient market there are no financial illusions. Investors are 
I', 
unromantically concerned with the finn's cash flows and the portion of those cash 
I flows to which they are entitled. 
Every year hundreds of companies increase the number of shares outstanding 
either by subdividing the existing shares or by distributing more shares as 
dividends. This does not affect the company's future cash flows or the proportion 
of these cash flows attributable to each shareholder. Let us consider another 
example as outlined by Breadley & Myers. Suppose the stocks of Chaste 
Manhattan are selling for £210 per share. A 3-for-1 stock split would replace each 
outstanding share with three new shares. Chaste would probably arrange this by 
printing two new shares for each original share and distributing the new shares to 
its stockholders as a "free gift." After the split we would expect each share to sell 
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for 210/3 = £70. Dividends per share, earnings per share, and all other per-share 
variables would be one-third their previous levels. 
The below figure shows the classic study by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) 
on the impact of stock splits. 
0.44 .. 
(Fama et al 1969) 
What we see from this study is the cumulative abnormal performance of stocks 
around the time of the split after adjustment for the increase in the number of 
shares. We can notice the rise in price before the split. The announcement of the 
split would have occurred in the last month or two ofthis period which means that 
the decision to split is both the consequence of a rise in price and the cause of a 
further rise. It looks as if shareholders are not as rational and hard-headed as one 
would have initially expected. Usually such an announcement would cause an 
unusual rise in the stock price, but in the case of the splitting companies there was 
no such occurrence at any time after the split. The apparent explanation is that the 
split was accompanied by an explicit or implicit promise of a dividend increase 
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and the rise in price at the time of the split had nothing to do with a predilection 
for splits as such but with the information that it was thought to convey. 
This behaviour does not imply that investors have a preference for dividend 
increases for their own sake, for companies that split their stocks appear to be 
unusually successful in other ways. For example, Asquith, Healy, & Palepu 
(1989) found that stock splits are frequently preceded by sharp increases in 
earnings. Such earnings increases are very often transitory, and investors rightly 
regard them with suspicion. However, the stock split appears to provide investors 
with an assurance that in this case the rise in earnings is indeed pennanent. 
t 
I ACCOUNTING CHANGES ARE NOTED BY INVESTORS 
There are other occasions on which managers seem to assume that investors suffer 
from financial illusion. For example, some finns devote considerable ingenuity to 
the task of manipulating earnings reported to stockholders. This is done by 
"creative accounting," that is, by choosing accounting methods which stabilise 
and increase reported earnings. Presumably firms go to this trouble because 
management believes that stockholders take the figures at face value. One way 
that companies can affect their reported earnings is through the way that they cost 
the goods taken out of inventory. Companies can choose between two methods. 
Under the FIFOII (first-in, first-out) method, the firm deducts the cost of the first 
goods to have been placed in inventory. Under the LIFO (last-in, last-out) method 
11 For a detailed discussion on FIFO consult Cost Accounting by Homgren, Foster and Datar (10th 
Edition) Prentice Hall, ISBN 013179356X 
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companies deduct the cost of the latest goods to arrive in the warehouse. When 
inflation is high, the cost of the goods that were bought first is likely to be lower 
than the cost of those that were bought last. Consequently, earnings calculated 
under FIFO appear higher than those calculated under LIFO. 
If it were just a matter of presentation, there would be no hann in switching from 
LIFO to FIFO but the revenue services in the UK insists that the same method that 
is used to report to shareholders also be used to calculate the firm's taxes. So the 
lower immediate tax payments from using the LIFO method also bring lower 
apparent earnings. 
If markets are efficient, investors should welcome a change to LIFO accounting, 
even though it reduces earnings. Biddle and Lindahl (1982), who studied the 
matter, concluded that this is exactly what happens, so that the move to LIFO is 
associated with an abnormal rise in the stock price. It seems that shareholders 
look behind the figures and focus on the amount of the tax savings. 
INVESTORS CAN EMULATE CORPORATE DECISIONS 
In an efficient market investors will not pay others for what they can do equally 
well themselves. As we have seen, many of the controversies in Corporate 
Finance centre on how well individuals can replicate corporate financial decisions. 
For example, companies often justifY mergers on the grounds that they produce a 
more diversified and hence more stable firm. However, if investors can hold the 
stocks of both companies why should they thank the companies for diversifying? 
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It is much easier and cheaper for them to diversify than it is for the firm. 
The financial manager needs to ask the same question when considering whether 
it is better to issue debt or common stock. If the firm issues debt, it will create 
financial leverage. As a result, the stock will be more risky and it will offer a 
higher expected return. However, stockholders can obtain financial leverage 
without the firm's issuing debt by borrowing on their own account. The problem 
for the financial manager is, therefore, to decide whether the company can issue 
debt more cheaply than the individual shareholder. 
REFLECTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THIS RESEARCH 
There are several dimensions by which one can assess the success or failure of 
research. In the context of this work, one can consider at a simplistic level 
whether or not the obj ections of the research as stated at the beginning of the 
thesis have actually been achieved. A second, albeit more perplexing questions 
may be to consider as to whether the findings have any relevance in terms of the 
modern world and in particular in the arena of financial inter-mediation. He 
central thrust of this research was to identify and examine the impact of company 
announcements on stock prices. Issues that were proposed for investigation 
included whether investors adjusted their portfolio in order to accommodate the 
incremental flows of information as they came to the market. 
Of further interest for us have been the speed with which such announcement 
flows are incorporated into share prices and if there are any patterns between 
stock holdings and the speed of incorporation. Whilst it is largely expected that 
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their are several1imitations to research, whether it be quantitative or qualitative, it 
is important to reorganise these limitations. These limitations can often have a 
bearing on the results or implications of the study itself and so by recognising 
them, we put the aims and implications of the study in the context of the 
limitations that the findings exhibit. 
What is of crucial importance in this context is also the fact that if the limitations 
of the study are not recognised, then the wealth impacts can be significant from 
the point of view of investors. For example, consider a situation whereby the 
findings of the study demonstrate that their is empirical evidence to suggest that 
significant time lags exist between the dissemination of information and 
corresponding changes in the stock prices. The impact of such a finding from a 
practitioner point of view would be that there is a potential to generate above 
normal returns based on the above findings. However, such an act could prove to 
be based on what may be described as spurious correlation. This could mislead 
the practitioner who is looking to implement the findings of the research and who 
fails to recognise the limitations that the research has to offer. Given that this is 
the case, certain conclusions can be made on the basis of these findings but one 
needs first to address several questions. Firstly, one should have some 
information relating to the sample that has been selected. What was the size of 
the sample comprising the analysis and what were the relative market 
capitalisation's of these firms? These are fundamental questions that one would 
ask before embarking on practising the findings of the report. After such issues 
had been addressed it would still not provide concrete and irrefutable evidence 
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that the findings of the research were worthy of being acted upon. Rather, one 
would be interested in addressing some relatively more probing questions in this 
regard. One may then be inclined to ask as to what methodological approval had 
been employed to ensure that these findings did infact have integrity. In terms of 
this research, we should find that the issue with regards to methodological 
approach should, within itself be an issue that is largely resolved. The study of 
this thesis firstly embarked on a pilot study to test the methodological integrity of 
the testing procedure before continuing to embark on a wider application of the 
process. 
A further test of the integrity of the findings may be to assess as to whether the 
classification of the announcements tested provide any cause for concern. For 
example, if one were to postulate that announcements disclosure leads to 
generation of abnormal returns, one may wish to know as to whether this finding 
related to any specific information flow or whether it was a more general standard 
relating to all information. It may be that whilst the research findings do have 
validity, the findings are only relevant when the announcements analysed are 
either financial or non-financial in nature. It would need to be made clear in such 
research findings as to whether the announcements that were being referred to 
were financial or non-financial in nature. Again, such a statement on abnormal 
returns that fails to reflect as to whether these returns could be generated from 
financial non-financial announcements would, in certain circumstances lead to a 
reduced or possibly negative impacts on shareholder wealth. This limitation 
would have to be recognised since one would not wish to embark on trading in 
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stocks or shares on the basis of financial announcements if it were infact non­
financial announcements that led to these and subsequent returns generation. 
The aims of this chapter are to take an opportunity to reflect on the finding that 
have been discussed by virtue of the research that has been undertaken. The 
purpose of the reflection may be in order to either consider what innovative 
practices could be deployed subsequent to this work being undertaken and also to 
put into context the findings that have since transpired. There may be, in this 
process of reflection, an opportunity to consider whether and to what extent the 
findings are infact correct and valid. 
What one may find is that, owing to the restriction of data, time, knowledge and, 
in more testing times, enthusiasm, the relative boundaries of innovation have been 
curtailed to the extent that further work would be beneficial. Whilst one may feel 
despondent that the limitations of the study do exist, one need not, and should not 
be overly discouraged by such limitations. Indeed, such limitations only further 
enhance the need for more research in the area that can, in some way supersede 
such findings and lead to a more calibrated acceptance or rejection of the 
hypothesis presented. It is in the spirit of the above statement that the limitations 
and reflections of the area are considered. 
The limitations and reflection of this work can be treated in terms of the sub­
categories into which these may fall. For the purpose of this chapter, it has been 
decided that whilst there are several limitations to the study, all limitations 
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considered in this chapter fall into one of six categories. There are limitations in 
the study that pertain to a more detailed discussion of the firm size effect
, 
for 
example. There are also issues to consider in terms of the disclosure effects of 
this study on companies that fall into this category. As with all studies, their will 
invariably be a significant limitation to the findings of the study that are as a 
direct result of the limitations of the data. Following on from that one may also 
wish to further question the methodological approach adopted in undertaking the 
study. Whilst a pilot study was conducted to offer support to use of the 
methodology approach chosen, this methodological approach is by no means 
! 
, without fault. These underlying possible limitations in the methodology are 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Within this analysis we may also be interested to examine the definitions that 
have been utilised when we considered what kind of announcements can be 
categorised as financial announcements and what kind of announcement can be 
categorised as non-financial announcements. 
Finally, one would not be fully supportive of the findings of this work without 
considering if there has been any impact as a result of the passage of time on this 
study. By this, one may wish to recall the composition of the sectoral 
representation on the dataset analysed as compared with the current dataset 
composition. The study has been taken over the period 1995 to 2002 and Figure 
11 on page 189 shows which sectors were represented at the time that study was 
under taken. 
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However, over the passage of time, the composition of the market may have 
changed to reflect the relative increases in importance that the market has given to 
certain sectors over the years. For example, it is clear that many markets in the 
current environment would tend to have a healthy representation of the 
information technology sector. If one were to go back to the years leading up to 
the turn of the millennium one would find that sectors such as the 
telecommunications industry were well represented. One needs to recognise the 
importance of the data used in the sample as being representative of the market 
from the point of view that the research is looking to make inferences relative to 
the market as a whole. In this regard, it is important that if inferences are made, 
they reflect the behaviour of a market and the data on which the analysis is based. 
Should it fail to do so, then we would have to concede that the work has inherent 
in it, such limitations. It is in regards to this and other issues that the limitations 
ofthis research will be discussed. 
DATA 
One of the main limitations on any research work whether it be of a quantitative 
nature or qualitative nature is the issue of data that has been used. In the analysis 
section of this doctoral work, we find that one has utilised closing share prices for 
the days trading and then proceeded to construct an event window spanning five 
days surrounding the event itself. The analysis is attempting to capture the impact 
of the announcements as they fall into the public domain and allow investors to 
place trades on the basis of this information. However, in the age of technology, 
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it has become increasingly possible to trade stocks from one hour to the next and 
often from one minute to the next. Thus, there is now a possibility for what is 
referred to as intra-day trading. Owing to the technological advancements that 
have taken place, it is also possible to be able to obtain intra-day data to base such 
on analysis on. The limitations associated with using closing stock price data at 
the end of each day is that it may be that the impact of the announcement has 
already been incorporated into the stock price in a matter of hours or even 
minutes. Therefore, whilst closing stock prices may result in little or no changes 
from one day to the next, their could be a case for analysing the path of stock 
prices in the hours leading up to the announcement of such events and in the hours 
after the events. This would mean that one could pinpoint and identify more 
specifically what exactly the impact of the announcements actually were and also 
what kind of time frame was required in order to allow the stock price to react the 
these announcements. 
Following on from the fact that this study has been conducted over a seven year 
period, their is also a danger that their has been structural changes in the stock 
market. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the objectives of this 
work are to, in some way, make inferences relating to the Alternative Investment 
Market as a whole. In order to do this, it would be important to demonstrate that 
the data used in the analysis, the test sample, in reflective of the market. Much in 
the way that an index reflects the composition of a market, our data also needs to 
be constructed in such a way that its composition reflects the composition of the 
market as a whole. However, the study has been conducted over a seven-year 
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period and the composition of the data used may not be reflective of the 
composition of the Alternative Investment Market as it stands today. 
We found that in the years leading up to the tum of the new millennium, a great 
many new telecommunications companies had entered the market and therefore 
the composition of the market become biased in favour ofthis sector. Of the total 
market capitalisation of the market, a significant proportion would have been 
comprised of the telecommunications sector. Any test sample that was used to 
analyse the stock market over this period would therefore have to be constituted 
having a significant representation of the telecommunication sector. In the same 
way, since the composition of the Alternative Investment Market has changes 
over the test period, one has to be careful as to what inferences may be made 
regarding the stock exchange as a whole. Since the beginning of the study, we 
find that the information technology sector has an increased importance in capital 
markets and so it may be worthwhile noting the impact of this. 
In essence, the question that has to be asked is that if this study is seen as valid in 
making inferences about the population or the stock exchange as a whole, is the 
data and are the sectors reflective ofthe market itself? 
Moving on to the announcements that have been considered in this analysis, it is 
worthy to note exactly what limitation are inherent as a result of these 
announcements. The use of the resulting announcements may be open to further 
analysis. What this study has done is analyse the impact of results announcements 
at a three, five and seven day event window surrounding the announcement. 
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However, when we consider the announcement of results, we are categorising all 
financial results into one single category. This study has analysed the impact of 
any such result announcement or a forecasted result announcement. It is 
noteworthy that the markets interpretation of these results may be vastly different 
from the markets perception of final results. This is mainly due to certainty 
regarding the future prospects of the company. Interim results, whilst having and 
providing some information with regards exception about the future, actually only 
provide anecdotal evidence of anything that can be expected in the future. 
One may find that the interim results are used to allay fears and concerns of 
investors and may be declared in response to pressure on management regarding 
performances. Whilst the announcement of interim dividend will provide 
anecdotal evidence regarding the interim performance of the company, we may 
find that the amlOuncement of the final dividend bears little or no relation to 
interim dividend announcement. Indeed, since the market is aware that investors 
value information highly and therefore build disproportionate expectations, we 
may find, by default, that the markets reaction to interim and final results 
announcements will infact be distorted. It may be that interim announcements are 
infact the cause of tempered reaction in view of interim results being intentionally 
understated and final results may lead to a greater reaction (and consequently 
greater abnormal returns) as a result of surprising investors and exceeding 
perceived exception. Thus, the consequent reaction of results needs to be further 
directed to separate the reactions ofthose results that pertain to final results. 
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A further limitation that may be considered in this context is the fact that results 
can be multi-dimensional in nature and market agents may have several opinion of 
which they are more inclined to have faith in. For example, whilst it is accepted 
that financial disclosure of accounting data can be a dubious motivation for 
trading, (owing to the creativity of financial accounting data) it is of empirical 
significance that a majority of traders still utilise financial accounting data as a 
basis for changing portfolio of holdings. If this is the case, then we would expect 
that their are significant reactions between accounting data disclosure and stock 
price adjustment. However, where analysing the impact of results announcements 
within the category of announcements, we are also considering announcements 
about earning. It is not simply profit announcements that are considered within 
this category. If this is the case, then a limitation of this research may stem from 
considering results as a collective category rather than considering the individual 
types of results that a company can declare. 
We may find that, whilst there mayor may not be an impact of result 
announcements on the abnormal returns of the lowly capitalised firms, if the 
individual results were analysed, we may find that earnings announcements do or 
do not have impacts. Also, we could discover if profit announcements do or do 
not have impacts. 
FIRM SIZE 
We begin our discussion on limitations by considering what implications these 
findings may have on the finn size effect. Indeed, it is difficult to comment to any 
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degree of depth in view of the fact that firm size has not been isolated as a 
parameter for analysis. The data that has been used in the analysis has derived 
from the Alternative Investment Market, which constitutes a market for small, 
new and lowly capitalised firms. In this regards, we find that the sample itself 
would or should take account of the fact that it is the lowly capitalised stock that 
are being analysed. However, whilst it is true that the sample itself deals with 
lowly capitalised, firms, it is also true to say that their exists, within this sample, a 
range of firms that have a range of market capitalisations and therefore we could 
expand this study to account for this parameter. What we have currently is a 
situation whereby firn1s are grouped as small companies with low market 
capitalisation on the basis of their membership or listing status on the Alternative 
Investment Market. 
There are however companies within the sample that fall within the extremes of 
these two market capitalisation's as set out in the AIM regulations regarding 
market capitalisation. An Inter-capitalisation study would therefore be helpful in 
being able to distinguish as to whether, within the sample, their are differences in 
the responsiveness of firms to incorporate information and view announcements. 
Following on from this factor, we can also consider a more sophisticated study 
that relates to shareholder concentration within the sample. In the study that has 
been presented here, one is commenting on the extent to which shareholder 
concentration is found to impact on the semi-strong fOIm efficiency of the lowly 
capitalised firms contained within the dataset. However, the methodological 
approach that has been adopted in this regards has been to simply categorise the 
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shareholder concentration III tenns of those shareholders that are both 
simultaneously directors and who also happen to hold up to 5% of the available 
share capital belonging to the business. One may be interested in the result of this 
study but one also needs to note that in such finns, directors need not be the only 
major holders of equity capital. We may find that their is a case for other 
shareholders that may be major shareholders but do not belong to the directorship 
of the company. The study that is contained here does not consider the extent to 
which other major shareholders have a role to play in this regard. 
DISCLOSURE EFFECTS 
Rather then to consider the limitation of the work, one can consider the limitation 
as a means of further work that is required or can be undertaken in the future. 
Their are, for example, several limitation that small firms face. Lowly capitalised 
finns have to conform with significantly less disclosure requirements then their 
blue chip counter parts. The Alternative Investment Market has, in attempts to 
facilitate the listing process, reduced the disclosure requirements of all such firms 
listed on the exchange. As a direct result of this, we find that two phenomenon 
take place. Firstly, we find that the frequency of the dissemination of incremental 
announcement flows is such that they are below that of the larger listed 
compames. Secondly, we find that their are far fewer monitors of these 
announcements since their is evidence to suggest that larger firms are relatively 
more closely followed than smaller firms. 
Taking the first issue of frequency of dissemination of incremental releases of 
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information, what possible limitation could this have on our results? The clear 
and distinct problem that limits firms disclosure is that their is a smaller set of 
information in the pubic domain on which to base investors buy and sell 
decisions. Thus, we may find that the extent of rationality and informed decision 
making is far reduced since the information set that forms the motivation for such 
decision is grossly limited. The implication of this may be that the actual 
computed abnormal returns that are generated may not stem from any specific 
rationally informed decisions. We may find that is cases where the event 
announcement has either superseded the expectations of the market or fallen short 
of market expectations, the subsequent market abnormal returns either fall short or 
exceed market expectations. With regard to our second limitation in the field of 
disclosure effects, we may also face a problem as a result of the fact that far fewer 
investors follow the track oflowly capitalised stocks. Often, since such shares are 
either closely held or if the number of investors monitoring the announcements 
are low, the reaction time between announcements and stock price adjustments 
can be delayed. 
The motivation for the stock price change is that traders adjust their portfolios to 
take into account any such new information. If there are few traders monitoring 
the activities and announcements of the market, then how is this to be achieved? 
Ifthere are no or few investors monitoring the announcement flow, then the trades 
required to move stock prices to the equilibrium newly adjusted price do not trade 
up to this price. Consequently, what we find in the short tenn is an interrupted 
series of price charges rather then a continuous adjustment process. In the 
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medium to long tenns there are greater implications since we find that a 
divergence develop between quoted stock prices and fundamental values. 
Further issues that may fonn the potential for limiting the results of this study 
relate to the analysis of how board changes impact on stock price returns of 
companies. Our analysis has considered the impact of, amongst other things, 
directorship changes on the abnormal returns of lowly capitalised filTIls. The 
basis for such an analysis is that it may be possible for the market to interpret the 
changes to directorships as either positive or negative. The hypothesis that is 
being tested is to see if such announcements feed into the price adjustment 
process. One would expect that the announcement of director changes does have 
an element of informational content since it is the quality of the directors 
decisions that impact on the future company perfonnance. However, is it correct 
to assume that this is infact the case. Our analysis has shown that in some cases, 
their has been no significant stock price adjustment as a result of director changes. 
In view of the fact that we are dealing with lowly capitalised filTIls, we may find 
that not all financial decisions are made at this level in the company. It may be 
rather presumptions of us to think that, in the case of companies analysed, the 
decisions made solely as a result of directors have an impact on future 
performance. The question may need to be investigated as to what the actual 
hierarchy of such companies is? We may find that whilst changes can lead to 
little stock reactions when considering board level activity, perhaps changes that 
are instigated in the lower echelons of the organisation do infact have an impact 
on stock prices. Could it be that their is a stronger concentration of power and 
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executive decision making at the lower level of lowly capitalised firms and that 
executives and chairpersons are seen as nothing more then organisational 
figureheads? Thus, one may wish to extend an investigation into such a matter. 
METHODOLOGY 
Great care has been taken m order to ensure that the research methodology 
adopted by this research has maintained a high level of integrity. In the context of 
methodology, the tried and tested form of event study has been adopted as a 
means of achieving and maintaining this integrity. However, it should be noted 
that a study of different event study approaches has been conducted and the 
results can be found in Appendix 1. In particular, the readers attention is drawn to 
the fact that the intentions of the pilot study are not to select an appropriate 
method of event study testing, rather, it is designed to offer support to the 
methodology selected. The pilot study confirmed that certain dispensations 
generated abnormal returns that proved to be more stable than when utilising other 
techniques, which re-affirmed the assumption that abnormal returns results may 
be methodology specific. That methodology which performed most consistently 
with the remaining methodologies and proved to be most stable was infact the 
event study methodology that was utilised. The results of the pilot study were 
therefore supportive of the selected methodology. 
A second and highly significant issue regarding the limitations on the data that has 
been utilised relates to the choice of companies that have been selected. Earlier in 
this chapter the issue of representativeness of data was discussed. It was 
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emphasised that the dataset needs to demonstrate that it represents all the different 
sectors that the stock market represents. Having said that, it is important to note 
that an element of survivorship bias has been evident in the data. The analysis as 
per Chapter 5 states that the data constituted some 134 companies at the beginning 
of analysis. This actually represented the whole of the Alternative Investment 
Market at the time that the sample had been taken. However, some companies 
had attained listing status subsequent to this period and some companies had 
attained listing status after this period. Chapter 5 sorted the data and included in 
the final study san1ple those companies that were listed at the beginning of the 
study period and that remained listed throughout the period of investigation. By 
definition, we may be able to conclude that only those companies that were 
financially strong and had strong and effective managers were therefore included 
in the study sample. If companies did not have a strong financial base or failed to 
make financially viable developmental decisions, then they may not have been 
included in the analysis as they would not have been in a financial position to 
maintain their listing status. As alternative view can also be taken of this. Whilst 
it is possible that a survivorship bias has been induced in the dataset that allows 
only for strong companies that maintain their listing status to remain in the test 
sample data, it is also possible that the stronger, more established companies have 
been excluded from the data. The reason for this is because it is possible that 
those companies that were highly successful were infact de-listing from the 
Alternative Investment Market and instead attained listing status on the main 
London Stock Exchange. 
In the case of survivorship bias, it is difficult to ascertain as to whether this 
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survivorship bias has been induced in favour of strong finns that have managed to 
maintained their listing status on the Alternative Investment Market. 
Alternatively, these may be bias in favour of weak firms since they have 
maintained their listing on the Alternative Investment Market but have been too 
weak to attain full London Stock Exchange listing status. Their is a possibility 
that future work should track those companies that later attained listing status on 
the main exchanges and then proceed to exclude them from the sample in the test 
data analysed. This would ensure that not all companies analysed are infact the 
stronger companies that subsequently went on to attain listing status. One could 
also look to reduce survivorship bias in our sample by omitting from the data 
analysed all these companies which were later de-listing from the Alternative 
Investment Market due to the fact that they either faced financial bankruptcy or 
failed to satisfy the ongoing disclosure requirements. 
Moving on to the next limitation to this study that is that as a direct result of the 
methodological approach taken, we need to remember that the issue of dividend 
has not been fully considered. Other than in the process of announcements of 
dividend, their has been no consideration of the impact that dividends has had on 
a stocks return. The fundamental principal or rationale behind the analysis has 
been that the only return that the stock generates is that return that has been 
generated through capital gain. If we look at the computation of the abnormal 
returns that correlate with announcements made, we find that the abnormal return 
is generated on a daily basis. 
The basis for this daily abnormal return generation is to compute the daily capital 
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gain and express this as a percentage daily movement. This calculation, since it is 
based on the changes in the closing stock price may account for the return that is 
derived as a result of dividend. If we find that there is no relationship between 
announcements and abnonnal returns, this may not be correct. It may be that 
whilst their may be no relationship based on the daily closing stock prices, if 
investors are receiving a dividend then this factor should be considered. One 
could also refute this view by suggesting that the impact of dividend payments 
should feed into capital gains through stock price adjustments. Indeed, if we 
consider the early works of Miller & Modigliani (1959) we do infact find that 
their are no differences between dividend payments and capital gains from the 
point of view of the investors. Whilst this idea was later refuted as a result of 
their being a difference between the tax treatment of these two forms in income, 
possible future work could reflect dividend payments as a distinct form of income 
and return for investors rather than to assume away such a variable. An 
alternative approach may be to look at dividend payments that have been made 
and then add those payments to the stock price such that the total return can be 
calculated. 
BETA STABILITY 
Even though the estimation of beta has been well documented, still the beta values 
proof vary for the one stock with different technique and assumption used. The 
common technique to estimate beta is to apply the standard empirical testing of 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) referred to on page 103. The main 
concern of CAPM is that it assumes beta is constant. There has of-course been an 
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expanding empirical literature related to the issue of beta stability. Parameter 
stability tests may demonstrate that beta either jumps or gradually shifts over time 
and thus, the beta value may change. We have in this study assumed that beta is 
both stable and constant. 
ANNOUNCEMENTS CONSIDERED 
Another consideration in our discussion of limitations to this research centres 
around the issue of the announcements used. The study looks to consider the 
impact of announcements on the abnormal returns and looks to identify any such 
correlation that may exist in this respect. However, the issue of the sentiment of 
the announcements has not been considered. Sentiment of company 
announcements is of importance from the point of view that the marked generates 
its own views of the future expectation in the field of profits or earnings. Whilst a 
profit statement or an earnings forecast may be announced, it is sometimes 
difficult to assess as to whether that particular announcement is a signal of good 
news or bad news. The reason for the this is that although the announcement may 
demonstrate an increase in profit, earnings or dividends for the company, the 
reaction from the point of view of the shareholders may not be as positive as one 
could have expected. If this is the case, then the announcements may infact be 
seen as bad news and have a negative impact on stock returns. Alternatively, in 
cases where companies declare losses, reduced earning or cuts in dividends, this 
may be seen as having positive impacts on stock prices as the losses may have 
been less than what was expected from the assessment ofthe market. 
Of all the announcements that companies make, the literature supports the view 
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that the strongest announcements are made when companies comment on the 
actual and expected dividends that are being declared by a company. Studies by 
Baker et al (1999) have strongly supported the idea that the announcement of 
dividends and any subsequent commentary with regards dividend is seen as 
having an excessively high level of informational content. Further, this idea is 
supported by the notion that dividends have a strong suggestive component about 
the future of the company since dividends reflect the cash position that the 
company is facing. Cash, unlike earnings and profits, is a highly tangible 
commodity and also has an absoluteness about it that induces an informational 
content that no other financial parameter can. Therefore, dividend announcements 
are often be seen as proxies of cashflow positions. This leads dividend payments 
(if they are preliminary) to force shareholders to generate expectations about the 
future of the business. 
If dividend payments are final payments, then this will cause there to be 
expectation about the next trading periods interim and final dividends. Signals of 
cashflow will always be seen by investors to have an informational content due to 
the reduced subjectivity that such announcements have. In terms of this research, 
one should always therefore be careful when considering the impact of dividend 
andlor any other announcements in this context because it is not always possible 
to distinguish as to whether the announcement is good news or bad news. What is 
good news and what is bad news is largely a relative measure that depends highly 
on what the expectations of the market were at that particular time. If we have 
met the expectations of the market, then, by all accounts, the announcement itself 
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may not have any infonnational content al alL If however, we find that 
expectations have been superseded, then this will give rise to good news 
sentiments. If we have fallen short of the expectations of the market, even 
although our financial performance has been good, we may find that the stock 
market reacts negatively to such an occurrence. The reaction of investors is 
therefore measured in tenns of or relative to the expectation of investors rather 
than the actual announcements themselves. 
A further innovation to this study would therefore be to consider not only the 
reactions to all announcements that companies make but to consider the impact of 
announcements made that have exceeded market expectations vis a vis those that 
have fallen short ofmarket expectations. 
With regards the event study methodology that has been deployed in this study, 
there could be a debate centred on the limitations that the event window has 
produced. What is clear is that changes in the event window will have consequent 
implication for the study. Currently, this study has deployed a seven day event 
window that analyses the abnormal returns on the event day itself, three days prior 
to the event date and three days after the event date. How well such an event 
window captures the impact of announcements is largely dependent on how well 
the market is able to anticipate announcements that are being made. For the case 
where the market demonstrates an ability to anticipate announcement well in 
advance, their could be a case for expanding the event window to incorporate the 
time period where the stock price adjustment began. This would involve going 
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back from time period zero to where the expectations regarding the 
announcements were first formed in the stock market. Often, a method of 
assessing the extent of market expectations is conducted by assessing the 
volatility of stock prices around different time periods. Such a methodological 
approach in this regards is to consider the period after the announcement is made 
and ask the question of as to how long after time period zero (the day of the 
announcement) was there evidence of a price adjustment process. The event 
periods utilised in this research pre-supposes that announcement impacts can be 
captured within three days proceeding and post the event announcement. This 
may appear somewhat innovative on the part of this research in view of the fact 
that some price adjustments may take longer than this. Perhaps further work 
needs to be carried out to analyse the impact of the stock price for a period beyond 
the days included within the even window. It could be the case that in smaller or 
lowly capitalised firms, the adjustment process to new information takes more 
time since the number of economic agents monitoring the market are fewer. It is, 
after all, established that smaller or lowly capitalised firms are far less closely 
followed by traders. 
Following or from the event window limitations that exist, it may be of use to re­
analyse the period over which mean reversion has taken place. If this research 
stands, the period ofmean reversion that has been analysed is two days post event 
announcement. In order to offer an insight into the over-reaction hypothesis, one 
could extend the event window to include periods pre and post announcements 
days to assess if there is an over-reaction and mean reversion phenomenon taking 
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APPENDIX 1 PILOT STUDY 
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Pilot Study Using Different Methodologies 
In order to establish an appropriate methodological approach to this study, a pilot 
study was carried out to ascertain as to whether there was any differences in the 
abnormal returns under different market model dispensations. 
Data used in pilot study 
Preliminary studies tested for deviations in abnormal returns of lowly capitalised 
companies around specific event dates and under different equilibrium market 
model dispensations. Daily stock price data was drawn from a sample of stocks 
trading on the Alternative Investment Market, (UK), a market set up specifically 
for lowly capitalised firms with capitalisation of £15-100m. The sample was 
drawn specifically to incorporate a range of businesses and ensure a sufficient 
number of company announcements. (disclosure levels of lowly capitalised fim1s 
are significantly lower 
In order to minimise noise, only companies listed and remained so throughout the 
experimental period were considered. To eliminate stock price impact of 
simultaneous announcements, only events that were unique to event windows 
were considered. Where several announcements were common to the same event 
window, those announcements were excluded from the analysis. 
The resultant sample consisted of a time series of 9 compames spanning the 
period 12/07/95 to 09/03/96 with 19 announcements considered. Announcements 
were obtained via the Regulatory News Service Database, London and related to 
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companies within the sample with a resultant average market capitalisation of 
£34m. When fommlating the various equilibrium market models, the market 
index was obtained from DATASTREAM database. The risk-free rate of return was 
based on the 3 month treasury bill rates with figures obtained from the Bank of 
England website. 
For CCAPM based tests, per capita consumption rates were supplied by Office for 
National Statistics. APT based abnormal returns were based on inflation figures 
from the UK Central Statistical Office. 
Procedure 
The percentage daily return for each stock was calculated. In the case of SIMM, 
using regression analysis, expected returns were extrapolated for a five day event 
window surrounding each announcement. Forecasted returns were extracted from 
actual returns for each of the two days prior to, the day of and prior to the 
announcement, thus defined as the abnormal return associated with the 
announcement under consideration. The expected return for the SCAPM used 
market betas of the security. In the case of ICAPM and CCAPM, inflation betas 
and consumption betas were derived by regression using inflation and per capita 
consumption statistics. In the case of the APT model, a multiple regression model 
was used utilising inflation rate, interest rate, industrial production levels and risk 
premium indices. The expected return for each security was extrapolated as 
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where 
a, =the expected level of return for stock i if all indices have a value of zero 
Ij = the value of the jth index that impacts the return on stock i 
bij = the sensitivity of stock i's return on the jth index 
e, = a random error term with mean equal to zero and variance equal to (52ei 
A five day event window pertaining to each of the 19 announcements covering 9 
securities were examined. Since the objective was not to assess the level of 
market efficiency but rather, assess whether different methodologies generate 
significantly different abnormal returns, an F test12 of difference of variability was 
conducted. The F statistic was computed 13 and tested for difference within a 95% 
confidence interval. The hypothesis tested was: 
Ho = (52 of abnormal returns of both samples are equal 
Ha = (52 of abnormal returns ofboth samples are not equal 
12 F tests statistics were derived from the variance of each abnormal return sample, Sx and Sy, 
2 " (X; - x)2 2 " (y; - f')2
obtained as follows Sx =~ , Sy =~ 1
m-1 n­
I(X;-X')2 
n-1 I (lj - y)2_ 
n-1 
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Results 
A preliminary two-way analysis of variance (ANOV A) was conducted detect the 
overall degree of difference between the abnormal returns for each of the days 
included in the event window. The results of the study can be found below: 
Two Way ANOVA Analysis Of Event Window 
Time F P-value F critical 

Period 

t_214 
 0.527 0.666 2.786 

t-l 0.009 0.999 2.776 

T 0.131 0.941 2.786 

t+l 0.073 0.974 2.786 

t+2 0.425 0.736 2.786 

14 ANOVA overall test of difference between the abnonnal returns 2 days prior to he event day 
gave an F statistic of 0.527. The critical value for F at a 95% level of significance is 2.786. Thus 
the probability of the null hypothesis being true, ie. no difference in the abnormal returns is 0.66. 
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The below figure represents the mean abnonnal return under each of the five 
different market model dispensations over a 5 day event window. 
Abnonnal Returns Under Different Dispensations 
AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN FOR 5 DAY EVENT WINDOW UNDER DIFFERENT 

EQUILIBRIUM MARKET MODELS 
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EVENT WINDOW ( 3 '" ANNOUNCEMENT DAY) 
Comparisons of differences in abnonnal returns generated by each of the 5 days 
covering the event window are shown in 
Discussion 
This pilot study examines any differences in the abnonnal return generated by a 
range of different equilibrium market models under event study conditions in 
emerging markets. Finance literature is largely supportive that abnonnal returns 
do not differ significantly irrespective of choice of returns generating process_ 
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Often, availability and accuracy of data restricts the choice of data utilised. 
Robust models generating consistent results are an appealing prospect, especially 
in the case of emerging markets where data is limited. While SIMM requires a 
market index, SCAPM, ICAPM and CCAPM require asset betas, inflation betas 
and consumption betas respectively. The choice of APT models may also require 
macro aswell as firm specific factors which, in established markets, are readily 
available. Emerging markets are found, typically, in less developed economies 
where data availability is limited and its reliability is questionable. It is therefore 
important to know which methodologies are acceptable so that a tradeoff can be 
reached between data availability and the appropriateness of methodological 
approach. Whilst, in established markets, different approaches result in similar 
abnormal retums, the same may not be said of emerging markets. 
Emerging markets have specific defining characteristics that may lead us to doubt 
the suitability of applying existing methodology with the same level of 
confidence. SIMM's market index reflects overall market movement and is well 
suited to a developed market well represented by a cross-section of industries. 
Since the index is highly diversified, it's movement may well carry individual 
stock movements so long as the index reflects the industry to which the stock 
belongs. 
Emerging markets growth tends to be led by specific sectors of industry. For 
example, emerging markets deVelopment of east Asia have been heavily 
influenced by electronics while on the Indian subcontinent, internet stocks have 
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been fundamental in the growth of regional exchanges. 
Emerging markets development of eastern Europe and the west has been fuelled 
both by internet stocks and telecommunications such as mobile phones. A market 
index weighted by capitalisation (as in the case of the FTSE) in an un-diversified 
market such as AIM is unlikely to influence the movement of stock prices of 
companies under-represented in those markets. Therefore, since the SIMM 
postulates a relationship between security and market returns, such a relationship 
becomes questionable in an emerging market. 
Standard Capital Asset Pricing Model relies on asset betas to forecast expected 
returns. Where these forecasts are short-term, asset betas may be sufficiently 
stable to extrapolate satisfactory forecasts. Asset betas reflect systematic risk in 
terms of variability of cashflows as a result of changes in market factors. Since 
companies listed on established markets are relatively established with regular 
cashflows, beta values of such companies are stable. Infact, listing on the major 
exchanges require trading histories, typically three years and so by default, 
company cashflows have stabilised. In contrast, AIM stocks are new and 
emerging firms with little or no trading record. They operate in unstable markets 
and have cashflows that are highly sensitive to changes in macro-economic 
factors. Such factors contribute to the overall level of non-diversifiable risk 
translates as an increased beta co-efficient and a reduced beta stability. Unstable 
beta parameter in expected returns generating equilibrium models leads to 
unreliable forecasts. 
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Inflation CAPM suggests that stock returns not only covary with market returns 
but also with inflation rates. Again, in established markets, a representative 
market index reflects market sentiment serving as a proxy for inflation rates. 
Excessive inflation may be countered by increases in interest rates which forces 
up the required rate of return on investments, thus overstating expected stock 
returns. Inflation CAPM suitability in emerging markets is questionable since 
companies in emerging markets rarely reflect market wide consumption, rather, 
that consumption component of total consumption which dominates growth in 
product markets. Consequently, inflation wide indices do not reflect sufficiently 
the sentiment of lowly diversified emerging markets. By the same token, 
Consumption CAPM may prove dubious on the same account. 
APT may prove the most reliable of returns generating models since APT is both 
non-static and multi-parameter defined. Firm risk and size parameters can be 
incorporated to reflect more realistically factors that impact on small firm returns. 
Preliminary analysis of variance, show no significant overall differences in 
abnormal returns between each model across the event window. This provide 
ostensible evidence consistent with established market theories suggesting that the 
use of different market models is insignificant in generating event study based 
abnormal returns. However, while overall abnormal return differences seem 
insignificant, we continue by considering the validity of each model individually. 
shows the average abnormal return over a 5 day event window for each of the 
models. 
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Firstly, we see that SCAPM based average abnonnal returns are significantly 
different to all other models tested. In all days within the 5-day event window, 
SCAPM systematically underestimates the average abnonnal return and all 
SCAPM based abnonnal returns were negative. However, for all other models, 
only 1 day prior and one day proceeding the event window shows a negative 
return [except in the case ofICAPM at time period t+l]. One possible reason for 
this result is that the magnitude of the SCAPM underestimation has a direct 
implication for the interpretation of announcement impacts. Where SIMM, 
ICAPM, CCAPM and APT models gave negative average abnormal returns, so to 
did the SCAPM. Thus a 'bad news' announcement was interpreted as such for 
each of the models and impacted negatively on the stock return. However, where 
'good news' announcements rendered positive average abnormal returns, SCAPM 
rendered negative average abnormal returns thus altering the interpretation of the 
announcement to one of 'bad news'. SCAPM's systematic under- estimation of 
average abnormal returns became increasingly pronounced as the event window 
extended. SCAPM had less difficulty in interpreting the sentiment conveyed by 
the announcement as the announcement date approached. 
Average daily underestimation for 2 days leading up to the announcement was 
4%, reducing to 3% on the announcement day increasing to 5% on the 
announcement day. SCAPM returns appear more consistent as compared with 
SIMM, ICAPM, CCAPM and APT on announcement days rather than days 
leading up to and proceeding announcements. In the case of the SIMM, CCAPM 
and APT, the average abnormal returns are not statistically different from each 
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other in any of the 5 days covering the event window. For all cases where 
positive average abnonnal returns were recorded by the SIMM, CCAPM and APT 
models also recorded positive average abnonnal return at time period t-2, t, t+2 
and overestimated the average abnonnal return at time period t-l and t+1. This 
result leads us to doubt the consistency of the average abnonnal return generated 
on a lCAPM basis. As we can see from the illustration on page 330, the sign of 
the average abnonnal return at time period t+1 is positive for ICAPM while being 
negative for SIMM, SCAPM, CCAPM and APT. Consequently, not only is the 
magnitude of the average abnonnal return unreliable, but also the sign of the 
average abnormal return. 
The unreliability of ICAPM may have resulted from the nature of companies 
found on emerging markets. New and emerging firms typically enter niche 
markets and their returns may not be efficiently modelled on the basis of 
economic wide inflationary pressures. Since these firms are not yet sufficiently 
diversified across a range of economic activities, market wide inflationary 
pressure may not effect their returns to the same degree. Thus, to postulate a 
relationship between market wide inflationary pressure and the expected returns 
of lowly capitalised finns may prove unreliable. That is not to say that inflation 
rates do not effect stock returns, only that the relationship may not be modelled on 
this basis alone. However, while ICAPM proves unreliable expected returns 
generating model, inflation combined with other parameters proves to give more 
consistent results. 
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The APT model generates expected returns using a combination of inflation rates 
, 
interest rates, industrial production and risk premium level indices. The APT 
multi-factor model incorporates all factors considered crucial to small stock 
returns. The result as per the figure on page 329 demonstrates that the APT based 
average abnormal returns were consistent with that generated by SIMM and 
CCAPM models. This may be because APT models are both non-static and 
multi-parameter defined. APT allows one to reformulate the model to suit the 
circumstances of the phenomenon being modelled. 
Comparisons ofthe variance of abnormal returns generated by each of the models 
at time period t-2. The F statistics highlighted show that within the sample 
generated by different equilibrium market models, no two pairs of abnormal 
returns had similar variances at a 95% level of significance. The exception to this 
was in the case of the SIMM and ICAPM based abnormal where the variances 
were not statistically different. Comparisons of variances at t-l, t, HI and H2 
time periods are also made. Again all differences were statistically at a 95% 
confidence interval except in the case of the SIMM and the ICAPM on event day 
t. This suggests that although the average abnormal return between these two 
models varies significantly for 2 out of 5 days in the event window, the variance 
do not. Since the variance of abnormal return does not differ significantly 
between the SIMM and the ICAPM, on the announcement date, this makes the 
use of SIMM or ICAPM increasingly desirable from the point of view of 
consistency. 
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In the larger context, this result has implications at the speculators and event 
traders' level, company level and the emerging markets development level. 
Figure 14 shows that trading volume growth has increased investor participation 
causing a redirection of funds to lowly capitalised firms trading on emerging 
markets. Assessment of event trading requires the prediction of expected returns 
under non-event conditions from which abnormal returns are derived. To attract 
investors, event traders need to demonstrate that returns generated need to exceed 
expected returns. 
Different market models show expected returns to be model specific. 
Consequently, the resultant abnormal returns become model specific. These 
findings give great scope to event traders claims of "beating" the market when 
infact the resultant abnorn1al returns may have been different had an alternative 
market model been applied. The implication for companies is equally 
fundamental. How are companies to portray their economic sentiment through 
announcements when the market is unable to gauge what the announcement 
impact actually is? Where announcements portray optimistic forecasts to instil 
confidence, the market is unable to translate the announcement and quantify this 
return. Problems of company announcement interpretation and contentions of 
market signalling arise. 
In established markets the ability to interpret the sentiment of company 
announcements has been questioned (De Bondt et al (1985)). In emergmg 
markets, this scenario is further compounded by the fact that there is no single 
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abnormal return. How are investors to know what the interpretation of company 
announcement actually is? The market-signalling problem can only be addressed 
once a consistent methodology for computing abnormal returns can be derived. 
These results may serve to add credibility to the over-reaction hypothesis as 
proposed by De Bondt et al (1985) and later by Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter 
(1992). The over-reaction hypothesis depicts consistent investor over-reaction to 
price sensitive surprises, which suggest a less than systematic approach by 
investors to announcement interpretation. Do investors not learn to interpret 
announcement impacts on abnormal returns based on previous experience? Event 
based abnormal returns under different equilibrium market model dispensation 
opens the possibility of abnormal returns being model specific. Thus, investors 
have no systematic way of determining the announcement effect on returns based 
on previous announcement impacts since different models gauge impacts 
differently. In established markets the choice of market model has been of only 
marginal consequence and the over-reaction is therefore far reduced. 
Chopra et al (1992) have demonstrated that the over-reaction hypothesis is far 
more prevalent for small firms which supports the idea of abnormal returns being 
model specific. Consequently, small firms need to be aware of the potential for 
mis-interpretation of their announcements by the investment community. Clearer 
announcements giving a clearer indication of company sentiment are needed. 
Since simultaneous announcements mitigate this problem, small firms should 
consider releasing announcements in and avoid clustering. A further impact of 
these findings may be on short-term fund flows to established markets. Emerging 
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markets development is defined, in part, by an increased flow of investment 
capital. Efficient financial inter-mediation attracts this capital to those companies 
where, on a risk-adjusted basis, shareholder wealth is maximised. If short-term 
emerging market returns cannot easily be quantified, the possibility of sub­
optimal investments being financed becomes likely which, in the long run, this 
may impact adversely on global growth. Until a definitive methodology is 
established to model short-term abnormal returns in lowly capitalised firms, a 
measured response is recommended to increased participation in emerging capital 
markets as well as in the trading on these markets in view of company news and 
events. 
In conclusion, a study was conducted to detect for differences in abnormal returns 
modelled under different equilibrium market model dispensations. The Single 
Index Market Model, Standard, Inflation and Consumption Capital Asset Pricing 
Model and Arbitrage Pricing Theory models were applied and a series of 
abnormal returns generated for events specific to AIM stocks over a five day 
event window. A comparison ofthe mean abnormal return under different models 
found that while SIMM, ICAPM, CCAPM and APT based results were not 
significantly different, SCAPM systematically underestimated the abnormal 
return. Since lowly capitalised firms tend to be symptomatic of instable betas, 
CAPM parameter mis-specification may have caused this. The variance of 
abnormal return was investigated over each of a 5 day event window and differed 
significantly for model to model for each of the days concerned. The exception to 
this was in the case of the Single Index Market Model and the Inflation based 
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CAPM two days prior to the announcement and on the days of the announcement 
itself. Since comparisons of the mean abnormal return may be distorted by the 
sign of the returns and outliers, an F test of difference of variance was conducted. 
ANOVA tests detect no difference in overall abnormal returns but variance of 
abnonnal returns within the sample detect differences at a 95% level of 
significance for each of the 5 days comprising the event window. This held true 
except in the case of the single index market model and the inflation based capital 
asset pricing model two days prior to and on the day of the announcement. 
Further, in the case of standard CAPM, the abnormal return was always opposite 
in sign as compared to the other models. This result has four important 
implications. 
From a methodology perspective, unlike event studies in highly capitalised firms 
where the choice of methodology is largely insignificant, in the case of lowly 
capitalised firms, abnormal returns under different market model dispensations 
result in significantly different results. 
Secondly, fund managers engaged in emergmg markets event trading face 
difficulty in justifying accrued returns to investors. Since different models render 
different abnormal returns, the choice of investment strategy in event trading 
becomes clouded. How do investors compare the performance of event traders 
when models produce different expected returns, thus confusing the benchmark 
for investors? So as to ensure an efficient benchmark for event trading 
performance in lowly capitalised stocks, a standard methodology needs to be used 
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as a benchmark. These results suggest that the single index market model and the 
inflation based CAPM render largely stable results. Standard CAPM is 
discounted on a statistical basis and on the theoretical basis that the small stock 
beta instability is high. (see Bowie & Bradfield (1998». Consumption CAPM 
based abnormal return appears unreliable since emerging stocks tend to be 
concentrated on specific segments rather than overall consumption. Newly 
formed UK emerging stocks in the 80's were dominated by property and private 
healthcare companies while in the 90's, high technology computing and internet 
stocks have dominated. APT based models may again be mis-specified since the 
defining parameters are macro-economic orientated which again prove 
inappropriate in modeling expected and abnormal returns in emerging markets. 
Thirdly, the issue of market signaling arises. An implication of not being able to 
reliably predict announcement impacts and adjust portfolio holdings accordingly 
leads to a confusion in the sentiment that companies endeavor to portray through 
these announcements. Investors adjust portfolio holdings differently in 
accordance with differing expectations based on different market models. 
Announcement sentiments meant to instill confidence are, at best, diluted and at 
worst, negated. 
Finally, the overreaction hypothesis as documented by De Bondt et al (1985) 
becomes more prevalent in emerging markets. Since models produce different 
expected returns, investors fail to learn the effects of previous event 
announcements since resultant returns are methodology specific. Investor's 
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overreaction does not diminish with time as a result of "learning" from events that 
have proceeded. While, in emerging markets, abnormal returns are more highly 
impacted by different equilibrium market models than established markets, the 
overreactions hypothesis is also more likely to be mitigated in these markets. 
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APPENDIX 2 LISTING OF AIM COMPANIES ANALYSED 
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Company Sub sector 
ACCESS PLUS Media Agencies 
AFA SYSTEMS Electronics 
AFRICAN GOLD Gold Mining 
AIM GROUP Manufacturing 
ALBEMARLE & Consumer Finance 
BOND HLDGS 
ALiZYME Medical Equipment & 
Supplies 
AMCO CORP Other Construction 
ANGLO-WELSH Leisure Facilities 
GROUP 
ANTONOV Auto Parts 
AORTECH Medical Equipment & 
INTERNATIONAL Supplies 
ASK CENTRAL Restaurants, Pubs & 
Breweries 
ATLANTIC CASPIAN Oil & Gas - Exploration 
RESOURCES & Production 
AUXINET Recruitment 
BEAUFORT Business Support 
INTERNATIONAL Services 
GROUP 
BIRCHIN Publishing & Printing 
INTERNATIONAL 
BIRMINGHAM CITY Leisure Facilities 
BOGOD GROUP Retailers 
C.A.COUTTS HLDGS Media Agencies 
CALEDONIAN Real Estate Holding & 
TRUST Development 
CAMBRIDGE Mining Finance 
MINERAL 
RESOURCES 
CHARLTON Leisure Facilities 
ATHLETIC 
CHARTERHOUSE Publishing & Printing 
COMMUNICATIONS 
CHELSEA VILLAGE Leisure Facilities 
CHORION Leisure Facilities 
COFFEE REPUBLIC Restaurants, Pubs & 
Breweries 

CONCURRENT Computer Hardware 

TECHNOLOGIES 

CON/STER TRUST Consumer Finance 

Country of Mkt Cap 
Origin £m 
UK 49.85 
UK 32.80 
UK 1.98 
UK 24.50 
UK 28.67 
UK 16.00 
UK 9.09 
UK 2.03 
UK 35.31 
UK 36.00 
UK 180.01 
UK 4.76 
UK 23 
UK 4.15 
UK 9.05 
UK 15.20 
UK 4.7 
UK 9.81 
UK 11.80 
UK 9.97 
UK 12.37 
UK 7.34 
UK 36.44 
UK 131.93 
UK 18 
UK 19.58 
UK 7.56 
DEEP-SEA LEISURE Leisure Facilities UK 8.16 
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DIGITAL Home Entertainment 
ANIMATIONS 
GROUP 
DOBBIES GARDEN Retailers - Hardlines 
CENTRES 
DRAGONS HEALTH Leisure Facilities 
CLUBS 
ELECTRONIC 
RETIREMENT 
SYSTEMS 
EPIC GROUP 
EQUATOR GROUP 
EURASIA MINING 
FARLAKE GP 
FAYREWOOD 
FEILDENS 
Electronics 
Publishing & Printing 
Broadcasting 
Contractors 
Mining Finance 
Real Estate Holding & 
Development 
Computer Hardware 
Manufacturing 
FLOMERICS GROUP Software 
FOUNTAINS Business Support 
Services 
GOLF CLUB Sports Facilities 
HOLDINGS 
GUITON GROUP 	 Publishing & Printing 
HAT PIN 	 Education, Business 
Training & Employment 
Agencies 
HIGHAMS SYSTEMS Education, Business 
SERVICES GROUP 
HURLINGHAM 
HYDRO-DYNAMIC 
PRODUCTS 
INTELLIGENT 
ENVIRONMENTS 
GROUP 
INTERNATIONAL 
GREETINGS 
JOHN LEWIS 
HUNGERFORD 
JUMBO 
INTERNATIONAL 
JUST GROUP 
KEYSTONE 
SOFTWARE 
Training & Employment 
Agencies 
Real Estate Holding & 
Development 
Chemicals - Speciality 
Software 
Publishing & Printing 
OF Furnishings & Floor 
Coverings 
Media Agencies 
Media Agencies 
Information Technology 
LADY IN LEISURE Leisure Facilities 
GROUP 
UK 

UK 

UK 

UK 

UK 

UK 

UK 

UK 

UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 

9.43 

41.50 

18 
20 
20.76 
4.20 
4.98 
241 
27.39 
1.5 
11.42 
12.91 
15 
55.53 
4.27 
2.84 
1.34 
0.77 
2.53 
93.26 
1.67 
1.97 
0.00 
14 
0.00 
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LAWRENCE Diversified Industrials UK 25.01 
LOFTUS ROAD Sports Facilities UK 9.5 
LONDON TOWN Property Agencies UK 14.54 
LONGBRIDGE Education, Business UK 1.71 
INTERNATIONAL Training & Employment 
Agencies 
MAJESTIC WINE Food & Drug Retailers UK 59.51 
MATRIX Hospital Management & UK 0.35 
HEALTHCARE Long Term Care 
MEARS GROUP Business Support UK 38.32 
Services 
MEGALOMEDIA Other Financial UK 19.48 
METRODOME Broadcasting UK 2.16 
GROUP Contractors 
MONDAS Software UK 5.63 
MOUNTCASHEL Investment Companies UK 4.47 
MULBERRY GROUP Clothing & Footwear UK 18.25 
MULTIMEDIA CORP Media Agencies UK 25 
MV SPORTS GROUP Leisure Equipment UK 11.94 
NETCALL Internet UK 4.77 
NEWMARK Security & Alarm UK 3.94 
TECHNOLOGY Services 
GROUP 
NMT GROUP Medical Equipment & UK 41.38 
Supplies 
NORTHERN Oil & Gas - Exploration UK 4.84 
PETROLEUM & Production 
NWF Retail UK 13 
ON-LINE Home Entertainment UK 2.64 
OXFORD Pharmaceuticals UK 14 
BIOMEDICA 
PATHFINDER Real Estate Holding & UK 9.17 
PROPERTIES 
PETRA DIAMONDS 
Development 
Other Mineral Bermuda 11.22 
Extractors & Mines 
PILAT Education, Business Israel 8.02 
TECHNOLOGIES Training & Employment 
INTERNATIONAL 
PNC TELE COM 
Agencies 
Telecommunications UK 14 
PRESTON NORTH Leisure Facilities UK 5.85 
END 
PUBS 'N' BARS Restaurants, Pubs & UK 9.65 
Breweries 
SOLID STATE Business Support UK 3.53 
SUPPLIES Services 
SOPHEON Software UK 21.72 
STAFFWARE 
SYSTEMS 
Information Technology 
INTEG Information Technology 
UK 
UK 
36 
0.4 
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RESEARCH 
SYSTEMS Software UK 4.56 
INTEGRATED 
RESEARCH 
SYSTEMS Information Technology UK 6 
INTERNATIONAL 
GROUP 
THEATHER & Consumer Finance UK 12 
GREENWOOD 
HOLDINGS 
THEO-FENNELL Household Appliances UK 5.18 
& Housewares 
THOMAS POTTS Publishing & Printing UK 10.57 
TRADEPOINT FIN Information Technology UK 7.8 
NETWORK 
TRINITY CARE Hospital Management & UK 10.50 
Long Term Care 
UA GROUP Retailers Multi UK 10.59 
Department 
UNIVENT Hospital Management & UK 2.97 
Long Term Care 
UNIVERSE GROUP Security & Alarm UK 10.25 
Services 
VFG Broadcasting UK 0.00 
Contractors 
VICTORY CORP Personal Products UK 21.91 
VOSS NET Internet UK 0.85 
WEEKS GROUP Business Support UK 8.19 
Services 
WEST 175 MEDIA Broadcasting USA 3.83 
GROUP INC Contractors 
WEST BROMWICH Leisure Facilities UK 6.75 
ALBION 
WESTERN Investment Companies UK 6.87 
SELECTION 
WESTMOUNT Oil & Gas - Exploration UK 6.92 
ENERGY & Production 
WINCHESTER Broadcasting UK 38.35 
ENTERTAINMENT Contractors 
XPERTISE GROUP Education, Business UK 3.97 
Training & Employment 
Agencies 
YEOMAN GROUP Computer Hardware UK 24.72 
347 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
APPENDIX 3 SKEWNESS/KURTOSIS TEST OUTPUT 
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APPENDIX 4 MEAN V ARIANCE ANALYSIS 
351 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
Analysis Of Mean And Variance When Controlling For Shareholder 
Concentration 
Table analysing the difference of means and variances of event returns 
For different shareholder concentration co­
efficients 
Announcement analysed;:: Acquisition Announcements 
Mean Variance t Stat t Critical two-tail 
Shareholder 
concentration 
comparison 
Event Window;:: t-2 a versus b 0.473891 4.921755 0.645994 2.262158887 
Event Window;:: t-1 a versus b 1.012252 5.34182 1.510243 2.16036824 
Event Window;:: t-O a versus b -0.62514 6.297353 -0.85379 2.228139238 
Event Window;:: t+1 a versus b 0.473891 4.921755 0.645994 2.262158887 
Event Window;:: t-6 a versus b 0.473891 4.921755 0.645994 2.262158887 
Event Window;:: t-2 a versus h 0.473891 4.921755 0.151904 2.109818524 
Event Window =t-1 a versus h 1.012252 5.34182 1.804573 2.228139238 
Event Window = t-O a versus h 0.97479 7.744528 0.005086 2.262158887 
Event Window;:: t+1 a versus h 0.473891 4.921755 0.645994 2.262158887 
Event Window;:: t-6 a versus h 0.473891 4.921755 0.645994 2.262158887 
Table analysing the difference of means and variances of event returns 
For different shareholder concentration co­
efficients 
Announcement analysed;:: Annual General Meetings Announcements 
Mean Variance t Stat t Critical two-tail 
Shareholder 
concentration 
comparison 
Event Window;:: t-2 a versus b -0.08608 0.148146 -1.03437 2.262158887 
Event Window;:: t-1 a versus b 0.867369 6.495949 0.58723 2.228139238 
Event Window;:: t-O a versus b 3.085508 54.97933 0.947823 2.446913641 
Event Window;:: t+1 a versus b -0.24829 0.81748 0.060477 2.228139238 
Event Window;:: t-6 a versus b -0.99443 6.963754 0.000449 2.16036824 
Event Window =t-2 a versus h -0.08608 0.148146 1.771848 2.306005626 
352 

Sudesh Ram Sangray, Doctoral Thesis October 2004 
Event Window =t-1 a versus h 0.867369 6.495949 -1.38145 2.178812792 
Event Window =t-O a versus h 3.085508 54.97933 0.289779 2.178812792 
Event Window =t+1 a versus h 
-0.24829 0.817480.179911 2.228139238 
Event Window = t-6 a versus h 
-0.99443 6.963754 -0.87084 2.306005626 
Event Window =t-2 b versus h 0.383818 1.481699 2.055416 2.228139238 
Event Window = t-1 b versus h 
-0.44851 32.74663 -1.51924 2.144788596 
Event Window = t-O b versus h 0.399576 1.409367 -0.73454 2.262158887 
Event Window = t+1 b versus h 
-0.29426 3.688479 0.035695 2.306005626 
Event Window = t-6 b versus h 
-0.99509 9.393236 -0.80978 2.262158887 
Table analysing the difference of means and variances of event returns 
For different shareholder concentration co­
efficients 
Announcement analysed 
=AP 
Mean Variance t Stat t Critical two-tail 
Shareholder 
concentration 
comparison 
Event Window = t-2 a versus b 
-0.36851 0.090649 65535 #NUM! 
Event Window = t-1 a versus b 
-0.14454 0.0021 -0.76133 #NUM! 
Event Window = t-O a versus b 0.008847 10.43153 0.265879 #NUM! 
Event Window =t+ 1 a versus b 0.538299 0.9771 1.408579 #NUM! 
Event Window = t-6 a versus b 3.059452 0.405576 6.01695 #NUM! 
Event Window = t-2 a versus h -0.36851 0.090649 -0.55659 2.446913641 
Event Window =t-1 a versus h -0.14454 0.0021 0.317437 2.570577635 
Event Window =t-O a versus h 0.008847 10.43153 -0.49103 4.302655725 
Event Window = t+1 a versus h 0.538299 0.9771 1.115583 3.182449291 
Event Window =t-6 a versus h 3.059452 0.405576 2.55738 2.446913641 
Event Window = t-2 b versus h -0.11599 #DlV/O! -0.26521 #NUM! 
Event Window =t-1 b versus h 0.173929 #DIV/O! 0.542325 #NUM! 
Event Window =t-O b versus h -0.56457 #DIV/O! -1.92079 #NUM! 
Event Window = t+1 b versus h -0.20791 #DIV/O! 0.737652 #NUM! 
Event Window = t-6 b versus h 0.047749 #DIV/O! -0.29153 #NUM! 
Event Window =t-2 h versus I 0.05591 3.216734 0.025167 2.570577635 

Event Window = t-1 h versus I -0.54268 9.432467 -0.45104 2.570577635 
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Event Window =t-O h versus I 1.280095 8.921209 1.060892 2.570577635 
Event Window = t+1 h versus I -0.47894 2.057434 -0.86987 2.570577635 
Event Window = t-6 h versus I 0.336188 5.586898 0.36087 2.570577635 
Table analysing the difference of means and variances of event returns 
For different shareholder concentration co­
efficients 
Announcement analysed = Chairmans 
Statement 
Mean Variance t Stat t Critical two-tail 
Shareholder 

concentration 

comparison 

Event Window = t-2 a versus h -0.36851 0.090649 -0.55659 2.446913641 

Event Window = t-1 a versus h -0.14454 0.0021 0.317437 2.570577635 

Event Window =t-O a versus h 0.008847 10.43153 -0.49103 4.302655725 

Event Window = t+1 a versus h 0.538299 0.9771 1.115583 3.182449291 

Event Window =t-6 a versus h 3.059452 0.405576 2.55738 2.446913641 

Event Window =t-2 h versus I 0.213919 2.75E-06 65535 #NUM! 

Event Window = t-1 h versus I 0.17724 0.000208 65535 

Event Window =t-O h versus I 0.091171 0.029321 65535 #NUM! 

Event Window =t+1 h versus I 0.201878 0.008427 65535 #NUM! 

Event Window =t-6 h versus I -22.0002 634.2583 -1.22531 #NUM! 

Table analysing the difference of means and variances of event returns 
For different shareholder concentration co­
efficients 
Announcement analysed = Contracts Awarded 
Mean Variance t Stat t Critical two-tail 
Shareholder 
concentration 
comparison 
Event Window = t-2 a versus h 0.158482 0.03042 -2.44355 12.7061503 
Event Window = t-1 a versus h 0.638255 0.19948 1.00779 12.7061503 
Event Window = t-O a versus h 0.746349 0.955666 11.94967 4.302655725 
Event Window = t+1 a versus h -3.81552 37.83048 -0.57508 12.7061503 
Event Window = t-6 a versus h -0.18441 0.702975 -3.79048 4.302655725 
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Event Window =t-2 h versus I 12.53676 51.30209 2.353301 12.7061503 
Event Window::;; t-1 h versus I -6.82521 109.5581 -1.34603 4.302655725 
Event Window::;; t-O h versus I -10.3781 1.096211 -4.17858 12.7061503 
Event Window::;; t+1 h versus I 5.735464 526.4379 0.265231 12.7061503 
Event Window =t-6 h versus I 3.150311 1.079316 3.871312 12.7061503 
Event Window =t-2 a versus I 0.158482 0.03042 -0.46168 12.7061503 
Event Window =t-1 a versus I 0.638255 0.19948 -0.91855 12.7061503 
Event Window =t-O a versus I 0.746349 0.955666 1.463854 12.7061503 
Event Window =t+1 a versus I -3.81552 37.83048 -1.33973 3.182449291 
Event Window =t-6 a versus I -0.18441 0.702975 -0.49543 3.182449291 
Table analysing the difference of means and variances of event returns 
For different shareholder concentration co­
efficients 
Announcement analysed =Director Changes 
Mean Variance t Stat t Critical two-tail 
Shareholder 
concentration 
comparison 
0.228409 0.361886 1.77704 2.570577635Event Window =t-2 a versus b 
0.698339 2.231135 0.840491 2.446913641Event Window =t-1 a versus b 
-0.02348 0.10978 -1.19666 3.182449291Event Window =t-O a versus b 
0.073788 2.457818 -0.34773 2.306005626Event Window = t+1 a versus b 
-1.82621 12.8818 -1.23468 2.570577635Event Window =t+2 a versus b 
0.228409 0.361886 -0.15144 2.446913641Event Window =t-2 a versus c 
0.698339 2.231135 1.232591 2.570577635Event Window =t-1 a versus c 
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Announcement analysed 
AP 
Mean Variance t Stat t Critical two-tail 
Shareholder concentration 
comparison 
Event Window =t-2 a versus b 
-0.37 0.09 0.00 0.00 
Event Window =t-1 a versus b 
-0.14 0.00 -0.76 0.00 
Event Window =t-O a versus b 0.01 10.43 0.27 0.00 
Event Window =t+1 a versus b 0.54 0.98 1.41 0.00 
Event Window =t-6 a versus b 3.06 0.41 6.02 0.00 
Event Window =t-2 a versus h 
-0.37 0.09 -0.56 2.45 
Event Window =t-1 a versus h 
-0.14 0.00 0.32 2.57 
Event Window =t-O a versus h 0.01 10.43 -0.49 4.30 
Event Window =t+1 a versus h 0.54 0.98 1.12 3.18 
Event Window =t-6 a versus h 3.06 0.41 2.56 2.45 
Event Window =t-2 b versus h 
-0.12 #DIV/Ol -0.27 0.00 
Event Window =t-1 b versus h 0.17 #DIV/Ol 0.54 0.00 
Event Window =t-O b versus h -0.56 #DIV/Ol -1.92 0.00 
Event Window =t+1 b versus h -0.21 #DIV/Ol 0.74 0.00 
Event Window =t-6 b versus h 0.05 #DIV/Ol -0.29 0.00 
Event Window =t-2 h versus t 0.06 3.22 0.03 2.57 
Event Window =t-1 h versus t -0.54 9.43 -0.45 2.57 
Event Window =t-O h versus t 1.28 8.92 1.06 2.57 
Event Window =t+1 h versus I -0.48 2.06 -0.87 2.57 
Event Window =t-6 h versus I 0.34 5.59 0.36 2.57 
Mean Variance t Stat t Critical two-tail 
Shareholder concentration 
comparison 
Event Window =t-2 a versus h -0.37 0.09 -0.56 2.45 
Event Window =t-1 a versus h -0.14 0.00 0.32 2.57 
Event Window =t-O a versus h 0.01 10.43 -0.49 4.30 
Event Window =t+1 a versus h 0.54 0.98 1.12 3.18 
Event Window =t-6 a versus h 3.06 0.41 2.56 2.45 
Event Window =t-2 h versus I 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Event Window =t-1 h versus I 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Event Window =t-O h versus I 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Event Window = t+1 h versus I 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Event Window =t-6 h versus I -22.00 634.26 -1.23 0.00 
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Announcement Analysed 
CON 
Mean Variance t Stat t Critical two-tail 
Shareholder concentration 
comparison 
Event Window = t-2 a versus h 0.16 0.03 -2.44 12.71 
Event Window = t-1 a versus h 0.64 0.20 1.01 12.71 
Event Window = toO a versus h 0.75 0.96 11.95 4.30 
Event Window = t+1 a versus h -3.82 37.83 -0.58 12.71 
Event Window = t-6 a versus h 
-0.18 0.70 -3.79 4.30 
Event Window = t-2 h versus I 12.54 51.30 2.35 12.71 
Event Window = t-1 h versus I -6.83 109.56 -1.35 4.30 
Event Window = toO h versus I -10.38 1.10 -4.18 12.71 
Event Window = t+1 h versus I 5.74 526.44 0.27 12.71 
Event Window = t-6 h versus I 3.15 1.08 3.87 12.71 
Event Window = t-2 a versus I 0.16 0.03 -0.46 12.71 
Event Window = t-1 a versus I 0.64 0.20 -0.92 12.71 
Event Window = toO a versus I 0.75 0.96 1.46 12.71 
Event Window = t+1 a versus I -3.82 37.83 -1.34 3.18 
Event Window = t-6 a versus I -0.18 0.70 -0.50 3.18 
Announcement Analysed 
DIR 
Mean Variance t Stat t Critical two-tail 
Shareholder concentration 
comparison 
Event Window = t-2 a versus b 0.23 0.36 1.78 2.57 
Event Window = t-1 a versus b 0.70 2.23 0.84 2.45 
Event Window = toO a versus b -0.02 0.11 -1.20 3.18 
Event Window = t+1 a versus b 0.07 2.46 -0.35 2.31 
Event Window = t+2 a versus b -1.83 12.88 -1.23 2.57 
Event Window = t-2 a versus c 0.23 0.36 -0.15 2.45 
Event Window = t-1 a versus c 0.70 2.23 1.23 2.57 
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